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1 INTRODUCTION AND FRAMEWORK 
1.1 Introduction and Motivation  
Stock exchanges in the past three decades have witnessed a ‘foreign cross-
listing’ phenomenon, whereby the stocks of firms not only trade on their local 
exchanges but also on other foreign international exchanges. This 
internationalization of trading has attracted extensive attention from academia to 
understand the dynamics of multi-market trading (Karolyi, 1998; 2006) as more 
companies opt for foreign cross-listing for its financial, operational and governance 
benefits (King and Segal, 2008) and more international investors trade these stocks 
for the promising portfolio diversification rewards (Domowitz et al, 2001).   
Depository Receipts(DRs) are considered the most common method for 
foreign cross-listing.  They trade on a foreign stock exchange as claims against the 
underlying stocks of the company on the local stock exchange. The DRs are issued 
by a trust bank that holds those underlying stocks on behalf of investors. While DRs 
are usually denominated in US dollars (USD), their underlying stocks trade in the 
currency of the local market. DRs that are listed on US exchanges are referred to as 
American DRs (ADRs) while DRs listed on international exchanges outside the US 
are usually referred to as Global DRs (GDRs).  
Except for their location of trade and currency denomination, the DR and its 
underlying stock have similar claims against the company’s cash flows and are also 
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fully convertible to one another; an important feature referred to as fungibility. These 
characteristics make the DR and the underlying stock to be essentially identical 
securities and we expect them to be priced with the same fundamentals.  
Academic researchers in asset pricing and multi-market microstructure have 
increasingly become interested in examining the pricing behavior of DRs relative to 
their underlying stock. They use the results of such analyses as an indicator of 
whether foreign cross-listing promotes stock market integration, by enhancing cross-
market linkages, versus an argument of greater fragmentation, due to the 
competition between stock exchanges over share of trading in cross-listed securities.  
Understanding the role of DRs in stock market integration is important as 
they are increasingly dominating the world of foreign listing. By the first half of 2011, 
over 3400 companies from 80 different countries were foreign listed on major 
international stock markets as DRs, with New York and London attracting the 
largest number of DR listing. More than 80.5 billion DRs were trading on 
international exchanges during that period with a value of  $1.91 trillion (BNYM, 
2011). DRs from emerging markets make up over 70% of listed DRs trading on 
international exchanges, yet research on them tends to be limited to periods of 
financial and economic crises. In this thesis, we focus on the pricing behavior of 
DRs from emerging markets.   
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Our lack of knowledge about how prices of DRs from emerging markets 
relate to their underlying stock is hampered by two main factors: first, the lack of 
quality data on the underlying stocks trading in emerging stock markets required for 
such analysis (Karolyi, 2006) and second, the trading barriers that exist in those 
markets and which are hypothesized to distort the theoretical pricing relationship 
between the DR and its underlying stock.  
The purpose of this thesis is to further our understanding of the pricing 
behavior of DRs and their underlying stocks using a sample of DRs from emerging 
markets in presence of trading barriers and making use of a proprietary high 
frequency intraday dataset.  The first analysis of this thesis  examines the 
fundamental economic relationship that ties both securities: the law of one price 
(LOOP). Since both securities have identical claims on the cash flows of the same 
asset, the LOOP should ensure that they are identically priced in the long run.  
Yet, since each security trades on a different market, differential market co-
movements, investor sentiment and noise trading can cause prices to diverge in the 
short term. This can create arbitrage opportunities for active arbitrageurs who can 
intervene to make risk free profits. Our second empirical methodology focuses on 
identifying whether arbitrage opportunities exist between emerging market DRs and 
their underlying stock, especially in presence of large trading barriers that was so 
hypothesized to hamper such activity. The analysis uses a unique high frequency 
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Figure  1-1 The Pricing Behavior of DRs: Comparing Methodologies 
intraday dataset to identify whether arbitrage opportunities exist and to establish 
whether arbitrage trades play a role in restoring price parity.  
We establish the important role of arbitrageurs in restoring prices to their 
fundamental values and in keeping prices from drifting away from a common 
efficient implicit price. This allows us to examine the last empirical question of this 
thesis, which is whether the local or foreign market plays a more dominant role in 
the pricing of emerging market DR. This question focuses on the price discovery 
process of DRs and their underlying stocks which is a key function of stock 
exchanges. Figure 1 provides an overview of the empirical framework of this thesis.  
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1.2 The Pricing Behavior of Depository Receipts 
This dissertation consists of three empirical examinations on the pricing 
behavior of DRs from emerging markets. Firstly, it examines the basic fundamental 
relationship governing the pricing of emerging market DRs and their underlying 
stock: that of the LOOP. Secondly, we carry out a static analysis of the pricing 
behavior through an intraday arbitrage analysis which examines whether arbitrage 
opportunities exist between the cross-listed securities during overlapping trading 
hours and the role of arbitrage trades in restoring price parity. Thirdly, we conduct a 
more dynamic analysis that measures the role of the local versus foreign market in 
the price discovery process of the cross-listed securities.  
This section gives a brief summary of each type of analysis and the main 
results of this dissertation.  
1.2.1 The Law of One Price  
The first empirical methodology tests whether the LOOP holds between the 
DR and the underlying stock. Economic theory stipulates that identical goods should 
trade at identical prices and this approach conducts a long term test of price parity to 
confirm stock market integration and efficiency.  
While a popular empirical methodology that dominated early studies on the 
pricing behavior of DRs, the analysis is confined by several limitations. First, testing 
the law of one price involves a direct comparison between the price of the DR and 
the underlying stock. Early studies, relying on comparing daily closing prices, confuse 
6 
 
price parity with lack of arbitrage opportunities in the DR market. Their analysis 
suffers from non-contemporaneousness due to the trading hour differences between 
markets and thus give nor real indication of whether arbitrage opportunities exist or 
not.  Second, a rejection of price parity between the DR and its underlying stock 
does not necessarily mean that both securities are not priced by similar factors. Since 
various market microstructure differences and trading barriers might exist between 
the foreign and local market, those price differences might reflect such barriers 
rather than a lack of price efficiency.  
We conduct an empirical analysis on whether the LOOP holds between 
Egyptian cross-listed securities using daily closing prices and relying on the common 
methodology in the literature. Since Egyptian stocks are cross-listed on the London 
Stock Exchange, this is the first test of the LOOP on companies cross-listed on 
exchanges outside of the US.  Other characteristics of the Egyptian sample that make 
such analysis useful, are the different trading week in Egypt and London as well as 
assessing the abolishment of a fixed exchange rate regime on the pricing of DRs 
relative to their underlying stock.  
The results of our empirical analysis reveals large deviations from price parity 
between Egyptian DRs and their underlying stock. This result, while indicating lack 
of full integration between stock markets trading the same assets, cannot be 
interpreted as a situation of market inefficiency. The large trading barriers and 
microstructure characteristics present in the local Egyptian market can cause market 
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segmentation between the local and foreign market which prevents full convergence 
in prices. Moreover, in order to conclude with certainty whether those large price 
deviations are indeed arbitrage opportunities,  we need to delve deeper into the 
process of arbitrage, which is only captured using intraday high frequency data 
(Suarez, 2005; Gagnon and Karolyi, 20101).  
1.2.2 Arbitrage Operations 
The second approach directly tests whether arbitrage opportunities exist 
between a DR and its underlying stock. This methodology stems from the argument 
that price parity should be ensured by active arbitrageurs in the market who act on 
any mispricing. When arbitrageurs find that prices between the DR and the 
underlying stock diverge, they will intervene by buying the underpriced security, 
selling the overpriced one and using the fungibility between both securities to close 
their positions, making risk free profits in the process.  
The arbitrage operation involved in DRs is a very unique situation in equity 
markets since it is instantaneous similar to the foreign exchange market. Unlike dual 
listed stocks, mutual funds and exchange traded funds, any deviation between the 
DR and its underlying stock does not require risky convergence trading whereby 
arbitrageurs have to wait for prices to close.  
Defining a price deviation between the DR and its underlying stock as an 
arbitrage opportunity requires two conditions. First, that both the foreign and local 
market are open at the same time so that arbitrageurs can instantly profit from any 
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deviation in prices. Second,  due to trading costs,  not all price deviations between 
the DR and the underlying stock are worth arbitraging, creating a no-arbitrage band 
inside which DR prices deviate from their underlying stock without being profitable 
arbitrage opportunities.  
These conditions entail that studies trying to identify whether arbitrage 
opportunities exist, have to rely on intraday data that capture the hours during which 
the DR and its underlying stock are trading at the same time. They should also 
account for all arbitrage trading costs involved in order to properly identify arbitrage 
opportunities. Both conditions make studies in this area so far very scarce.  
In fully informationally efficient markets, the mere threat of an arbitrage 
opportunity should keep the prices of DRs and their underlying stock at par. In 
financial markets the ‘word out there’ is that arbitrage opportunities between DRs 
and their underlying stock are frequent and that arbitrageurs make ‘good money’. So 
far, empirical studies that can validate this notion are lacking.  
The second methodology we employ in this thesis for examining pricing 
behavior of DRs studies whether arbitrage opportunities exist between DRs and 
their underlying stocks and analyzes the role of arbitrage trades in the price 
convergence process. The empirical analysis was facilitated by the use of a high 
frequency dataset that consists of approximately two years of intraday transaction 
data for two emerging markets with trading barriers: Egypt and Argentina.  The 
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unique features of our markets and the characteristics of the dataset required several 
modifications from the traditional methodology involved in studying the pricing 
behavior of DRs relative to their underlying stock.  
We find that not only do arbitrage opportunities exist between our sample of 
emerging market DRs and their underlying stock, but that arbitrage trades played an 
important role in restoring prices to equilibrium (defined as a band of price 
deviations inside which arbitrage is not profitable) . We extract real arbitrage trades 
form our intraday transaction data which reveals that arbitrageurs are active and 
profit considerably from large mispricing between the DR and its underlying stock.  
While the benefits of the arbitrage analysis in understanding the relationship 
between prices of the DR and its underlying stock is that it does not suffer from any 
joint hypothesis problems of relying on certain pricing models, its limitation is that it 
is a static form of analysis doesn’t capture the evolution of prices. A price discovery 
model that can capture where the price is determined, locally or internationally, 
provides some useful insights on the role of the foreign market in pricing DRs.  
1.2.3 Price Discovery  
Finally, we conduct a price discovery analysis to establish whether the foreign 
or local market plays the more dominant role in the pricing of DRs. When securities 
trade in different stock markets, the question of where the price is determined 
amongst the competing trading venues provides an important analysis on the extent 
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to which information that arises in the new overseas market contributes to price 
discovery.  
The role of the foreign market in the pricing of the local stock can provide us 
with insights on how information flows travel and the role DRs play in enhancing 
stock market linkages. Our analysis of how the international market contributes to 
price discovery process of cross-listed stocks has been facilitated by the multi-market 
price discovery models of Gonzalo and Granger (GG) (1995) and Hasbrouck (1995) 
which have initially been empirically applied in studies on the role of regional 
exchanges in pricing of US equities and then adopted by the multi-market literature 
to measure the contribution of the foreign stock exchange in the price discovery of 
cross-listed stock.  
However, the main obstacle to the application of such models is that they 
can only be properly operationalized with high frequency data. This makes our 
understanding of price discovery in a multi-market setting mostly guided by  a 
number of fragmented studies across different settings, time frames and 
methodologies. While most studies so far have found that the local market continues 
to dominate the price determination process, with the foreign market acting as a 
satellite to the local one, the result depends on the share of trading that migrates to 
the international market.  
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Our objective is to measure the contribution of the local versus foreign stock 
exchange in price discovery of Egyptian and Argentinean cross-listed stocks using 
the high frequency intraday dataset we employ in this thesis. Such an analysis is 
motivated by the lack of price discovery studies on emerging market DRs that are 
foreign listed on international exchanges.  
Our methodology employs the Component Share methodology of Gonzalo 
and Granger that relies on estimating a vector error correction model between the 
DR and underlying stock price, while accounting for exchange rate movements. 
Before estimating the GG model, we first establish that for all of our sample the DR 
and its underlying stock are co-integrated and thus they are linked by long term 
international arbitrage linkages, a results which we verified by our arbitrage analysis.  
 Our results indicate that whereas the local market for Egyptian securities is 
the dominant market for price discovery, the price for Argentinean securities is 
determined in both the local and US stock markets, to the extent that for some 
stocks the local market acts as a pure satellite to the international exchange.  We 
believe this evidence to be the first of its kind in DRs and corroborates Eun and 
Sabherwal’s (2003) results on dual-listed Canadian stocks. We find that liquidity, 
volume of trade, and market capitalization are all significant variables that are 
dynamic, that evolve over time, and that explain the share of price discovery.  
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1.3 Thesis Strucutre 
This thesis is organized as follow. Chapter 2 provides an in-depth literature 
review of studies on the pricing behavior of DRs. We present our sample of 
emerging markets and the dataset we employ in this work in Chapter 3.  
The articles that make up the core of this thesis are presented in Chapters 4-6. 
Chapter 4 presents our first empirical study on the Law of One Price titled: “The Law 
of One Price in Global Depository Receipts: Empirical Evidence from Egyptian GDRs”. 
(accepted for publication in Middle Eastern Finance and Economics). Chapter 5 
presents our second empirical study entitled “The Proof is in the Pudding: Arbitrage is 
Possible in Limited Markets: Intraday Evidence from the Depository Receipts of Emerging 
Markets”.(Submitted to Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and 
Money) We present our price discovery study in Chapter 6 entitled “An Investigation of 
Intraday Price Discovery in Cross-Listed Emerging Market Equities”. (Submitted to 
Investment Analysts Journal) 
Finally Chapter 7 provides a General Discussion of our findings and avenues for 






2  LITERATURE REVIEW  

In this section, we start by giving an overview of the organization and trading 
of DRs. We then summarize studies on the pricing behavior of DRs by arranging 
them around the following three questions: (1) Does the law of one price hold 
between the DR and the underlying stock? (2) Are there really arbitrage 
opportunities in the market for DRs? and finally (3) where does price discovery 
occur for internationally traded DRs?  
While much research has been dedicated to the first issue, studies that 
address the last two questions tend to be mostly guided by data availability, leaving 
us with a number of fragmented studies across different settings, time frames and 
methodologies. Our objective is thus not only to present the main results of studies 
on the pricing behavior of depository receipts, but to take a more critical approach 
that highlights the differences in data and methodologies. 
This review allows us to draw a roadmap for studying pricing behavior of 
DRs from emerging markets. We start by giving an overview on DR trading and 
organization and then review the literature on the three questions.  
2.1. Overview of Depository Receipt Trading 
 The New York Stock Exchange and the London Stock Exchange are the two 
largest stock exchanges that host DR trading, comprising 34% and 18% of total DR 
listings on the 12 international exchanges around the world, respectively. DRs 
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trading in the U.S. go by the name of American Depositary Receipts (ADRs), while 
in London and other countries outside the US, they are generally called Global 
Depository Receipts (GDR). Every DR is a claim on a one or more of the underlying 
stock, which is set by the ‘bundling ratio’ of the DR.   
 Investors can easily exchange DRs to their underlying stocks, a process 
referred to by ‘fungibility’. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) describe the characteristics of 
a fully fungible security some of which include no legal restrictions on cross-border 
ownership and trading, seamless trading between the foreign and home markets and 
the freedom for investors to hold the underlying stock or the DR.  
 The process through which DRs are issued (or cancelled) from their 
underlying stock involves the conversion of local stock to DRs (or vice versa) and 
requires the interaction of several parties1. Suppose an investor in London wants to 
buy 200 GDRs of the Japanese company Fujitsu which is trading on the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange . He can either buy them directly through the LSE or can instruct 
his broker to issue new GDRs through the following process:   
1. The investor contacts his broker in London with the request.  
2. The broker contacts a local broker in Tokyo to buy 1000 stocks of the 
underlying stock (since 1 GDR of Fujitsu is made up of 5 local stocks) on the 
Tokyo stock exchange.  

1 The process described here is adapted from Bank of New York Mellon website (www.bnymellon.com)  
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3. The local broker will deposit the stocks in a Custodian Bank. 
4. The Custodian bank will contact a Depository Bank with the instructions to 
issue 200 GDRs and deliver it to the broker in London. 
5. Finally the broker delivers the GDRs in the investor’s name in London.  
 The GDR holder can later trade those GDRs on the LSE or can cancel them 
(through a process similar to the one described above) and the underlying shares can 
be sold on the Tokyo Stock Exchange. The latter process will cause a ‘flowback’ of 
the GDR to the local market, which is hypothesized to rarely occur unless the 
volume of trading on the GDR in the foreign market is very low.   
The biggest challenge to studying the pricing behavior of depository receipts in 
relation to their underlying stocks is the time difference between the international 
exchange in which the DR trades and the local exchange in which trading on the 
underlying stock occurs. Appendix 1 of this thesis presents a summary of all DRs 
from different countries that are traded on international exchanges. We have also 
compiled data related to the trading hours of the underlying stock on the local 
exchange as well as the DR on the international exchange, outlining the total number 
of overlapping trading hours2 between the local and foreign market.   

2 The overlapping trading hours presented are not fixed but change across the year with daily light saving (DST) schemes. They 
are intended for illustration purposes only and researchers interested in specific markets should obtain exact timings for DST to 
adjust hours accordingly.  
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2.2. The Law of One Price(LOOP)  in Depository Receipts 
2.2.1. Introduction 
The Law of One Price is sometimes considered the ‘second law of 
economics’ and  entails that identical goods trade at identical prices. The mechanism 
that ensures that the LOOP holds is referred to as arbitrage, whereby the arbitrageur 
simultaneously purchases the underpriced security and sells the overpriced security to 
make riskless profit.  
 The DR market provides for an interesting context to test whether the 
LOOP holds since the DR and its underlying stock are essentially identical  and 
fungible security. This motivated studies as early as the 1980s to try to test this 
hypothesis. We mention the most important ones in this section.  
2.2.2. Summary of Studies 





         (Eq 2.1) 
where ௧ܲ஽ோ is the price of the DR in listed on the foreign exchange in the 
foreign currency (usually USD), ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞is price of the underlying stock in the local 
market in local currency, b is the bundling ratio or the number of stocks 
that make up one DR and ୲ is the Foreign/Local Currency exchange rate. For 
simplicity we will refer to the adjusted stock price ௉೟
ೄ೟೚೎ೖכ௕
ௌ೟
  as ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ᇱ 
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Testing equation 2.1 is usually done by testing the null hypothesis that the 
difference between prices ௧ܲ஽ோ and ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ᇱ is not significantly different from zero. 
Table 2.1 summarizes the difference measures for price deviation used to test this 
hypothesis. Studies that rely on econometric models (see below) to measure the 
speed of prices to converge to price parity also use differences in returns rather than 
prices  as an equivalent measure for parity since returns have better statistical 
properties for estimation using econometric models.  
INSERT TABLE 2.1 HERE 
Early studies find that price parity holds between developed market 
depository receipts and their underlying stock (Maldonado and Saunders, 1983; Kato 
et al, 1991; Park and Tavakkol, 1994). These early studies suffer, however, from two 
main limitations. First, the focus on small samples from developed market DRs and 
second, they suffer from asynchronousity, since stock markets have different trading 
hours around the world and they compares use daily closing prices from markets 
with no or little trading overlap. This motivated more recent studies on the issue, 
which find that indeed the LOOP is violated, especially in emerging market DRs.   
Two main factors explain this break from this theoretical relationship : Trading 
Barriers and Special Events.  
2.2.2.1. Trading Barriers and the LOOP 
More recent studies, however, challenge the early result that the LOOP holds 
in the DR market, arguing that trading barriers can prevent prices between the DR 
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and its underlying stock from being perfeclty aligned. Those trading barriers include 
non-overlapping trading hours, large trading costs, capital controls, short selling 
restriction, foreign ownership restriction and regulatory restriction on fungibility 
between the DR and its underlying stock. We discuss these next.  
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) provide the largest study of  the LOOP yet. They 
study ADRs from the 39 countries over the period between 1993 and 2002. They 
overcome the limitation of early studies of price parity, which compare closing prices 
that do not occur at the same point in time,  by using the intraday price of the ADR 
that corresponds to the closing time of the local market and compare this intraday 
DR price to the closing prices on the local stock. Despite overcoming non-
contemporaneousness of their dataset, they find evidence of the existence of price 
deviations for most stocks.  Although the prices of the cross-listed stocks and those 
of the home-market stocks lie within a 20 to 85 basis point band of each other, but, 
for some stocks, they can range from a 66 percent premium to an 87 percent 
discount.  
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) find that holding and trading costs explain the 
large deviations from price parity. Trading costs create a band of price deviation 
between the DR and underlying stock price inside-which are not profitable to 
arbitrage away. They also note that the violation of price parity can be explained by 
the wide range of institutional market frictions and trading barriers including short 
sales restriction, capital controls, foreign ownership restriction and restrictions on 
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DR-home share fungibility that exist in different countries. Several studies study the 
effect of each type of trading barrier on the pricing of DRs separately.  
Domowitz et al (2001) foreign ownership restrictions in Mexican foreign 
cross-listed stocks cause significant deviations between the DR and the underlying 
stock.  This clear violation of the LOOP is due to the effect of the foreign 
ownership restrictions that cause the a ‘demand differential hypothesis’ whereby 
foreign and domestic investors have different valuations of cash flows of firms.  
Similarly Indian DRs have attracted the attention of researchers, since they 
traded at large premiums to their underlying stock, which were explained by foreign 
ownership and fungibility restrictions. Lamont and Thaler’s (2003) and 
Puthenpurackal (2006) study the interesting case of the remarkable price discrepancy 
of the Indian IT company Infosys, which due to the restrictions of trade on the local 
stock by foreigners as well as the lack of convertibility between the DR and its stock, 
the DR was priced at a 136% premium to the local share. This was mainly explained 
by American investor enthusiasm about the stock (which could be driven by 
increased investor sentiment to buy in a stock that is not correlated to their 
portfolios) and the limitations to arbitrageurs to make use of the price discrepancy to 
make riskless profits.  
On the effect of foreign exchange and ownership restrictions, Rabinovitch et 
al (2003) study the pricing of Argentinean and Chilean ADRs relative to their 
underlying shares during periods of such restrictions. While prices did deviate, they 
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converged to parity rather quickly, as measured by a self-exciting threshold 
autoregressive model (SETAR) that takes into consideration trading costs by 
measuring the speed by which large price deviations resort to equilibrium. They 
argue however, that this was due to the contemporaneous trading hours of the US 
and both South American countries, which allows arbitrage activity to take place to 
close such gaps.  
Auguste et al (2006) and Yeyati et al (2008) study the effect of capital 
controls on the pricing of ADRs. August et al (2006) find that the ADRs of the large 
stocks in Argentina were used as means for capital flight, which caused the ADRs to 
trade at premiums to the local stocks since the factors that determine demand for 
cross-listed stocks in the home market may diverge from those in the foreign market 
resulting in a discrepancy between the two prices. Yeyati et al (2008) find that capital 
controls segment the local from the foreign market. Controls on outflows induce 
cause DRs to trade at discounts to their underlying stock, while controls on inflows 
generate premiums on DRs. Despite this, they find that price deviations across 
markets are rapidly arbitraged away particularly so for liquid stocks.  
Finally, another hypothesized barrier to price parity is short selling, since it is 
argues to hamper arbitrage activity. An arbitrageur who wants to profit instantly 
from a mispricing in DRs, would buy the underpriced security, short sell the 
overpriced security and lock in the profit. He can thereafter close the short sale 
position by converting the security he bought to the other one, facilitated by the 
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fungibility feature of DRs. Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) argue that one reason for 
observing large price deviations from parity in cross-listed emerging market equity is 
the short selling restriction which prevent arbitrage from taking place.  
More recent evidence on short selling by Blau et al (2012) show that short 
sellers more heavily trade ADRs from countries where short selling is prohibited 
than from markets where short selling is allowed because these ADRs are more often 
subject to temporary misevaluation. The action of these short sellers can actually 
create large deviations from parity to the underlying stock. Whether arbitrageurs are 
able to correct such deviations is yet to be empirically tested.     
2.2.2.2. Special Events and the LOOP 
Another explanation for the existence of price deviation are breaks from the 
LOOP that are observed around special events. Two studies are worth mentioning 
here. First, Blouin et al (2005) study the unexpected reduction in U.S. capital gains 
taxes at the announcement of the 1997 budget accord, which changed the pricing of 
cross-listed stocks relative to their underlying home country stocks, widening the 
gaps by an average of 40 basis points. 
Second, Pasquariello (2008) shows that financial crisis has an effect on the 
LOOP by studying the mispricing of ADRs relative to their underlying stocks during 
financial crises in Mexico, East Asia, Russia, Brazil, Turkey, and Argentina. He 
identified persistent breaks in the LOOP before and during the crises and concludes 
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that during financial crises, the market for emerging ADRs became on average less 
efficient and more segmented than during more tranquil times. 
2.3. Arbitrage  
2.3.1. Introduction 
Theoretically under market efficiency arguments, arbitrage operations have an 
important function since they drive prices towards their fundamental valuations and 
enforce the law of one price (Fama, 1965; Madhavan, 2000; Ross, 2001). The most 
common textbook definition of arbitrage is the simultaneous purchase and sale of 
equivalent assets in two different markets in order to profit from discrepancies in 
their price relationship (Sharpe and Alexander, 1990 and Bodie, Kane and Marucs, 
2006).  
Whenever a deviation between the price of two equivalent assets appears, 
arbitrageurs should enter the market to bring back prices to parity. Arbitrage 
strategies are not unique however, and depend on the mechanisms that link the two 
equivalent assets.  
Equivalent assets can be either two identical assets trading in different markets or 
perfect substitutes. As Scholes explains “the shares a firm sells are not unique works 
of art but abstract rights to an uncertain income stream for which close counterparts 
exist either directly or indirectly via combinations of assets of various kinds” (1972, 
p. 179) The arbitrage strategy between equivalent shares depends on two factors: 
Time and Substitutability.  
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2.3.2. Arbitrage Strategies 
When two securities are perfect substitutes of each other and trade during the 
same time, the arbitrage strategies should  require neither capital nor entail any risk. 
As soon as a price deviation is observed between these securities, an arbitrage 
operation is carried out in real time to close the gap. The presence of these ‘pure 
arbitrage strategies’ is the foundation of the major asset pricing theories as well as 
price discovery models. In financial markets, pure arbitrage operations can only be 
carried out in a limited number of contexts mainly in the foreign exchange market 
and in DRs, since DRs are fully convertible to their underlying stock.  
When identical assets are not fully substitutable, arbitrageurs have to rely on risky 
arbitrage strategies involving opposite positions in the two assets, while waiting for 
prices to converge. Such a strategy takes place in financial markets between dual 
listed stocks (which trade in different markets and cannot be exchanged to one 
another) as well as mutual and exchange traded funds and their underlying stocks.  It 
also takes place in DRs that trade during different trading hours than the underlying 
stock.  
This section will discuss the difference between the pure and risky arbitrage 
strategy.  
2.3.2.1. Pure Arbitrage Strategy 
In a pure arbitrage an investor can make profits from the price divergence 






ฬ ൐ Ͳ      (Eq 2.2) 
When the DR is trading at a higher price than the underlying stock (i.e. 
premium), they short sell the DR and simultaneously they buy the local stock, 
deposit it at a custodian and have the depository issue a DR. Consequently they can 
sell the DR at a price higher than what they paid for to create it. The opposite is true 
in case the DR is selling at a lower price (i.e. discount). The arbitrageur can buy the 
DR and short sell the local stock, instructs the depositor to release the stocks in the 
local market, then close the short sale position by returning the stock and lock in the 
profit net of transaction costs involved. This pure arbitrage occurs when it is usually 
easy and straightforward to break open a DR and release the underlying locally listed 
stocks, making the two stocks fungible. (Miller and Morey, 1996; Savasoglu, 2000) 
In reality, however, riskless pure arbitrage can never occurs since the real world 
of market frictions and imperfect information (and the cost of obtaining such 
information) may discourage an arbitrageur (Merton, 1987). Even in complete 
absence of any restriction to arbitrage, arbitrage operations can be costly (Pontiff, 
1996). Time zone differences, transaction costs and prolonged settlement periods are 
some of those risks that are involved with above described arbitrage process. For 
example transactions costs create an arbitrage band around a security’s equilibrium 
value. (Kato et al, 1991) As such, in order for the arbitrage to be lucrative, the price 
differential has to exceed the cost; that is arbitrageurs will only define a price 
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ฬ ൐ ݇       (Eq 2.3) 
 Moreover, it is hypothesized that a short selling restriction on the local stock 
should prevent arbitrage when the DR is selling at a discount to the stock, since 
arbitrageurs cannot short sell the local stock.  
2.3.2.2. Risky Arbitrage Strategies 
Sometimes the simultaneous buying and selling of DRs and the underlying 
stocks cannot be achieved. This can be due to non-overlapping trading hours and 
long settlement periods (Kato et al, 1991); as well as trading restrictions such as 
limits on fungibility (Savasoglu, 2000). Thus, when prices of DR and the underlying 
stocks diverge, arbitrageurs engage in risky arbitrage. If the DR is trading at a 
premium, the arbitrageur can short the DR and buy the underlying stock. Instead of 
making instant profits, he has to wait for prices to converge. The prices will converge 
if the joint distribution of the DR and the underlying stock is stationary (Hong and 
Susmel, 2003). 
Risky arbitrage falls under the category identified by Bondarenko (2003) as a 
‘statistical arbitrage’. Bondarenko (2003) defines a Statistical Arbitrage 
Opportunity(SAO) as “a zero-cost trading strategy for which (i) the expected payoff 
is positive, and (ii) the conditional expected payoff in each final state of the economy 
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is nonnegative.” Unlike a pure arbitrage opportunity, a SAO can have negative 
payoffs provided that the average payoff in each final state is nonnegative. This form 
of arbitrage is used frequently by hedge funds to make profits out of statistical mis-
pricings or price relationships that are true in expectation, in the long run when 
repeating a trading strategy. 
2.3.3. Summary of Studies 
Because of the two arbitrage strategies described above, one might expect 
that DR prices ‘should be aligned with their underlying currency adjusted equivalent 
in the home market’ (Karolyi, 2006). When deviations exist between the price of the 
DR and that of the underlying asset, the DR is said to be ‘mis-priced’.  
Thus, arbitrage occurs if it is possible to buy in one market and sell in the 
other at a higher price net of transaction costs. Since such a activity occurs during 
the overlapping trading period between the foreign and local market, high frequency 
intraday data is required to capture arbitrage at the frequency in-which it occurs. 
Academic studies have thus gauged market efficiency tests by examining whether 
there are unexploited arbitrage opportunities in the DR market, but  tend to be very 
limited due to lack of quality intraday data.  
The first real study on arbitrage opportunities in the DR market is that of 
Miller and Morey (1996) who were the first to use high frequency data for only 
company (Glaxo Wellcome PLC) listed on the LSE and its ADR. They found that 
the price difference in the two markets is small throughout their 2-month sample. 
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The second study is that of Suarez (2005a) who finds that 2% of the 
deviations measured from his high frequency data set, where outside a no-arbitrage 
band that accounts for transaction costs. He makes use of these excess deviations 
through a trading rule to reach profits of $70,000. These profits are very small and 
infrequent that he argues are not incentive enough to hire an arbitrageur to monitor 
the market. He notes that these profits came out of a set of highly traded developed 
market stocks, and hypothesizes that emerging market stocks can provide larger 
deviation and more profitable arbitrage.  
Using trading strategies to pinpoint the profits from the price deviations is an 
interesting approach, since it provides a quantifiable analysis of forgone arbitrage. It 
also highlights the economic significance of the anomaly, since as Jensen (1978) 
argued, if anomalous return behavior is not definitive enough for an efficient trader 
to make money trading on it, then it is not economically significant. However, these 
studies do not attempt to find the reasons for the existence of arbitrage 
opportunities in the first place.  
This area of research provides a promising venue since so far evidence on 
arbitrage opportunities in the DR market is not clear. Moreover, while several studies 
hypothesize that less liquid stocks, like those from emerging markets, could present 
more profitable opportunities, so far an empirical test has not been carried out due 
to data unavailability.  
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2.3.4. Why do Arbitrage Opportunities Arise? 
Following a traditional view of frictionless economies, stocks move due to a co-
movement in their fundamentals. Thus, DRs and their underlying stocks should 
move together since they are claims on identical future cash flows. However, an 
alternative view that takes market frictions, noise trading and limits to arbitrage into 
consideration, giving rise to what Barberis, Schleifer and Wurgler (2005) call “friction 
based” or “sentiment based” movements, allows for price co-movement that are not 
linked to fundamental value. Froot and Dabora (1999) examine the prices for twin 
‘Siamese’ stocks and find evidence that each stock pair appears to be closer 
correlated with the markets on which they are traded most, and, therefore, do not 
necessarily move together. Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2010) also find robust evidence of 
excess co-movements of DRs with the foreign market inwhich they trade. 
The reason for these excess co-movement is sometimes attributes to investor 
sentiment of owners holding different types of stocks. Empirical research has shown 
that investors can sometimes over or under-react to news, which are not explained 
by fundamental values, which was presented in the Investor Sentiment Model of 
Barberis, Schliefer and Vishny (1998). Thus, Ji (2006) explored the question of 
whether deviations between DR and the underlying stock are driven by investor 
sentiment was explored. She found that ownership base affects the deviation from 
parity, since large excess co-movements can be explained by investor base and that 
higher US institutional following is associated with larger systematic deviations from 
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parity. Similarly, Grossman et al, (2007) include investor sentiment to explain the 
price deviation, and find that at price deviation of ADR from underlying stock is 
more driven by US consumer sentiment than local sentiment. Finally, Arquete et al 
(2008), show that the discounts attached to Chinese securities, whether trading as 
ADRs on the NYSE or as H-stocks on the Hong Kong market, appear to have been 
significantly influenced by changes in both exchange rate expectations and investor 
sentiment during 1998–2006. 

2.4. Price Discovery 
2.4.1. Introduction 
 Price discovery,  defined as the process of searching for an equilibrium price 
(Harris et al., 1995),  is a key function of stock exchanges.  The question of where 
price discovery occurs for securities that trade in multiple markets during 
overlapping trading hours was first examined in US securities that trade on different 
regional exchanges inside the USA. Two cornerstone methodologies in the literature 
are the basis of measuring price discovery: Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Component 
Shares and Hasbrouck (1995) Information Shares.  
 Harris et al. in their studies of IBM (1995) and Dow stocks  (2002) use the 
Component Share of Gonzalo and Granger (1995) that rely on common long-
memory error-correction estimation approach to measure price discovery. They 
demonstrate that that all three US regional exchanges contribute to price discovery. 
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Hasbrouck (1995) examined the same question by measuring price discovery using 
the “information share” of each market, which he defines as the fraction of long-
term total variation in returns that is explained by each market from a variance-
decomposition analysis. Both measures depends on the estimation of a vector error 
correction model of the different prices of identical securities trading in multiple 
markets.  
 Multi-market price discovery studies since then have relied on either the GG 
Component Share or Hasbrouck’s Information Shares to measure contribution to 
price discovery. A special edition of Journal of Financial Markets (Issue 5, 2002) was 
dedicated to discuss the differences and merits of each approach (see for example 
DeJong (2002), Baille et al (2002) and Harris et al. (2002)). The general conclusion is 
that both methodologies are related and give similar results in most contexts,   
depending on data type used and the objective of the analysis.  
 In this section we will start by giving an overview of the econometric 
methodology behind price discovery models. We will then present a summary of the 
main studies on the topic focusing on securities that trade in multiple markets 
around the world.  
2.4.2. Measuring Multi-Market Price Discovery 
 In this section, we discuss how we measure the contribution of multiple 
markets to price discovery of cross-listed stocks by adapting from the several articles 
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published in the Special Issue 5 on the topic in Journal of Financial Markets 2002, 
mainly DeJong (2002), Baille et al (2002) and Harris et al. (2002). 
 In order to formulate the dynamics of price adjustment across 
informationally-linked exchanges, we consider a common stochastic trends 
representation of the local stock and depository receipt price series arising from the 
trades executed by traders on the Local Stock Exchange, ୈୖ, and trades executed 
by traders on the foreign market ୗ.  
 The LOOP underlying both prices should ensure that while each price series 
is non-stationary in itself, there exists a co-integrating relationship between them 
which share the implicit efficient price as a common stochastic trend. The implicit 
efficient price, ୲, follows a random walk and is represented by: 
୲ ൌ ୲ିଵ ൅ ୲     ̱ሺͲǡ ɐ୵ଶ ሻ     (Eq 2.4) 
where t is trading time and ୲ is the random information arrival. ୲ is a non-mean 
reverting series and therefore can be represented by ୲ ൌ ଴ ൅ σ ୲୲୲ୀଵ . 
 The actual trading that occurs on the stock and depository receipt impound 
the ୲ information arrivals but each differs from the efficient price ୲by a zero-
mean, covariance-stationary identically distributed random disturbance ɂ୲ୗ or ɂ୲ୈୖ: 
୲ୗ ൌ ୲ ൅ ɂ୲ୗ and ୲ୈୖ ൌ ୲ ൅ ɂ୲ୈୖ     (Eq 2.5) 
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re-writing (2) in first differences: 
ο୲ୗ ൌ ο୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୗ ൌ ୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୗ and  
ο୲ୈୖ ൌ ο୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୈୖ ൌ ୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୈୖ                                   (Eq 2.6) 
which can be extended to the following form: 
୲ୗ ൌ ୲ିଵୗ ൅ ୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୗ and ୲ୈୖ ൌ ୲ିଵୈୖ ൅ ୲ ൅ οɂ୲ୈୖ        (Eq 2.6’) 
This means that at any realization t=T both prices should impound the same 
stochastic trend in the implicit efficient price and therefore 
୘ୗ ൌ ଴ୗ ൅ σ ୲୘୲ୀଵ ൅ ɂ୘ୗ  and ୘ୈୖ ൌ ଴ୈୖ ൅ σ ୲୘୲ୀଵ ൅ ɂ୘ୈୖ   (Eq 2.7) 
 The common stochastic trend in Equation (2.7), is similar to a Stock and 
Watson (1988) representation, and has a permanent common stochastic  σ ୲୘୲ୀଵ  
that presents the long term relationship between prices and a short term transitory 
disturbance which a zero mean covariance stationary term given by ɂ୘ୗ  and ɂ୘ୈୖ.  
 Since the DR and stock prices have the same common stochastic trend, the 
difference between prices  
ሺ୘ୗ െ ୘ୈୖሻ ൌ  ɂ୘ୗ െ ɂ୘ୈୖ                                                                         (Eq 2.8) 
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which is a stationary I(0) process with one co-integrating relationship. According to 
the Granger Representation Theorem, co-integrated series can be represented by a 
vector error correction model of the form 
ο୲ ൌ ȽȾᇱ୲ିଵ ൅ σ ୨ȟ୲ି୨ ൅ ୲୩୨ୀଵ      (Eq 2.9) 
where ୲ ൌ ሺ୲ୗǡ ୲ୈୖሻᇱ, Ƚ  is the error correction vector, Ⱦᇱ୲ିଵ is the error 
correction term represented by ୲ ൌ Ⱦᇱ୲ ൌ ୲ୗ െ ୲ୈୖ with the co-integrating vector  
Ⱦ ൌ ሺͳǡെͳሻᇱ and k is the optimal lag length determined by the AIC or BIC.  
 The first term ȽȾᇱ୲ିଵ represents the long run equilibrium dynamics between 
the price series while σ ୨ȟ୲ି୨୩୨ୀଵ  depicts the short term dynamics induced by 
market imperfections. The error term ୲ is a zero mean vector of serially 
uncorrelated innovations with a co-variance matrix ȳ:  




2.4.2.1. Gonzalo and Granger’s Component Shares 
 The VECM Equation in 2.9 can be presented in a Stock and Watson’s (1988) 
common trend representation: 
௧ܲ ൌ ௧݂ ൅  (௧         (Eq 2.10ܩ
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Where ௧݂ is the common factor component and ܩ௧is the transitory component with 
no permanent impact on ௧ܲ. Gonzalo and Granger (1995) define the common factor 
of be a combination of the factors ௧ܲ ൌ ሺଵ୲ǡǡ ଶ୲ǡሻ, such that ௧݂ ൌ Ȟ ௧ܲ, where 
Ȟ ൌ ሺɀଵǡ ɀଶሻ and is a 1x2 common factor coefficient vector. They prove that Ȟis 
orthogonal to the error correction vector Ƚ denoted by Ȟ ൌ Ƚ ٣ Ԣ and is normalized 
so that σɀ୧ ൌ ͳ.  
 Harris et al (2002) show that the specification ௧݂can be considered as 
portfolio of prices from each market with Ȟ serving as portfolio and that therefore 
the contribution of the first(second) market to price discovery can be measured by 
ɀଵ(ɀଶሻ. Since the error correction vector Ƚ is orthogonal to Ȟ, ୄߙ ൌ ሺɀଵǡ ɀଶሻᇱ and so 




        (Eq 2.11) 
2.4.2.2. Hasbrouck’s Information Shares 
 Hasbrouck (1995) uses a structural form of equation (2.7) by providing a 
vector moving average representation of the VECM model of Equation (2.9) as: 
୲ ൌ ୲ ൅ Ȳଵ୲ିଵ ൅ Ȳଶ୲ିଶ ൅ ڮ ൌ Ȳሺሻ୲    (Eq 2.12) 
which can be re-written as  
୲ ൌ Ȳሺͳሻσ ୱ୲ୱୀଵ ൅ Ȳכሺሻ୲     (Eq 2.13) 
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Where Ȳሺͳሻ is finite and measures the long run impact of a shock on the level of 





ୱୀଵ ൅ Ȳכሺሻ୲      (Eq 2.14) 
ɗ ൌ ሺɗଵǡ ɗଶሻ is a 2x1 vector with ɗȽ ൌ Ͳ. The term ɗσ ୱ୲ୱୀଵ  is the common 
stochastic trend component. The increment ɗ୲ from the first part of equation 2.14 
is the component of price change that is permanently impounded into the price. If 
one decomposes the variance of the common factor innovations into ݎܽݒሺɗ୲ሻ ൌ
ɗȳɗᇱ, the information share of each market is the proportion of ݎܽݒሺɗ୲ሻ that is 






         (Eq 2.15) 
 Baillie et al (2002) show that the Component Share and Information Shares 











       (Eq 2.16) 
 When there is high correlation between the error terms, Hasbrouck’s 
Information shares cannot be measured by Equation 2.15 but rather  the variance-




























   (Eq 2.17) 
where ɏ is the correlation between the residuals of the VECM, ɐଵ and ɐଶ are the 





      (Eq 2.18) 
Hasbrouck (1995) considers the upper (lower) bound of market j’s information share 
when market j is the first (second) variable in the factorization (Baille et al, 2002).  
2.4.3. Summary of Studies 
 Studying the contribution of competing stock exchanges in determining price 
discovery becomes more motivating for international cross-listed stocks that trade in 
local and foreign markets during overlapping trading hours3. Because price discovery 
is concerned with adjustments to prices due to cross-market information flows, the 
market with more information on the security should contribute more to its price 
discovery. Assuming that more information on the stock comes from its local 
market, the hypothesis is, therefore, that the local market will be the dominant one 

3
 For studies on price discovery during non-overlapping trading hours, see Agarwal et al. (2006) on Hong Kong Shares, 
Lieberman et al. (1996) and Qadan and Yigali (2011) on Israeli shares, Kadapakkam et al. (2003) on Indian shares, and Su 
& Chong (2007) on Chinese shares.  
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and contribute more to price discovery than would the foreign market, which will act 
as a pure satellite (Garbade and Silber, 1979).  
 Several studies use either the GG or the Hasbrouck methodology to test this 
hypothesis in various settings. The main obstacle to arriving at a general conclusion 
on the issue is the lack of quality of the intraday data that is required to 
operationalize such models, so our knowledge is built on various studies that 
investigate the question in different settings and times. The general finding is that 
both markets contribute to price discovery, that the local market is generally 
dominant, and that both findings depend on the proportion of trading volume that 
migrates to the international exchange. We summarize the most important studies 
next.  
 Using transaction prices for a Malaysian cross-listed stock, Ding et al. (1999) 
found that the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange (KLSE) contributes more to price 
discovery than does the Singapore Stock Exchange (SSE). They explain this situation 
by the greater trading volume for the stock in the local market. In the Grammig et al. 
(2005) study of three German stocks and the Pascual et al. (2006) study of six 
Spanish stocks cross listed as ADRs on the NYSE, the local market dominated, even 
after the researchers had controlled for exchange rate shocks and trade-related 
shocks. The Lok and Kalev (2006) and Frijins et al. (2010) studies of Australian and 
New Zealand cross-listed stocks also found that, whereas price discovery occurs on 
both markets, the local market is the dominant one.  
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 The only research reporting mixed findings seems to be that of Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003) on 62 Canadian–US cross-listed securities; in that study, the 
foreign market was found to be dominant for a number of stocks. We can explain 
the difference between the results of Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and those of the 
previous studies by the extent to which trading in the host market is “liquidity- rather 
than information-driven” (Agarwal et al., 2006). US and Canadian markets are 
informationally linked by virtue of their geographical proximity and shared language; 
thus the US market is an important one for Canadian companies and is more likely 
to play an influential role in their price discovery process. In the other studies cited 
here, language, cultural, and geographical barriers may increase the probability of the 
host market being more liquidity driven than information-driven. Whether this result 
is true for emerging market stocks that list on international exchanges such as the 
USA or London is yet to be studied, and such research is necessary in order to 
corroborate this hypothesis and explain the factors underlying the price discovery 
process.  
2.5. Discussion and Areas for Research 
Various studies have analyzed the pricing behavior of DRs relative to their 
underlying stocks. The first line of studies focuses on whether the LOOP holds 
between the identical pair, relying on daily datasets. While price parity is not rejected 
for developed market securities, emerging markets provided interesting grounds for a 
more in-depth analysis since their DRs trade at significant price deviations from their 
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underlying stock. Trading barriers such as trading costs, capital controls, fungibility, 
ownership and short selling restrictions as well as special events have all been found 
to affect price parity.   
While studies on the LOOP conclude that those deviations from parity are a 
reflection of barriers rather than real arbitrage opportunities, such a result is not 
accurate since it does not capture arbitrage in the real frequency in which it occurs, 
which is using intraday data during the overlapping trading hours between both 
markets to capture real arbitrage opportunities as they arise.  
As we increasingly have access to higher frequency data, two studies emerge in 
the literature that study arbitrage in-depth by identifying whether arbitrage 
opportunities exist using intraday data between DRs and their underlying stock. Both 
studies use developed market securities from US and France. While Miller and 
Morey (1996) do not find any arbitrage opportunities, Suarez (2005a) identified very 
small arbitrage opportunities that give very small amounts of profit.  
Identifying whether arbitrage opportunities exist in the DR market provides a 
very interesting venue for research since the samples examined so far are very small 
and ignore emerging market DRs. Since emerging markets have large limitations to 
arbitrage that cause price parity to be broken, it is only possible to examine whether 
arbitrage opportunities really arise with intraday data during the overlapping trading 
hours between the local and foreign market.  
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What is even more interesting is to try to identify real arbitrage trades from the 
dataset. The literature on arbitrage in general has so far assumed how the process 
works, but empirical evidence that reveals actual arbitrage trades is not available. 
Identifying arbitrage trades from intraday data requires a novel methodology that 
goes beyond identifying price deviations in the data. Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2010) 
study provides a motivation for further examining this issue since they “believe that 
the mechanics of arbitrage in the market for cross-listed stocks is complex and the 
institutional features of this marketplace make it difficult to judge the actual 
profitability of such trading strategies”.  
Moreover, further motivation from Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) is for more 
specialized studies that can accurately account for trading costs and use high 
frequency data since “arbitrage activity in this market may take place intraday for 
those markets in which there is some overlap of trading hours…..we cannot know 
for certain whether the patterns in price deviations are economically real or artifacts 
of asynchronous trading between the two securities” 
Finally, while an intraday arbitrage analysis on emerging market DRs should 
provide useful insights on whether arbitrage opportunities exist and whether 
arbitrage trades really occur to cause price convergence, such an analysis is static in 
nature and doesn’t identify which market dominates in terms of price discovery. 
 Price discovery studies summarized above can help examine the dynamic role 
of the international stock market in pricing DRs. However, since such models also 
41 
 
require intraday data from emerging markets, which are limited, so far no study 
examines the contribution of the foreign versus local market in the price discovery 
process of DRs from emerging markets.  
 This thesis tends to fill the above gaps in the literature review by examining 
the process of arbitrage and price discovery in DRs from emerging markets using 
high frequency intraday dataset. The markets that are chosen for the sample are 
selected to have trading barriers that mask any real patterns in pricing with daily data 
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3 DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.1. Sample Markets 
We are interested in studying the pricing behavior of DRs from emerging markets.  With 
that, the sample of this thesis is made up of all Egyptian stocks that are listed on the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange(EGX) and foreign cross-listed as GDRs on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) as well as all Argentinean stocks listed on the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange(BCBA) and cross-listed as ADRs on US exchanges (New York Stock 
Exchange(NYSE) and NASDAQ).  
The different location of foreign cross-listing for Egyptian and Argentinean 
securities allow us to compare results across different settings and  to overcome the focus 
of the majority of studies on ADRs trading on US exchanges. Moreover, both markets have  
several characteristics that make them ideal for this study: synchronous trading 
between the local and foreign market, lack of a fungibility restriction while having 
other limits to arbitrage and similar market microstructure. We discuss of these 
criteria next.  
3.1.1. Synchronous Trading 
Argentina and Egypt have a considerable portion of trading overlap between 
the international markets in which the DR trades and the local stock exchange in-
which the underlying stock trades overcoming asynchronousity problems and 
ensuring that arbitrage strategies can be carried out in real time.  
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Egyptian stocks trade on the EGX during regular trading hours from 10:30 a.m. to 
2:30 p.m. local Cairo time; the normal trading week starts on Sunday and ends on Thursday. 
Egyptian GDRs trade on the LSE during regular trading hours from 8:00 a.m. to 4:30 p.m. 
local UK time from Monday to Friday, giving the two markets only four days each week of 
overlap, with 4 overlapping trading hours daily.  
Argentinean stocks trade on the Mercadoes de Valores de Buenos Aires (BCBA) from 
Monday to Friday from 11:00 am to 5:00 pm local Buenos Aires time; the ADRs trade 
during the same trading week on US exchanges from 9:30 am to 4:00 pm US Eastern time, 
giving both markets 6 overlapping trading hours during winter and 5.5 hours during 
summer. Figure 3.1 shows the trading hours in each of our markets in GMT time. 
INSERT FIGURE 3.1 HERE 
Having synchronous trading hours between the foreign and local market should 
ensure that prices in each market incorporates  information fully and thus prices should not 
deviate. One exception of this synchronistic trading in our sample is due to the different 
weekend between the EGX and LSE. While Egyptian stocks trade during the same 
overlapping hours as their GDRs, they do so  for only 4 days of the trading week. Our first 
article in this thesis in Chapter 4 discusses how this variable affects the LOOP between 
Egyptian GDRs and their underlying stock.  
3.1.2. Fungibility 
Both local stock exchanges allow full fungibility between the DR and its 
underlying stock. This should ensure price parity as arbitrage operations are not 
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hampered. We verify the fungibility criterion in Argentina by the study of Auguste et 
al (2006) who show that when capital controls where imposed in Argentina during 
the Argentinean crisis, ADRs aided capital flight by allowing investors to buy the 
stock and convert it to the ADR and sell it in the US. As for Egypt, we support 
fungibility by data obtained from the Egyptian Depository and Clearing House, 
revealing large number of issuances and cancellation between Egyptian GDRs and 
their underlying stock. 
3.1.3. Limits to Arbitrage  
Despite the lack of restriction on arbitrage operations, we pick Egyptian and 
Argentinean securities since they trade under some other trading barriers that are 
hypothesized to limit arbitrage. 
First, short selling restrictions are in effect in Egypt and Argentina. While 
regulatory bodies have loosened up the regulation on short sales in both countries, in 
practice they remain in effect (Bris et al, 2007). The short selling restriction is one 
variable we are interested to examine, since studies so far have only hypothesized the 
effect on arbitrage, arguing that it stop arbitrage activities on the side of the short 
sale, yet empirical evidence is yet to corroborate this hypothesis.  
 Second, Egypt and Argentina have large trading costs. Trading costs create a 
large band around a security’s equilibrium price in which prices of the DR and 
underlying stock can deviate without making them profitable enough to be 
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eliminated by arbitrageurs. This presents an interesting challenge to come up with 
precise trading costs that we can use in our analysis.  
Finally, both markets have capital controls. Argentina has a capital control on 
inflows in the form of 30% of any money transfers into the country to be deposited 
with the central bank for a minimum of 1 year. Egypt currently has capital controls 
on outflows post the January 25th 2011 Egyptian Revolution, however during our 
sample period Egypt was not subject to capital controls. 
Capital controls provide an interesting case for violations from price parity as 
discussed in Auguste et al (2006). During the Argentinean crisis, the corralito was 
imposed by the Argentinean government, in-which all foreign funds were prohibited 
from being transferred abroad. The Argentinean ADRs played an important role 
during the crisis since they served a ‘loop-hole’ in the financial system that allowed 
investors to use their bank deposits to purchase Argentine stocks, convert them 
ADRs and sell them in the US. and the dollar proceeds deposited in a U.S. account.  
Such action caused the prices of the ADR to sell at huge discounts to the underlying 
stock and thus cause strong violation of price parity. Much like short selling 
restrictions, while capital controls reveal violations from the LOOP, current studies 
cannot establish whether capital controls hamper arbitrage activity in emerging 
markets or not.  
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3.1.4. Market Characteristics and Microstructure 
 Egyptian and Argentinean stock exchanges are very similar. While both are 
amongst the oldest stock markets in the world, dating back to 1883 and 1854, 
respectively, they are both relatively small stock exchanges with similar 
microstructure. Both are order-driven markets, with an electronic trading system for 
matching trades; they have no taxes on dividends or capital gains. 
 As in most emerging market stock exchanges, a relatively small set of 
companies dominates the market and trading value. Table 3-1 presents some 
indicators from our markets.  In Egypt, the 30 most heavily traded firms account for 
an average of 34% of total market capitalization. The market in Argentina is much 
thinner, with the largest 10 companies comprising over 70% of market capitalization. 
We focus on local companies listed in both market.  
 Table 3-1 shows that the number of traded companies in both exchanges is 
very small. In Egypt, the number of companies dropped from over 700 companies in 
2005 to 289 by end of  2009 due to the restructuring of the exchange which involved 
the de-listing of inactively traded companies.  
INSERT TABLE 3.1 HERE 
3.2. Data Description 
The sample of this thesis is made up of all Egyptian stocks that are listed on the 
Egyptian Stock Exchange(EGX) and foreign cross-listed as GDRs on the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) as well as all Argentinean stocks listed on the Buenos Aires Stock 
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Exchange(BCBA) and cross-listed as ADRs on US exchanges (New York Stock 
Exchange(NYSE) and NASDAQ).  
The local Egyptian stocks trade in Egyptian pound (EGP) while their GDRs trade 
in USD. On the other hand, Argentinean stocks trade in Argentinean peso (ARS) while their 
ADRs trade in USD. Therefore in studying the prices of each pair, we are not only interested 
in prices but also in the foreign exchange rates between the EGP/USD and the ARS?USD. 
 A summary of all Egyptian and Argentinean DRs listed overseas is 
presented in Table 3-2.  We pick DRs whose underlying stocks have ISIN numbers 
registered on the EGX and  BCBA.  Since we are interested in the pricing behavior 
of the DR and its underlying stock the main variables under study in this thesis are 
the DR price in USD, ௧ܲ஽ோ, the underlying stock price ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ in local currency and 
the foreign exchange rate between the local currency and USD ܵ௧.  
INSERT TABLE 3.2 HERE 
We rely on both daily and intraday data in this thesis. Daily data are used to 
test the law of one price in Chapter 4 and to detect whether price parity holds 
between the DR and its underlying stock. Intraday data are used for studying 
arbitrage and price discovery in Chapters 5 and 6.  
Daily data was obtained from Reuters 3000 Xtra and include daily open 
prices, closing prices as well as volumes for each of our DRs and their underlying 
stock. Daily closing exchange rate data was also obtained. The intraday data was 
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obtained with the help of a senior Reuters executive from the Reuters Tick Database. 
It consists of all intraday transactions on each of the DR and the underlying stock 
including date, timestamps, prices and volumes. Intraday foreign exchange rate data 
included both bid and ask quotes for the EGP/USD and ARS/USD.  
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Table  3-1 Sample Country Market Indicators 
Egypt 
Indicator 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
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Argentina 
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International Bank COMI LSE 1/7/1996 1:1 Banks 
EFG-Hermes HRHO LSE 1/8/1998 1:2 Financial Services
Orascom Telecom ORTE LSE 1/7/2000 1:5 Telecom
Orascom Construction 
Industries OCIC LSE 1/8/2002 1:1 Construction & Materials 
Telecom Egypt ETEL LSE 1/12/2004 1:5 Telecom
Palm Hills Development 
Company* PHDC LSE 7/5/2008 1:5 Real Estate Inv&Serv 
Lecico Egypt LECI LSE 11/23/2004 1:1 Industrial Engineer.
Suez Cement SUCE LSE 11/29/1996 1:1 Construction & Materials
El Ezz Steel Rebars AEZD LSE 12/26/2005 1:3 Indust.Metals&Mining
Argentina  
Banco Macro BMA NYSE 3/23/2006 1:10 Banks
BBVA Banco Frances FRA NYSE 11/23/1993 1:3 Banks
Edenor EDN NYSE 4/30/2007 1:20 Electricity
Grupo Financiero Galicia GFG NASDAQ 6/22/2000 1:10 Banks
Inversiones Y 
Representaciones S.A. IRS NYSE 5/1/1994 1:10 Real Estate Inv&Serv 
MetroGas MET NYSE 2/26/2001 1:10 Gas,H20&Multiutility
Transportadora de Gas 
del Sur TGS2 NYSE 10/21/2002 1:5 OilEquip.,Serv.&Dist 
Alto Palermo S.A. SAM NASDAQ 11/10/2000 1:4 Real Estate Inv&Serv
Cresud CRES NASDAQ 3/18/1997 1:10 Food Producers






Figure  3-1 Trading Hours in Sample Markets 
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4 THE LAW OF ONE PRICE IN GLOBAL DEPOSITORY 
RECEIPTS: EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE FROM EGYPTIAN 
EQUITIES 
4.1 Introduction 
 The Law of One Price (LOOP), considered the ‘second law of economics’ 
(Lamont & Thaler, 2003), states that identical goods must trade at identical prices. 
One example in financial equity markets where the LOOP should be observed 
involves stocks that are foreign-listed as depository receipts on international 
exchanges.  Depository receipts(DRs), which are negotiable certificates issued by a 
trust bank that holds the underlying stock on behalf of investor, is the most common 
means for foreign-cross listing on international exchanges.  
 Despite trading in different market and in different currency denominations, 
the DR and its underlying stock are considered identical securities. Both securities 
have the same claim on the firm’s cash flows and are freely exchangeable to one 
another. Therefore any difference between the currency adjusted prices should be 
eliminated by instantaneous arbitrage activity that ensures that  the LOOP holds 
between both securities.  
 Early studies find that price parity holds between developed market DR and 
their underlying stock (Maldonado and Saunders, 1983; Kato et al, 1991; Park and 
Tavakkol, 1994). However, more recent evidence by Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) find 
that price parity is sometimes violated, especially for emerging markets’ securities, 
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due to factors that segment the two markets such as large trading barriers and 
transaction costs that make arbitrage activity difficult to carry out. All of these 
studies, however, focus on DRs listed on US exchanges, commonly referred to as 
American DRs (ADRs). Several cross-listed equity, however, prefer to list on other 
exchanges around the world, mainly the London Stock Exchange (LSE), as Global 
DRs (GDRs) for reasons related to business and geographical proximity. This makes 
the question of whether the LOOP holds between GDRs and their underlying stock 
so far lacking.  
 We examine this question in Egyptian stocks that are trading on the Egyptian 
Stock Exchange(EGX) in Egyptian pound (EGP) and their GDRs trading on the 
LSE in US dollars (USD). Egyptian GDRs represent the largest and most active 
cross-listed Arab equity. Many international investors seek to diversify their 
portfolios through investing in emerging market equity and Egyptian securities 
offered an attractive option for foreign investors as means for portfolio 
diversification, especially when it was  considered one of the world’s best performing 
stock exchanges from 2003 till 2005 (Saleh, 2004).  Moreover, two of the Egyptian 
GDRs, Orascom Telecom (ORTE) and Orascom Constructions(OCIC), are 
considered amongst the most actively traded GDRs in London.  
 Egyptian GDRs also play other important roles in terms of providing liquidity, 
evident during the uprising in January 2011 since they prevented a complete 
shutdown of trading on the large Egyptian securities. While the EGX was closed for 
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over 2 months, the Egyptian GDRs of Egyptian companies – including major 
financial services, telecommunication and construction firms – continued trading on 
the LSE with no disruption.  
“It is very positive that the [Egyptian] DRs are working … I definitely see that this is the right 
thing [for issuers].” Hisham Ramez, Deputy Governor of the Central Bank of Egypt to Bank of 
New York Mellon (Bank of New York Mellon DR Report, August 2011) 
 Our data consists of daily open prices, closing prices and volumes for 10 
Egyptian stocks and their GDRs, since their listing on the LSE and until April 2009, 
as well as daily foreign exchange rate data.  While examining whether the LOOP 
holds in DRs is not new,  two main aspects of our sample differentiate this study 
from previous analysis: studying the effect of the different trading week between the 
EGX and the LSE and different exchange rate regimes on price parity.    
 First, the EGX has a different trading week than the LSE. Therefore, while 
Egyptian stocks trade mostly within the same overlapping hours as their GDRs from 
Monday-Thursday, the EGX’s weekend, Friday and Saturday, is different from 
LSE’s, Saturday and Sunday. Thus, trading occurs on the GDR on Friday while 
EGX is closed and also trading occurs on Sunday in Egypt while LSE is closed. We 
study whether the effect of the different trading week on the LOOP.  
  Second,  prior to January 2003 Egypt had a fixed exchange rate regime which 
was changed to a free-floating regime after that date. Four Egyptian securities that 
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were cross-listed prior to that date allow us to examine whether the LOOP is 
affected by the type of exchange rate regime of the country.  
 The results of this paper reveal statistically and economically significant price 
deviations from parity across our sample. These results are not biased by the non-
overlapping trading days nor the exchange rate regime.  
 This study is thus organized as follows. Section 4.2 data description and basic 
relationships. The study’s tests and results will be presented in Section 4.3. Finally, 
Section 4.4 concludes and outlines directions for future research 
4.2  Data Description and Basic Relationships 
4.2.1 Data Description 
 There are currently 10 Egyptian companies that are foreign listed on the LSE 
as GDRs. Egyptian companies were motivated to list on the LSE to widen their 
investor base and gain international visibility.  
“Telecom Egypt Launched its GDR program to enhance the company’s profile and enlarge its 
investor base, in addition to creating a convenient mean to our international investors to invest in 
TE”        Telecom Egypt Investor Relations 
“We have chosen to initiate a GDR program in order to increase the level of awareness of OCI 
within the international investor and brokerage community. We also believe our listing on the 
London Stock Exchange will be beneficial as OCI pursues its regional expansion plans.”            
     Mr. Nassef Sawiris, Orascom Constructon CEO 
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Due to the concentration of market capitalization of the EGX in a few 
companies, these 10 companies on average constitute over 30% of the market. Our 
dataset is made up of 9,333 individual data observations for each of the daily open 
prices, closing prices and volumes for 10 Egyptian GDRs and their underlying stocks 
as well as daily foreign exchange rate between the Egyptian Pound (EGP) and the 
US dollar(USD), which were all obtained from Reuters 3000 Xtra. The number of 
observations are uneven for each company since we use data since each company’s 
GDR listing on the LSE and until 31st of January 2009.  
It has been observed that some of the GDRs had a very low volume of 
trading on the LSE (AEZD, PACH) with less than 50 observations per year and 
have been excluded from the analysis. Thus our analysis below was conducted on 
only 8 of the GDR-stock pairs.  
Table 4-1 provides a summary of the companies included in our sample. 
Since DRs are usually issued in bundles of underlying stock, the bundling ratio in 
column two refers to the ratio of GDR to underlying stocks. For example, one GDR 
of the Egyptian company ORTE is a claim on five stocks of ORTE stock traded on 
the EGX, thus the GDR bundling ratio is 1:5.  Table 4-1 also shows various 
descriptive on our GDRs and stocks that reveals the level of  heterogeneity amongst 
our sample. The concentration of the market liquidity on these companies is 
obviously on the local stock traded on the EGX as apparent from a comparison 
between the average annual volume of trade on the GDR versus the local stock. 
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Moreover, for some stocks such as LECI and PHDC, the market activity on the 
GDR is extremely low compared to the local stocks, since they are traded very 
infrequently on LSE as shown by the average number of trading days per year.  
INSERT TABLE 4-1 HERE 
4.2.2 Basic Relationship 





                 (4.1) 
Where ௧ܲீ஽ோ is the price of the GDR in USD listed on LSE, ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞is price of the 
underlying stock in EGX in EGP, b is the bundling ratio (Table 2-1 ) and ܵ௧ is the 
USD/EGP closing spot exchange rate.  
The LOOP is tested by first measuring the price deviation between the 
depository receipt price and the foreign exchange underlying stock price and testing 
whether it is significantly different from zero. The two most common measure for 
price deviation are: Measure (1)Price Deviation ௧ܲீ஽ோ െ
௉೟ೄ೟೚೎ೖכ௕
ௌ೟
 and Measure (2) 





ሻ. The advantage of the second measure is that  
it allows comparison across the different stocks in the sample.  Prices are assumed 
not to deviate due to the presence of active arbitrageurs who keep the price of the 
GDR and currency adjusted Egyptian stocks in equilibrium. Should the prices of the 
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GDR and stock deviate, arbitrageurs should instantaneously intervene to bring prices 
to parity.  
Egyptian stocks trade during non-overlapping days with their GDRs. We 
thus test for the LOOP during the overlapping trading days which are Monday to 
Thursday as well as during the non-overlapping days Friday and Sunday. This 
requires us to construct two price deviation series: Weekday Series and Weekend 
Series.  
x Weekday Series (I) (Monday-Thursday Prices) since London closes 4 
hours after EGX then prices should incorporate stocks closing prices as 
well as react to new information while EGX is closed. Thus, these prices 
series are made up of coinciding daily closing prices of the GDR, the 
underlying Stock and the Exchange rate from Monday-Thursday when 
trading occurs on both markets. Three price vectors were constructed: 
௧ܲǡெି்
ீ஽ோ  = daily closing price of the GDR in USD listed on LSE from 
Monday to Thursday 
௧ܲǡெି்
ௌ௧௢௖௞ = daily closing price of the underlying stock in EGX in Egyptian 
Pounds LE from Monday to Thursday 
ܵ௧ǡெି் = daily closing USD/LE exchange rate from Monday to Thursday 








      (4.2a) 




)       (4.2b) 
x Weekend Series (II): Friday-Sunday-Monday: This weekend series 
assesses non-contemporaneous relationships arising from non-
overlapping weekends. The price vectors were as follows:  
௖ܲ௟௢௦௘ǡி
ீ஽ோ  = Friday closing price of the GDR in USD listed on the LSE  
௢ܲ௣௘௡ǡௌ
௦௧௢௖௞  = Sunday opening price of the underlying stock in EGP listed on the 
EGX  
௖ܲ௟௢௦௘ǡௌ
௦௧௢௖௞  = Sunday closing price of the underlying stock in EGP listed on the 
EGX  
௢ܲ௣௘௡ǡெ
ீ஽ோ  = Monday open price of the GDR in USD listed on LSE  
Regarding the exchange rate to convert the local stock into USD:  
ܵி   = the USD/LE exchange rate on Sunday is the closing price of the 
USD/LE exchange rate on Friday  
We measure the price deviation across non-overlapping weekdays as follows:   








         (4.3a) 
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ሻ   (4.3b) 
4.3 Tests and Results 
 The objective of this empirical study is to examine the LOOP between GDR 
and their underlying stock. We do that by first directly assessing whether price parity 
holds.  In case price parity is violated, we follow this with a test of whether the 
returns of Egyptian GDRs are identically distributed to their underlying stock.  
 In our analysis below, we choose to conduct the analysis on our data starting 
either the foreign date of listing or April 1st 2003, whichever comes earlier. This is to 
isolate the effect of the change in foreign exchange rate regime in 29th  January 2003. 
We close this section with an analysis of the effect of the foreign exchange rate 
regime on price parity separately.  
4.3.1  Price Parity Assessment 
This involves a direct test of the law of one price by measuring the size of 
price deviations between the DR and the underlying stock. Price parity holds under 
the null hypothesis that the price deviation is not significantly different from zero. 
We use the two common measures discussed above: Price Deviation and Relative 
Price Deviation in both their absolute and non-absolute forms to test the null 
hypothesis. Results are presented in Table 4-2.  
INSERT TABLE 4-2 HERE 
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It is obvious that on average price deviations can be very big, as high as 
USD6.68 difference in the case of Palm Hills between the GDR and the underlying 
stock using the first measure or 117% premium of the price of the GDR to the 
underlying stock for Lecico during our sample period. Parametric t-test for the null 
hypothesis reject the null hypothesis of price parity for the majority of stocks, since 
price deviations under the different measures are significantly different from zero 
both in weekdays and on weekends and are all different from zero using the absolute 
version of the price deviation measures.  
 We comment on the results of the most actively traded companies in both 
markets: ORTE and OCIC. These two companies are amongst the two most active 
firms both on EGX as well as from the top 10 most active GDRs on the LSE, and 
despite this ORTE’s GDR trades at an average of -2.63% discount to its stock 
counterpart during overlapping trading week, and OCIC’s GDR at a 2.61% premium 
to its stock during the overlapping trading week. The only stock that does not show 
any deviations using non-absolute measures of deviations is that of ETEL. This 
provided an impetus to examine the number of days in which a stock traded at a 
premium or a discount, which is provided in Figure 4-1.  
INSERT FIGURE 4-1 HERE 
It is obvious that the sign of the non-absolute measures of deviation give an 
indication of whether the GDR are more traded at premiums or discounts. It also 
63 
 
explains why ETEL does not have significant deviations on average since the 
number of days trading at premium is close to those trading at discount. 
 Our final hypothesis is to examine whether the size of the price deviations 
during the non-overlapping weekend series are greater than during the weekday 
series. Results presented in Table 4-3 show that, on average, for all of our companies 
the weekend and weekday price deviations are not different at the 99% confidence 
level.  
INSERT TABLE 4-3 HERE 
The question thus becomes: Why are weekend and weekday deviations not 
different? One possible explanation could be volume of trading on Fridays and 
Sundays. Indeed a cross sectional analysis of the average daily volume on the GDR 
and Stocks on Fridays and Sundays, reveal that these two days on average have the 
lowest volume proportional to the total weekly volume of trade, Figure 4-2. This 
means that for the GDR, the lowest volume of trade is on Friday and for the local 
stock it is Sunday.  
INSERT FIGURE 4-2 HERE 
We can make sense of these results as follows: On Friday in London, 
investors rarely observe any new information about the stock, since the markets are 
closed in Egypt for the weekend. Therefore, the volume of trading is lowest, 
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reflecting only liquidity traders. Similarly, investors trading in Egypt on Sunday react 
to the trading on the GDR on Friday, but are not aggressive in trading, since these 
companies are considered “international” so trading on the stock is slow on Sunday 
as investors wait for information on Monday when both markets are open. This is 
obvious since the % of the weekly volume of trade occurring on Monday in both 
markets is much higher than either Friday or Sunday trades.  
Our result on the law of one price between Egyptian GDRs and their 
underlying stock show that price parity is violated for all of our stocks and that 
violation of price parity is consistent across the overlapping trading weeks and non-
overlapping trading weekends. We chart the prices of each DR and its underlying 
stock in Appendix 2. Our price parity results are verified, in that large price 
deviations are apparent, however, in the long run both securities follow the same 
trend which means that prices adjust to each other.  
This bring us to an important question: is the GDR a true dollar translation 
of the underlying stock? We examine this question in the next section.  
4.3.2 Return Distribution 
Although we find that prices between the GDR and the underlying stock 
deviate, we examine whether the GDR and the underlying stock are the same 
security  by testing whether one exhibits superior returns to the other. We empirically 
test this by constructing  a return deviation series from the GDR and adjusted local 













ቍ       (4.4) 
whereby we test the null hypothesis that this deviation on average is zero. Since we 
find that both weekend and weekday series provide similar results, we conduct the 
following analysis on the total series that combines both. The parametric T-Test fails 
to reject the null hypothesis that the average return deviation between the GDR and 
Stock is different from zero for all stocks. These results are shown in Table 4-4 and 
indicate that indeed on average the return deviation between them is zero and thus 
that one cannot obtain superior returns by buying the GDR over the underlying 
stock.  
INSERT TABLE 4-4 HERE 
However, even if the return deviations on average are zero, there is a 
potential possibility that the average does not capture the direction of returns. Thus, 
to check that the returns move in the same direction, we conduct two non-
parametric tests: the Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test and the Sign Test. The results 
presented in Table 4-5 also confirm that there is no difference between the direction 
of the two return series.  
INSERT TABLE 4-5 HERE 
4.3.3 The Effect of Exchange Rate Regime on Price Parity  
On January 29th, 2003, the Egyptian government allowed its currency to float. 
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Before January 29th, 2003, the Egyptian government had a fixed exchange rate regime 
whereby the Egyptian pound (EGP) was pegged against the USD. However, a series 
of economic downturns in 2002 forced the government in January 2003 to free float 
the currency. (Allam, January 29th, 2003). For the four companies in our sample 
(COMI, SUCE, OCIC and ORTE) for which we had data prior to January 29th, 
2003, this seemed an interesting question how the results of our analysis on the 
arbitrage between GDR-stock pairs would be affected by the exchange rate regime. 
 Previous studies, as those by Maldonado and Saunders (1983) and Rabinovitch 
et al (2003), have found that fixed exchange rate regimes do not affect LOOP 
between cross-listed stock. Thus, for these four stocks (COMI, SUCE, OCIC and 
ORTE) we analyze the pre-post fixed exchange rate regime effect on price parity 
between the GDR and stock. We compare the size of the deviations between the 
prices of our four GDR-stock pairs.  
We measure the price deviations for COMI, SUCE, ORTE and OCIC during 
the fixed exchange rate regime and after its change to a floating one. Results in Table 
4-6 shows that for our different price deviation measures SUCE, ORTE and OCIC 
price deviations were reduced after the fixed exchange rate regime was abolished. 
However, for COMI the opposite seems to have occurred. From this brief analysis, 
we can conclude that the fixed exchange rate regime did affect the size of price 
deviations, however, despite the direction, deviations were still observed.  
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INSERT TABLE 4-6 HERE 
We also examine whether the return distribution of the GDR and stock is 
affected by the different exchange rate regimes. The return deviation measures are 
not different pre and post the exchange rate regime as Table 4-7 shows. Indeed, a t-
test of the null hypothesis that the averages of the return deviation before and after 
the exchange rate regime are equal to zero couldn’t be rejected. Moreover, a 
comparison of averages pre and post also gives insignificant results. Thus, we 
conclude that the exchange rate regime did not affect the ability of returns of both 
markets to adjust to each other.  
INSERT TABLE 4-7 HERE 
4.4 Conclusions 
“Does the Law of One Price Hold for Egyptian GDRs?” The evidence 
presented here indicates clear deviations from parity. Compared to research on the 
area in the 1980s and 1990s (Maldonado and Saunders, 1983; Kato et al, 1991) which 
have pre-dominantly focused on ADR-Stock pairs (mostly from developed market 
stock) and find no deviations from parity, this study uses similar methodology and 
finds evidence of the presence of statistically large deviations. This deviation from 
price parity is consistent even across the different weekend days and is not affected 
by a fixed  versus floating exchange rate regime. According to the Law of One Price 
any such price deviation should be instantly eliminated by active arbitrageurs in the 
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market, who buy the underpriced security and short-sell the overprice security to 
make risk free profits. The fungibility feature of depository receipts that allows them 
to be fully convertible to each other makes them attractive for arbitrageurs. 
However, while our results on the violation of price parity might indicate a lack of 
market efficiency and hint at the presence of forgone arbitrage opportunities in this 
market, there are several reasons that make such statements inconclusive.  
First,  while prices do deviate, the return distributions of Egyptian GDRs and 
their underlying stocks are not different from each other, which indicates that an 
investor cannot earn superior returns from investing in one security over the other. 
Second, the price deviations we observe can easily be explained by large trading costs 
that create an arbitrage band around a security’s equilibrium value (Kato et al, 1991) 
and as such, in order for the arbitrage to be lucrative, the price differential has to 
exceed the transaction cost. Moreover, trading restrictions, such as short selling 
restriction in Egypt, can explain why prices deviate from each other (Gagnon and 
Karolyi, 2010). Finally, it is important to note that one limitation of this study is that 
we compare daily closing prices that do not occur at the same point in time due to 
the different closing times of the EGX and LSE.  
The results of this paper should be interpreted with caution since while we 
observe a clear break from price parity and which we can explain by several market 
imperfections, this does not give an indication of the presence, or lack of, arbitrage 
opportunities in Egyptian GDRs. Arbitrage opportunities are better captured using 
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higher frequency data that can capture arbitrage at the frequency in which in actually 


































COMI 1:1 13 220 1.125-13.5 166 
 
261 1.125-13.5 
SUCE 1:1 1 70 2.73-20.9 17 262 2.86-20.98 
HRHO 1:2 2 246 0.88-37.4 373 243 0.85-34.4 
ORTE 1:5 52 251 0.66-83.8 67 247 0.71-84.9 
OCIC 1:1 10 240 2.57-175 25 245 2.3-171.26 
LECI 1:1 2 65 2-7.3 30 223 2.04-8.76 
ETEL 1:5 3 156 10-21.5 109 244 9.78-21.54.5
PHDC 1:5 2 67 4.9-20.56 22 178 5.23-20.1 
a Source: Bank of New York Mellon (www.bnymellon.com)   




Table  4-2 The Law of One Price Test Results 






Mean Minimum Maximum Standard Deviation T-Test Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation T-Test 
COMI 0.286** -0.114 1.019 0.219 22.249 0.292** -0.014 1.049 0.222 32.841
SUCE -0.178** -3.75 4.72 0.913 -6.628 -0.11** -4.06 5.7 1.001 -2.71
HRHO 0.576** -1.07 5.25 0.845 6.329 0.564** -0.61 4.88 1.003 9.694
ORTE -0.445** -5.15 4.71 0.8424 -18.576 -0.4118** -5.02 4.96 0.966 -7.349
OCIC 0.072** -0.54 0.51 0.202 4.65 0.0502** -0.73 0.45 0.234 2.03
LECI -0.62** -4.48 4.83 1.69 -3.996 -0.78** -2.84 2.54 1.35 -4.052
ETEL 0.00 -4.34 3.31 0.58 -0.176 0.04 -2.19 2.54 0.67 0.836
PHDC 0.53** -0.84 6.68 1.51 2.829 0.34* -4.42 5.19 1.59 1.142
(B) Daily Absolute Price Deviation (USD)ܪ଴ െǣ ฬ ௧ܲீ஽ோ െ
௉೟ೄ೟೚೎ೖכ௕
ௌ೟
ฬ ൌ Ͳ 
Company 
Monday-Thursday Friday-Sunday
Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation T-Test Mean Minimum Maximum 
Standard 
Deviation T-Test 
COMI 0.292** 0 1.019 0.228 23.35 0.297** 0 1.0493 0.224 34.537
SUCE 0.577** 0 4.72 0.729 22.473 0.592** 0 5.7 0.814 14.076
HRHO 0.592** 0 5.25 0.833 13.374 0.611** 0 4.88 0.975 19.684
ORTE 0.69** 0 5.15 0.62 34.4 0.736** 0 5.02 748 16.319
OCIC 0.177** 0 0.54 0.12 19.19 0.193** 0 0.73 0.138 15.274
LECI 1.51** 0.03 4.83 0.96 17.099 1.41** 0.05 2.84 0.66 14.848
ETEL 0.37** 0 4.34 0.45 16.993 0.43** 0 2.54 0.51 10.981
PHDC 0.88** 0 6.68 1.33 5.359 0.91** 0 5.19 1.34 3.105
** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% 
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Deviation T-Test  Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation T-Test  
COMI 
7.88%** -7.80% 19.45% 4.56% 31.458 8.01%** -9.51% 25.26% 4.55% 45.756
      
SUCE -2.34%** -33.92% 36.69% 8.91% -9.358 -1.73%** -41.48% 42.98% 8.39% -5.334
HRHO 7.76%** -20% 30% 7.22% 8.409 6.71%** -20% 25% 7.67% 14.663
ORTE -2.63%** -26.55% 10.58% 4.29% -28.584 -2.53%** -17.00% 12.54% 4.31% -19.446
OCIC 2.61%** -15.00% 19.80% 7.00% 6.492 0.78%** -19.00% 17.00% 12.13% 2.5
LECI -11.23%** -71.34% 117.09% 37.11% -3.288 -14.52%** -60.60% 71.11% 30.52% -3.329
ETEL -0.04% -47.56% 24.93% 4.39% -0.195 0.19% -16.75% 17.30% 4.49% 0.55
PHDC 5.47%** -12.15% 76.43% 16.75% 2.635 4.71%* -31.37% 56.72% 16.52% 1.536

















COMI 8.20%** 0.04% 19.45% 3.95% 37.811 8.34%** 0.07% 25.26% 3.91% 55.368
SUCE 6.14%** 0.01% 36.69% 5.65% 34.747 6.92% 0.00% 42.98% 6.47% 22.523
HRHO 9%** 0% 30% 6% 26.275 8%** 0% 25% 6% 13.683
ORTE 3.14%** 0.00% 26.55% 3.93% 35.085 3.21%** 0.00% 17% 3.85% 24.675
OCIC 5.87%** 0.01% 20% 4.61% 39.876 3.07%** 0.00% 19.00% 4.75% 14.423
LECI 32.20%** 0.62% 117.09% 21.42% 16.332 30.06%** 1.77% 71.11% 14.98% 14.045
ETEL 2.56%** 0.00% 47.56% 3.56% 14.924 2.91%** 0.00% 17.30% 3.42% 11.201
PHDC 9.10%** 0.02% 76.43% 15.06% 4.874 8.55%** 0.00% 56.72% 14.84% 3.105




Table  4-3 T-Test Results for Differences between Weekday and Weekend 
Price Deviations 
Company 
H0  Price Deviation of 
Weekday Series-Price 
Deviation of Weekend 
Series=0 
H0  Log Price Deviation of 
Weekday Series-Log Price 






COMI -0.0056 -0.358 -0.13% -0.414 
SUCE -0.069 -1.063 -0.57% -0.893 
HRHO -0.0075 -0.063 0.93% 1.0057 
ORTE -0.0292 -0.605 -0.12% -0.473 
OCIC -0.11 -1.14 0.05% 0.16 
LECI 0.225 0.92 3.22% 0.583 
ETEL -0.052 -0.86 -0.30% -0.621 
PHDC 0.169 0.444 0.63% 0.149 
















Company Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation T-Test 
COMI -22.43% 15.63% -0.02% 2.67% -0.235 
SUCE -53.29% 59.86% -0.12% 8.62% -0.41 
HRHO -27.00% 22.00% -0.01% 5.47% 0.052 
ORTE -12.09% 12.00% 0% 2.35% -0.034 
OCIC -20.23% 222.99% -1.03% 15.83% 0.95 
LECI -101.17% 121.55% -0.29% 21.85% -0.147 
ETEL -60.49% 48.05% -0.19% 5.59% -0.739 
PHDC -65.38% 44.27% -1.04% 16.73% -0.544 
** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% 
 
Table  4-5 Non-Parametric Results on GDR and Stock Return Distribution 
Company 
Wilcoxon 




COMI -0.320 +ve ranks(0.749) 
-0.186
(0.852) 
SUCE 1.268 –ve ranks(0.205) 
-0.905
(0.365) 
HRHO -0.349 +ve ranks(0.727) 
-0.210
(0.834) 
ORTE -1.033 +ve ranks(0.302) 
-0.459
(0.625) 
OCIC -0.201 +ve ranks(0.841) 
-0.370
(0.712) 
LECI -0.080 –ve ranks(0.936) 
-0.096
(0.923) 
ETEL -1.435 –ve ranks(0.151) 
-1.498
(0.134) 








Table  4-6 Price Deviation Measures Pre-Post Exchange Rate Regime Shift 
 Price Deviation Relative Price Deviation 
 Before After 
T-stat 
Before After 







COMI 0.071** 0.078 0.463* 0.419 -36.234 4.24%** 0.18% 7.96%* 4.55% -16.874
SUCE -0.090* 0.188 -0.157* 0.941 2.215 -2.65%* 5.39% -2.09%* 9.03% -1.490
OCIC 0.120** 0.218 0.534* 1.780 -8.837 3.76%** 7.45% 2.11%* 7.18% 5.494
ORTE -0.112** 0.091 -0.422* 1.019 12.355 -8.69%** 6.71% -2.59%* 4.27% -20.206
** and * indicates deviation significance at 1% level and 5% level 
 
Table  4-7 Return Deviation Pre-Post Exchange Rate Regime Shift 
 Before After 
T-stat 
(Difference of 
Means)  Mean St Deviation Mean St Deviation 
COMI -0.02% 0.07% -0.02% 0.11% 0.030 
SUCE -0.01% 2.77% -0.12% 7.35% 0.392 
OCIC -0.06% 3.84% 0.00% 8.89% -0.145 
ORTE -0.01% 4.29% -0.02% 2.33% 0.045 


















5 THE PROOF IS IN THE PUDDING: ARBITRAGE IS 
POSSIBLE IN LIMITED MARKETS 
 
“As better data become available and as our econometric sophistication increases, we are beginning 
to find inconsistencies that our cruder data and techniques missed in the past. It is evidence which we 
will not be able to ignore”  
    Michael Jensen, 1978, Journal of Financial Economics 
5.1 Introduction 
  Arbitrage, the simultaneous purchasing and selling of identical assets to  
take advantage of price differences,  has been referred to as “one of the central 
concepts of financial economics” (Mitchell et al., 2002). Nonetheless, empirical 
evidence for the contribution of arbitrage trades in price convergence is still limited 
and tends to involve joint hypotheses. In this paper, we study arbitrage in the market 
for emerging market depository receipts (DRs).  
 In theory, arbitrage should keep the prices of a DR in parity with its underlying 
stock, as long as arbitrage costs are sufficiently small. In financial models, the costs 
of arbitrage are typically assumed to be zero, so arbitrage opportunities disappear 
almost as quickly as they appear. As prices diverge, arbitrageurs intervene to bring 
prices back to parity by buying the underpriced security in one market and selling the 
other at a higher price in the other market, thereby making risk-free profit. A unique 
feature of DRs that ensures efficient arbitrage is their fungibility, which allows 
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arbitrageurs to exchange freely between the cross-listed pair. Because evidence on 
arbitrage opportunities in DRs is limited, the role of arbitrage trades in this price 
convergence process is lacking.  
 Early studies find no evidence for significant deviations from parity in DRs, 
supporting a theoretical perspective (Rosenthal, 1983; Kato et al., 1991 and Park and 
Tavakkol, 1994). These studies have small samples, however, and given the time 
differences between markets, compare daily closing prices at different points in time. 
More recent studies using intraday data continue to support the theoretical 
perspective. They find either zero arbitrage opportunities (Miller and Morey, 1996) 
or extremely small, infrequent, and short-lived opportunities (Suarez, 2005). These 
studies focus on developed-market DRs, in which trading costs are relatively low, 
liquidity is relatively high, and trading barriers are absent. But these conditions do 
not hold in many emerging markets, and emerging market DRs have increasingly 
come to dominate foreign cross-listing (Global Finance, 2010). A recent study by 
Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) provides evidence for large deviations from parity in 
emerging market DRs. Their underlying data are sampled daily, however, so one 
cannot infer that it would have been cost-effective or feasible to trade away these 
apparent price deviations.  
Our study uses intraday data to examine whether arbitrage trades influence 
price convergence in emerging-market DRs with limits to arbitrage. Our sample 
comprises two years of data on Egyptian stocks listed on the Egyptian Stock 
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Exchange (EGX) and cross-listed as Global DRs (GDRs) on the London Stock 
exchange (LSE), as well as Argentinean stocks listed on the Buenos Aires Stock 
Exchange (BCBA) and cross-listed as US DRs (ADRs) on US exchanges. The 
inclusion of different host and destination countries enables us to compare results 
across settings. Furthermore, our sample overcomes asynchronousity problems by 
focusing on overlapping periods when arbitrageurs could trade both the DR and the 
underlying stock. In the emerging markets we study, limits to arbitrage include high 
trading costs and short-sales restrictions (Bris et al., 2007). Argentina also has capital 
controls, although Egypt did not at the time of our study.4 Arbitrage trades are 
hypothesized to be difficult to conduct in such a context, and we provide the first 
real empirical test for this hypothesis. 
Our investigation provides evidence for the notion that arbitrage 
opportunities exist in emerging-market DRs and that arbitrageurs are active despite 
substantial limits to arbitrage. We estimate the price deviations between DRs and 
their underlying stock, and find that, consistent with Gagnon and Karolyi’s (2010) 
findings, economically significant intraday deviations from parity do exist and can be 
as high as 24% for Egyptian DRs and 57% for Argentinean DRs.  
A novel arbitrage identification procedure that incorporates accurate trading 
cost estimates as well as volumes classifies only 15% of Egyptian and 10% of 
Argentinean price deviations as profitable arbitrage opportunities. We find that they 

4 Argentina has a capital control on inflows: 30% of any money transfers into the country must be deposited with the 
central bank for a minimum of one year. Egypt currently has capital controls, which were instated after the Egyptian 
Revolution of 25 January 2011. 
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linger for an average of 46 minutes in Egyptian securities and 14 minutes in 
Argentinean securities, and that it takes on average 1.58 trades in Egypt and 1.9 
trades in Argentina for those opportunities to disappear. These statistics vary within 
the sample, with arbitrage opportunities in more liquid and active securities persisting 
for shorter periods.  
We finally consider whether such arbitrage opportunities involve real 
arbitrage trades that contribute to the convergence of prices to the no-arbitrage 
bands. Our methodology relies on the application of a filtering algorithm on our 
transaction data, which extracts real arbitrage trades. A conservative arbitrage trading 
strategy reveals profits of approximately USD 1.2 million and USD 1.8 million from 
arbitrage operations involving Egyptian and Argentinean DRs, respectively, over the 
two-year period we analyzed.  
Our paper contributes to two main areas of study in the multimarket 
microstructure literature. (1) It builds on a number of studies concerned with testing 
arbitrage efficiency by determining if arbitrage opportunities exist between foreign 
cross-listed stock and their underlying securities – an open issue despite decades of 
research. (2) This study draws on a slim body of literature that tests whether trades 
are important for price convergence between cross-listed stocks (Kaul and Mehrotra, 
2007) by using a novel empirical methodology that does not suffer from the joint 
hypothesis problems inherent in price discovery methodologies.   
This paper is organized as follows. Section 5.2 presents our data description and 
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price deviation construction. In Section 5.3, we present our tests and the results of 
our arbitrage analysis; and Section 5.4 provides a discussion of our results. Section 
5.5 concludes.  
5.2 Data Description and Price Deviation Construction 
In this section, we present our data description as well as the intraday price 
matching methodology we use to construct the price deviation series and test for 
price parity between the depository receipt (DR) and its underlying stock.  
5.2.1 Data Description  
Our intraday transaction data consist of date, timestamps, prices and volumes 
for Egyptian stocks, and their GDRs from 2 January 2008 to 14 March 2010, as well 
as Argentinean stocks and their ADRs from 2 January 2008 until 31 December 
20095. We also obtain intraday foreign exchange quote data for the EGP-to-USD 
exchange rate and ARS-to-USD for the period. Our intraday trade and foreign 
exchange data were obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History Database6, 
providing price resolution of USD .01 or better and a time resolution of 0.001 
second. We are therefore provided with individual intraday data of approximately 3.8 
million observations on the DRs and stocks, as well as 65,964 Bid-Ask quotes for the 
EGP/USD exchange rate and 229,045 observations for the ARS/USD.  
For identifying arbitrage opportunities, we use trading cost estimates 

5 We pick DRs with underlying stocks having ISIN numbers registered on the Egyptian and  Argentinean stock exchanges.  




published by Elkins McSherry7 and arbitrage trading costs from the Bank of New 
York Mellon website. Our cost estimates provide the most precise and 
comprehensive estimate of arbitrage trading costs presented in arbitrage studies to 
date, an issue we discuss in greater depth in Section 3.  
A summary of our sample of Egyptian and Argentinean DRs listed overseas 
is presented in Table 5-1, which includes their ticker symbol, bundling ratio ( the 
number of shares included in each depository receipt), value traded in USD million, 
and number of intraday trades in the sample. DRs with extremely low activity (less 
than 75 days trading in either market) were excluded, leaving us with 6 Egyptian 
GDR stock pairs and 10 Argentinean ADR stock pairs. These companies are among 
the largest in their local markets, comprising an average of 30% of the Egyptian and 
61% of the Argentinean market capitalizations during the sample period.  
INSERT TABLE 5-1 HERE 
Although the average foreign exchange adjusted price of the underlying stock 
does not deviate greatly from the DR prices in our sample, we find a large 
discrepancy in trading activity because the market for the majority of the traded value 
of the securities varies across the sample. For companies such as ORTE and IRS, 
most of the value is trading in the foreign market; for the others, the proportion of 
the traded value varies, with companies such as PHDC having less than 10% of their 

7 Trading costs include explicit costs (commissions, taxes, and fees), as well as implicit costs 
(market impact costs computed by comparing the trade price to a VWAP benchmark price on the 
day of the trade). Domowitz et al. (2001) and Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) use the same source for 
trading costs, and they verify its accuracy. 
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total value trading on the foreign market. In general, Argentinean securities seem to 
be trading with greater activity in the foreign market than Egyptian ones are. 
5.2.2 Price Deviation Construction 
 The first step in the arbitrage analysis is to measure the deviation between 
prices. We rely on the most widely used measures of price deviation:  
௧ܦ  ൌ ௧ܲ஽ோ െ
௉೟ೄ೟೚೎ೖכ௕
ௌ೟






ሻ                    (5.2) 
where Dt = the price deviation at time t, ܴܦ௧=relative log price deviation at time t,  
௧ܲ
஽ோ = the price of the depository receipt in USD, ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞  is the price of the כ
underlying stock, ܵ௧ is the exchange rate measured as USD per unit of foreign 
currency, and b is the bundling ratio. 
The price deviation measures are typically measured using daily closing 
prices. We start by using daily closing prices for our sample of DRs and their 
underlying stock and present the results in Table 5-2. As expected, daily price 
deviations show large and significant deviations from parity. Despite this, the 
correlations between prices is very high, corroborating the evidence that they follow 
each other in the long run. Moreover, Appendix 3 shows the price charts for our 
DR-stock pairs which also confirm that the prices move together in the long run.  
INSERT TABLE 5-2 HERE 
Because markets in different jurisdictions rarely close simultaneously, 
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however, a non-zero measured deviation using daily closing prices would not 
necessarily correspond to a deviation in real time. We rely on matched intraday prices 
to capture such real-time deviations, focusing on the hours when trading is active in 
both relevant markets.  
Intraday data, although preferable to daily data, present their own challenges, 
because true synchronicity among depository receipt prices, share prices, and 
exchange rates is rare. Miller and Morey (1996), who use quote data to identify 
forgone arbitrage opportunities, require that all three prices be matched within 
specific intervals of one minute; Suarez (2005), who also uses quote data, requires a 
one-second match. Our data, however, comprise trade records rather than quote 
records, as our aim is not merely to identify arbitrage opportunities, but to identify 
actual arbitrage trades from the data set. We therefore rely on the minspan matching 
procedure of Harris et al. (1995). 
We proceed with the minspan matching algorithm, which requires two steps: 
(1) to create a USD value for the underlying share, ௉೟
ೄ೟೚೎ೖכ௕
ௌ೟
 by matching the stock 
price and exchange rates in time; and (2) to match it with the USD-denominated DR 
price, ௧ܲ஽ோ For Step (1), we adjust every trade on the local stock market with the 
exchange rate mid-quote, calculated as (ask+bid)/2, with the closest time proximity 




with the DR price, ௧ܲ஽ோǡthe trade of which occurs closest in 
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time to the underlying stock trade ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ We look both forward and backward in 
time to the underlying stock trade ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞and match it with the DR trade that occurs 
within a minimum time span. This intraday matching technique gives us vectors of 
matched DR- and USD-denominated stock trades that do not always occur at the 
same timestamp t, and we take t to denote the time on stock trade ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞. 
Table 5-3 presents some statistics of our intraday matching exercise. Our 
final sample yields 74,899 matched observations for Egyptian DR stock pairs and 
162,622 for Argentinean DR stock pairs. The mean time span between the trades is 1 
minute 3 seconds in Egypt and 5 minutes 6 seconds in Argentina. The maximum 
time difference between our trades can go as high as 1:20:38 in Egypt for HRHO 
and 5:55:38 in Argentina for TGS2, which reflects the illiquidity that sometimes 
occurs in the trading of emerging market stocks.  
INSERT TABLE 5-3 HERE 
Table 5-4 presents descriptive statistics of the price deviation measures 
presented in equation (1) and (2). The average price deviations are significant across 
our the two different measures for 15 out of our 16 securities (exception is HRHO). 
Deviations can reach as high as $5 or 25% for Egyptian DR-stock pairs and $10.28 
or 56.55% for Argentinean DR-sock pairs. There are two interesting observations. 
On average, price deviations for Egyptian securities are around -0.61% and for 
Argentinean securities it is much higher around -2.78%. This indicates that across 
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both samples, Egyptian securities trade at lower price deviations than Argentinean 
ones. 
INSERT TABLE 5-4 HERE 
Our price deviations are skewed to the negative side when the DR is trading 
at a discount to the stock in both markets.  Figure 5-1 shows the a graphical 
illustration of this is by charting the intraday price deviation series for Orascom 
Telecom (ORTE) and Banco Marco(BMA) and their histograms. Appendix 4 
contains all price deviation charts for our sample securities and their histograms.  We 
can see that price deviations fluctuate greatly and are skewed to the discount side.  
This is evident in more securities than other. For example, BMA, shows a greater 
frequency of the DR trading at a discount than a premium. It makes more sense to 
have discounts in our sample as a natural consequence of the short selling 
restrictions and capital controls. We will discuss this point further in the next section.  
INSERT FIGURE 5-1 HERE 
There are several takeaways from the price deviation analysis. First, price 
deviations between the DR-stock pairs are significantly large, and that this result is 
even across our sample and is not biased by the type of measure nor the size, sector 
or liquidity of the company. Therefore, this indicates that asynchronous trading 
hours is not the main reason for such price deviations. The main question is thus 




opportunities or just a reflection of large trading costs and arbitrage barriers which 
widen the no- arbitrage band inside which prices deviate without being considered 
profitable arbitrage opportunities.  
 Second, comparatively, the fact that Argentinean securities trade at larger 
deviations forces another question: whether these deviations are due to larger trading 
costs in Argentinean or that indeed Argentinean securities have larger arbitrage 
opportunities than Egyptian ones. This comparison is important since it allows us to 
compare the efficiency of the markets involved, most importantly the efficiency of 
pricing of securities listed on American Exchanges versus the London Stock 
Exchange.  In order to test these two questions we need to identify whether such 
price deviations are indeed arbitrage opportunities, which we present in the next 
section. 
5.3 Tests and Results 
Theoretically, arbitrage can occur in both direction of the price deviation. If the 
depository receipt is selling at a higher price than the underlying stock, an arbitrageur 
should be able to buy the stock and short sell the DR and vice versa, making instant 
profit as long as such an arbitrage process compensates for the therefore identify 
them using the absolute form of our price deviation measures. Table 5-5 presents the 
results of analyzing the absolute form of the price deviation measures.  
INSERT TABLE 5-5 HERE 
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We still find that price deviations are large and significant and this is now 
consistent across all of our stocks. The question therefore becomes: Are these price 
deviations really an indication of arbitrage opportunities? To identify arbitrage 
opportunities in the DR market empirically, we need to capture the exact process of 
arbitrage. An arbitrageur facing a price deviation between the DR and its USD-
adjusted stock price, will conduct an arbitrage trade only if it is profitable. 
Profitability of arbitrage trades depend on two factors: the arbitrage trading costs 
involved and whether there are enough volumes to trade in both markets.  
In Section 3.1 we introduce a new arbitrage identification procedure that 
identifies arbitrage opportunities using price deviations, volumes and external 
estimates of trading and arbitrage costs. After all, if we do not find any arbitrage 
opportunities in our sample, the issue of whether arbitrage trades contribute to price 
convergence becomes irrelevant. An affirmative result here establishes that arbitrage 
opportunities do arise in our markets and  in Section 3.2 we examine the frequency, 
speed of convergence and duration of arbitrage opportunities in our markets.   
5.3.1 Identifying Arbitrage Opportunities in Emerging Market DRs 

To identify arbitrage opportunities in the DR market empirically, we need to 
capture the exact process of arbitrage. An arbitrageur facing a price deviation 
between the DR and its USD-adjusted stock price, will conduct an arbitrage trade 
only if it is profitable. Profitability of arbitrage trades depend on two factors: the 
90 
 
arbitrage trading costs involved and whether there are enough volumes to trade in 
both markets. Previous efforts in identifying arbitrage opportunities in DRs suffer 
from two main limitations: the inaccurate estimating of trading cost and failure to 
account for volumes of trade. Before we introduce our novel identification 
procedure that recognizes both factors, we discuss their importance in identifying 
arbitrage opportunities.  
Trading costs create an arbitrage band around a security’s equilibrium value 
(Kato et al., 1991), and in order for the arbitrage to be lucrative, the absolute price 
differential ȁܦ௧ȁmust exceed the cost k of implementing the arbitrage. In their 
intraday arbitrage analysis, Miller and Morey (1996) and Suarez (2005) use historical 
trading costs that do not match their time series. Moreover, they did not consider 
some major arbitrage cost components such as global custodian and safekeeping 
fees, both of which are significant8. This issue does not present a serious problem for 
their results, because they study arbitrage in developed market stocks, which usually 
have small and stable costs of trade.  We need to be extremely careful in estimating 
the costs of arbitrage in emerging markets, however, as they are known to have large 
trading costs (Domowitz et al., 2001), which, as we will soon show, fluctuate greatly 
from year to year. Furthermore, we need to make an accurate account of all costs 
involved in arbitrage activity. 

8 We conduct two interviews with brokers in EFG Hermes and Pharos and would like for pointing 
out those costs of arbitrage. 
91 
 
Previous arbitrage identification procedures rely on a comparison of price 
deviations with trading costs without inclusion of any volumes. In this paper, our 
sample involves emerging market securities in which liquidity and activity vary greatly 
across the sample, making volume a significant variable. Without sufficient volumes 
available to trade, it will be difficult for an arbitrageur to cover the large fixed trading 
costs, even if the deviation is quite considerable. This volume effect is reinforced by 
Hsu and Wang (2008), who find that sudden differences in volumes of trade in 
emerging market cross-listed stocks can create arbitrage opportunities.  
Our procedure classifies a matched price deviation as an arbitrage 
opportunity when: 
ȁܦ௧ȁ ൐  (௧        (5.3ܭ
where ȁܦ௧ȁ is our absolute price deviation and ܭ௧ corresponds to the cost of 
arbitrage in every t.  
Because the cost of trading in our emerging market sample is relatively large, 
we gather hand-picked trading cost estimates, as shown in Table 5-6, from a variety 
of sources, including Elkins & McSherry trading cost averages and the Bank of New 
York Mellon. We account for all costs of conducting an arbitrage in the DR market, 
which, besides brokerage fees, includes foreign exchange rate fees, settlement, 
safekeeping fees, and DR conversion fees.  
INSERT TABLE 5-6 HERE 
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Unlike previous studies, the cost of arbitrage is not fixed across the sample but 
is dynamically estimated for each price deviation. We define ܭ௧as: 
௧ܭ   ൌ
୩ϐ౟౮౛ౚ
௏௢௟೟
൅ ୲୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣ  and      
୲୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣ ൌ ሺ୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣୈୖ כ ܴ௧ሻ ൅ ሺ୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣୗ כ
ୗ౪כୠ
୊ଡ଼೟
ሻ    (5.4) 
Where ϐ୧୶ୣୢ comprises fixed global custodian fees (including safe keeping and 
settlement fees) and DR conversion fees, ୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣୈୖ  and ୴ୟ୰୧ୟୠ୪ୣୗ comprises all costs 
of trading the DR and stock that are quoted in basis points per share. ܸ݈݋௧ 
corresponds to the volume of trade available at time t. If ܸ݈݋௧is small, this will make 
the fixed costs quite large and therefore it will not be profitable to arbitrage the price 
deviation.  
 ௧ can be estimated as the minimum of the volumes associated with the݈݋ܸ
matched prices. However, the volumes associated with the matched trades are not 
reflective of the actual volume due to order splitting9. In our trade data, we observe a 
split order as a series of consecutive trades executed at the same price, with 
timestamps that occur within small differences of each other and with small volumes.  
We thus design an algorithm that calculates aggregate volumes of trade. With 
trades matched by the minspan approach, assume that we have a matched trade in 
which the stock trade is followed by the DR trade. For the stock, we identify 
whether order splitting occurred, by checking previous trades to the matched trade 

9 Order splitting is an order-submission strategy that is used extensively to reduce the cost of order execution and to 
minimize the price impact of a trade (Tkatch & Alam, 2009) 
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one by one. If the previous trade to the stock has the same price and a timestamp of 
less than 10 minutes difference, we automatically aggregate its volume to the 
matched trade volume and proceed to the previous trade, and so on. We abort the 
aggregation with the following order criteria: (1) we reach a previously matched DR 
stock trade, (2) the stock price changes, and (3) the timestamp difference between 
the first and last aggregated trade is greater than 10 minutes. We save the aggregate 
as  ܸ݈݋௧
ௌ௧௢௖௞. For the DR, we use the same rule, moving forward, stopping the 
aggregation only when we reach another matched trade, price change, or large time 
change, and save the aggregate ܸ݈݋௧
஽ோ. Our matched volume ܸ݈݋௧in equation (3) is 
the minimum of the two blocks ܸ݈݋௧
ௌ௧௢௖௞andܸ݈݋௧
஽ோ. We follow the same 
approach should the DR trade be matched with a subsequent stock trade.  
5.3.2 Frequency and Persistence of Arbitrage Opportunities 
We compare ȁܦ௧ȁ with ܭ௧in order to identify arbitrage opportunities. Table 5-
7 presents results of the identification procedure, including the frequency of 
arbitrage opportunities as well as descriptive statistics of the mispricing.  On average, 
9.81% of Argentinean and 15.32% of Egyptian trades matched price deviations were 
identified as profitable arbitrage opportunities. The descriptive statistics of the price 
deviations classified as arbitrage opportunities give an indication of the size of the 
thresholds around the no-arbitrage zone. Price deviations need to exceed on average 
23 cents or 2.25%  in Argentina and 45 cents or 1.29% in Egypt to be classified as 
arbitrage opportunities.  
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INSERT TABLE 5-7 HERE 
Table 5-8 summarizes the speed of convergence and persistence of arbitrage 
opportunities. The average time for securities to return to the no-arbitrage zone – 
defined as time it takes until a non-profitable price deviation occurs – is much slower 
for Egyptian (46 minutes) than Argentinean securities (14 minutes), with large 
variation among securities. The speed of convergence is implicitly measured from 
each dataset to avoid joint-hypothesis problems experienced by Suarez (2005b) and 
Rabinovitch et al. (2003), who use the Self Exciting Threshold Autoregressive Model 
(SETAR) to measure convergence speed.   
INSERT TABLE 5-8 HERE 
Kozhan and Tham (2009) define an efficient arbitrage as the one being 
eliminated by the next incoming trade. It takes an average of approximately two 
trades for both Argentinean and Egyptian arbitrage opportunities to disappear. It is 
striking that arbitrage opportunities can persist in intraday data for as many as 15 
trades in the Egyptian sample and 114 trades in the Argentinean sample. We find 
that arbitrage opportunities were most likely to persist during the financial crisis in 
September to November 2008,10. On average, 35.13% of Argentinean and 40.3% of 
Egyptian arbitrage opportunities converge to the no-arbitrage zone after one trade. 
For those arbitrage opportunities that do not disappear in one trade, approximately 
51% of Argentinean and 54% of Egyptian arbitrage opportunities disappear by the 

10 This was verified with a separate analysis and result is available upon request.  
95 
 
third trade. The large number of trades required for arbitrage opportunities to 
disappear is consistent with Yeyati et al. (2008), who attribute illiquidity – due to low 
demand and volumes of trades on either the DR or the underlying stock – to the 
creation of a large price disparity that cannot be arbitraged away until the new trades 
take place. 
In summary, large and active companies have the fewest arbitrage 
opportunities, a much higher speed to convergence relative to the other stocks in the 
sample, and the lowest level of persistence in arbitrage opportunities. The results are 
similar in Argentina and Egypt, with the exception of the Argentinean company, 
BMA, which, although it is a large and active security, has many arbitrage 
opportunities. A more in-depth analysis reveals that most of the arbitrage 
opportunities in BMA occurred during the onset of the financial crisis in September 
and October 2008, which severely affected most other financial institutions and 
banks as well.  
It is obvious that it takes a considerable number of trades and time for an 
arbitrage opportunity to disappear in our sample. This brings us to a very important 
question: did these arbitrage opportunities involve real arbitrage activity? This 
requires analyzing the process of arbitrage in emerging market DRs 
5.3.3 The Process of Arbitrage in Emerging Market DRs 
Whether the disappearance of arbitrage opportunities identified in the previous 
section involve arbitrage trades is cast in doubt, theoretically, because those markets 
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have a short-selling restriction and capital controls that are hypothesized to limit 
arbitrage. As Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) discuss, if short selling is prohibited in the 
home market, the situation in which the DR is selling at a discount to the stock 
would be difficult to arbitrage. Moreover, capital controls in Argentina can affect 
arbitrageurs by preventing them from moving cash to buy the underpriced security 
(Yeyati et al., 2008). Neither arguments were supplemented by formal empirical tests.  
We identify real arbitrage trades from the transaction data. A profitable price 
deviation is defined as a real arbitrage trade if it involves matching volumes in both 
markets. Let us assume, for example, that we have a trade on the LSE at 11:00:20 am 
on the DR of ORTE for USD 59.5 and volume of 1100 , and then at 11:00:22 am we 
have a similar trade for ORTE stock on the EGX for a volume of 5500 (translated to 
1100 DRs at the bundling ratio) and  price of USD 60 (adjusted for the closest 
intraday EGP/USD spot exchange rate). If the price deviation of USD 0.50/share is 
net profitable, it can also be classified as a real arbitrage trade, because identical 
trades occurred in both markets within a short time (limited to 10 minutes).  
We extract samples from the data of the trades identified as real arbitrage 
trades. Figure 5.2  illustrates some of trade data of the extracted sample for a sample 
of our companies. More examples from trade-data for all of our 16 can be found in 
Appendix 7. Highlighted trades, which were identified as real arbitrage by our 
classification algorithm, are indeed identical in volume in both markets, 
corroborating the evidence that they are made by arbitrageurs entering the market 
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for profit. Our extracted trades reveal that they occurred when the DR was selling at 
a discount to the stock and when the DR selling at a premium to the stock.   
INSERT FIGURE 5-2 HERE 
The reality for arbitrage trades for all of our 16 DR stock pairs is daunting, 
especially as it shows that profitable arbitrage trades occur during different times and 
days, with different volumes (as high as 100,000 shares for Orascom Telecom on 31 
March 2008, resulting in over USD 20,000 profit in less than a minute!) and with 
extreme precision (observe, for example, the 676 shares on both sides of the market 
on Commercial International Bank). It is noteworthy that our matching algorithm 
provides a highly conservative estimate of arbitrage activity in our sample, as it 
matches only trades that are executed within 10 minutes of each other, and we 
aggregate only trades that were executed at the same price. This may not be always 
be the case, because arbitrageurs can be risky and fill their arbitrage orders at 
different prices or within times greater than 10 minutes.  
We estimate the profits from real arbitrage trades as: 
 ൌ σ ȁሺ୲ȁ െ ୲ሻ୲୘୲ୀଵ       (5.5) 
The First part of Table 5-9 presents the proportion of real arbitrage trades 
from all our identified arbitrage opportunities. It shows that, on average, 70% of 
Egyptian and 88% of Argentinean arbitrage opportunities involved real arbitrage 
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activity. The remaining arbitrage opportunities that were not identified as real 
arbitrage trade (labeled lost) are either a result of our conservative algorithm or a 
result of such trades being large block trades. Indeed, we find that the average 
volume of a lost arbitrage trade is triple that of a real arbitrage trade.    
INSERT TABLE 5-9 HERE 
The second part of Table 5-9 shows that arbitrageurs over our sample period 
could have made up to USD 1.2 million in profits from cross-listed Egyptian 
securities and USD 1.77 million from cross-listed Argentinean securities. Whereas 
most of the profits are made when the DR is selling at a discount to the stock, there 
is still considerable profit from arbitrage operations when the DR is selling at a 
premium. Arbitrage profits from Egyptian securities are distributed among the 
various stocks. Profits in the Argentinean sample are concentrated in one stock, 
however – BMA – which we have shown to have a large frequency of arbitrage 
opportunities during the financial crisis.  
The results of our arbitrage analysis above confirms the hypothesis set forth in 
Suarez(2005) that cross-listed stock with lower trading frequencies, such as those 
from emerging markets, present large arbitrage opportunities and that arbitrage 
trades are a main contributor in those markets for prices to converge (Kaul and 
Mehrotra, 2007). Our results of our analysis can be summarized as follows (1) 
empirically identifying arbitrage opportunities requires intraday data that not only 
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matched prices but also volumes and precise account of arbitrage trading costs, (2) 
although price of emerging market DRs and their underlying stock deviate greatly, 
most of those deviations are indeed not profitable due to the large trading costs 
involved and finally that (3) arbitrage opportunities are real and (4) arbitrage trades 
are needed for prices to converge.
 
5.4 Further Discussion 
In this section, we provide an in-depth discussion of how arbitrage  occurs with 
limits to arbitrage that were previously hypothesized to hamper arbitrage activity. We 
also discuss whether arbitrage opportunities are equally distributed across the sample 
period and  try to explain some of the reasons why not all  arbitrage opportunities 
disappear with arbitrage trades.  
5.4.1 Arbitrage Operations under Limits to Arbitrage  
 The most striking result of our arbitrage analysis is that the presence of various 
limits to arbitrage did not prevent arbitrageurs from exploiting them and did not stop 
arbitrage operations from  occurring. Below we discuss the limits to arbitrage that are 
present in our sample, mainly trading barriers and time differences, and the 
mechanisms by which arbitrageurs can overcome them.  
5.4.1.1 Capital Controls  
Assume that with the capital control in-place on inflows in Argentina, at time 




஽ோis currently at a premium to the quoted stock price ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ after adjusting for 
foreign exchange rate using the current ܵ௧and that the price deviation and volumes 
quoted for the DR-stock pair make this deviation profitable.  
We present to this setup a local arbitrageur holding a portfolio of 
Argentinean pesos(ARS) in Argentinean banks and US dollars in American banks, 
has cash holdings ܶܨܥ௧ିଵset at time t-1  where ܶܨܥ௧ିଵ ൌ ሼܨܥ௧ିଵ஺ோௌǡ ௧ିଵ̈́ܨܥ ሽǤWhen 
this local arbitrageur observes the profitable price deviation at time t,  she can 
instantaneously  buy the local stock with holding of ARS and short sell the DR and 
deposit the proceedings in US dollars in her American bank. She will then convert 
the stock to depository receipts and close her short position on the NYSE. The total 
value of her cash portfolio is currently better off by the profits net the arbitrage 
trading costs, although the profits are currently held in a different currency. Should 
the arbitrageur decide to transfer her dollar proceedings to the local Argentinean 
peso, she will have to make sure that 30% of the cash transferred is kept in her local 
bank for the next year to abide by the capital control in Argentina. This should not 
present a real problem for such a large and savvy international arbitrageur, assuming 
that the frequency of arbitrage opportunities are large enough to justify this practice . 
5.4.1.2 Short Selling Restriction 
Two way arbitrage can be done in practice even in the presence of short selling 
restrictions by arbitrageurs who trade against their own or their clients’ accounts with 
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large diversified holdings11. Assume that with short selling restriction in Egypt, the 
price of the Egyptian ORTE DR trading on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
௧ܲ
஽ோcurrently sells at a discount to the stock price ௧ܲௌ௧௢௖௞ after adjusting for foreign 
exchange rate using the current ܵ௧and that the price deviation and volumes quoted 
for the DR-stock pair make this deviation profitable.  
Now assume an arbitrageur is also an investor (or acts on behalf of one) in the 
Egyptian market with a diversified portfolio holding of large Egyptian stocks ܲܪ௧ିଵ 
and holds a number of share of ORTE ܪ௧ିଵைோ்ா . When this local arbitrageur observes 
the profitable price deviation at time t,  she can instantaneously buy the DR and sell a 
portion of her holding of ORTE in the local market, then convert the DR to the 
stock, thus locking instant abnormal returns on her (or her clients’) portfolio without 
affecting their underlying stock inventory ܪ௧ିଵைோ்ா ൌ  ௧ைோ்ாܪ
5.4.2 Arbitrage Opportunities Across Sample Period 
We compare the frequency of arbitrage opportunities month by month 
throughout the sample. Appendix 8 shows the frequency of arbitrage opportunities 
per month in each of our securities.   
 In Egypt, we find that arbitrage opportunities are evenly distributed across the 
sample, showing no significant pattern. However, in Argentina arbitrage 
opportunities appear to be most frequent during May, June and July 2008 as well as 

11 Indeed two interviews with arbitrageurs in Egyptian DRs reveal that this is the case.  
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during the onset of the financial crisis in September, October and November 2008.  
This indicates that the volatility and excessive co-movements that characterized these 
periods  created significant price differences between the DR  and it underlying 
stock. Moreover, we find that for Banco Marco (BMA), the Argentinean bank with 
the largest frequency of arbitrage opportunities, this was a sign of the toll that the 
crisis took on the pricing behavior of financial services equity.  
Our extracted trading subsets show that arbitrage activity was persistent during 
these months, providing proof that active arbitrageurs monitor the market to make 
use of the price differences and have made considerable profits from the volatility 
Argentinean DRs arbitrage during the crisis.  
We also analyze whether arbitrage opportunities appear during a certain time 
of the trading overlap. Miller and Morey (1996) point out that volatility can be high 
during the opening and closing of the trading overlap as prices adjust to each other. 
Appendix 9 shows the size of the price deviation by time of the overlap. No 
significant pattern is observed, similar to the result of Suarez (2005).  
5.4.3 Why are deviation skewed to the discount side? 
The average price deviations for both Egyptian and Argentinean DRs are 
significantly skewed to the negative side. This indicates that the DR mostly sell at 
discounts to their underlying stocks.  
Figure 5.3 shows a histogram of the price deviations for all of our sample 
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securities in Egypt and Argentina. Appendix 10 shows the histogram for each 
individual security.   Previous studies such as Gemmill and Thomas (2002) explain 
the persistent discounts by the short selling restriction that make arbitrage difficult to 
carry out. However, since we have shown that arbitrage is possible in our markets, 
the persistent discounts can be explained by trading asymmetry between the foreign 
and local market since traders are only allowed to take bearish positions on the DR, 
thus the more incidence of DR discounts to the underlying stock within the no-
arbitrage band.  
INSERT FIGURE 5.3 HERE 
Moreover, since the companies are more active in their local markets, the 
discounts can be explained by the difference in demand curves of the two markets 
on the DR and the underlying stock, since foreigners can view the DR as more risky 
and demand it only at a discount relative to the underlying stock, up until the limits 
of the no-arbitrage bands. This is especially true due to the period of the sample, 
which is around the financial crisis. Prior to 2008, there has been an increased 
demand by large foreign investors and funds to hold emerging market security, 
which reversed prior to and post the financial crisis.  
Our results on the prevalence of discounts on the DR side in Argentina 
throughout our sample period is contrary to the result of Yeyati et al (2008) who 
show that when capital controls were first instilled in Argentina, this increased the 
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demand on the DR and caused the DR to trade at a premium. The explanation of 
this conflicting result could either be that over time foreign investors have found 
other means of overcoming the capital control, or that the effect of another trading 
barrier, such as the short selling restriction, has a stronger effect on the direction of 
the price deviation, which was missing from Yeyati et al’s(2008) analysis. 
5.4.4 Why aren’t all arbitrage opportunities utilized? 
 Although we show that arbitrage is possible, we attempt to explain the lost 
arbitrage opportunities which were not utilized by arbitrageurs. Lost arbitrage 
opportunities can be due to the limits on arbitrageurs’ capital  (in the case of 
arbitrageurs under capital control restrictions) or stock holdings (in the case of 
arbitrageurs circumventing short selling restrictions) as postulated by Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997). Indeed, we hypothesize that the lost arbitrage opportunities will be 
those that involve larger volumes of stocks (and thus capital) to conduct the 
arbitrage, which typically exceed an arbitrageurs capacity to overcome them.  
 We analyze the difference in the volumes of trades of real versus lost arbitrage 
opportunities. The results presented in Table 5-10 illustrate that on average the 
average size of the lost arbitrage trade is three times that of the real arbitrage trade 
and that the first and third quartile are higher for the lost arbitrage trades.  
INSERT TABLE 5-10 HERE 
5.5 Conclusions  
This paper provides the first real time evidence of arbitrage opportunities in the 
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DR market for cross-listed emerging market stocks in presence of limits to arbitrage. 
We find statistically significant absolute price deviations from parity that average 
around 0.61% between Egyptian DRs and their underlying stock and 2.78%  for 
Argentinean DR and stock pairs. However, using a novel identification procedure for 
identifying arbitrage opportunities that takes prices and volumes into consideration, 
we find that only 15% and 10% of trades in our sample are considered profitable 
arbitrage opportunities in Egypt and Argentina, respectively, reflecting the large and 
cumbersome costs of arbitrage in this market.  
Our results reveal that approximately 70% and 88% of arbitrage opportunities in 
Egypt and Argentina, respectively, involved real arbitrage activity, as identified by 
symmetric arbitrage trades in the stock and DR extracted from the trade data. 
Arbitrageurs in our sample markets seem to be doing a good job in maintaining price 
efficiency by allowing most trades to converge to no-arbitrage zones in two trades, 
but which might take a long period of time averaging 46 minutes in Egyptian DRs 
and 14 minutes in Argentinean ones, reflecting the lower activity of trade on some 
stocks in the sample. However, we observe that there is a large disparity between the 
size, frequency, duration and speed of convergence amongst the individual stocks 
that are all related to the liquidity of the DR. For liquid DRs that have a considerable 
part of their value trading in the foreign market such as ORTE and OCIC from 
Egypt and GFG, FRA and MET from Argentina, we find that they have the smallest 
price deviation, the lowest frequency of arbitrage opportunities and the fastest speed 
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and duration to converge to no-arbitrage zones. This confirms the hypothesis that 
the higher the liquidity of DRs, the smaller the number of arbitrage opportunities.   
We reach a point in our analysis that necessitates discussing why such large and 
profitable arbitrage opportunities exist in emerging markets, even in presence of 
limits to arbitrage such as large trading costs, short selling restrictions and capital 
controls. Arbitrage opportunities arise because of differential price movements 
between markets, which can occur as a result of information asymmetry, differential 
co-movements of assets with the markets in which they trade and different consumer 
sentiments (Grossman et al, 2007;Arquete et al, 2008). Moreover, special events such 
as wars, financial crises and regulatory changes (Hsu and Wang, 2008) can cause 
prices to deviate during these special periods. Indeed, we can see that during the 
financial crises, prices of Argentinean DRs greatly deviated from each other, creating 
large and profitable arbitrage opportunities.  
Our paper contributes to pre-existing studies on arbitrage in the DR market as 
follows. It supplements the study of Gagnon and Karolyi (2010) by dissecting their 
observations on large price deviations in cross-listed emerging market equity with 
limits to arbitrage to show that arbitrage opportunities do exist. It also provides 
empirical proof to the results of Kaul and Merhotra (2007) on the role of trades in 
price convergence. To the authors’ knowledge, this is the first evidence of the 
presence of arbitrage trades in DRs, which was probably concealed so far from 
studies by arbitrageurs who profit from such an anomaly. However, whether we as 
107 
 
individuals can take a piece of the pie might prove difficult since such activity must 
be institutionalized by large traders with large capital holdings to overcome the limits 
present. Further studies to this one need to explore whether arbitrage activity persist 




Table  5-1 Summary of Egyptian and Argentinean Companies 
Ticker 
Symbol Bundling Ratio 
Market Cap 
(USD Million) 




Average Price in 
Sample (USD) 
   Stock DR Stock DR Stock DR
    
COMI 1:1 2,969.05 3,756.22 551.12 542 533 10.16 10.27
HRHO 1:2 1,318.33 5,843.81 201.65 542 351 12.34 13.04
ORTE 1:5 3,672.07 7,216.55 13,858.65 535 557 8.09 8.02
OCIC 1:1 9,622.32 7,943.14 7,726.08 542 558 47.64 47.46
ETEL 1:5 4,370.13 76,341.78 103.51 543 337 15.81 15.47
PHDC 1:5 441.71 1,112.63 95.17 458 96 7.20 8.56
LECI 1:1 151.69 330.86 33.95 542 73 8.22 12.25
SUCE 1:1 1,164.04 131.90 0.19 543 22 7.50 7.84
AEZD 1:3 1,011.38 30,808.18 0.06 543 2 11.24 78.50
    
BMA 1:10 2,361.13 581.22 570.25 491 505 18.74 18.41
FRA 1:3 1,914.88 162.13 95.81 491 505 5.03 4.94
EDN 1:20 239.24 252.64 161.69 491 497 9.54 9.32
GFG 1:10 1,382.89 369.51 190.01 491 505 4.29 4.20
IRS 1:10 822.15 44.11 223.36 484 505 8.15 7.94
MET 1:10 62.75 7.41 4.58 473 448 2.54 2.54
TGS2 1:5 307.38 42.26 15.81 501 491 3.10 3.02
SAM 1:4 706.01 2.62 1.55 219 195 9.56 8.57
CRES 1:10 831.15 48.14 359.79 505 487 13.38 11.73
YPF 1:1 18,661.63 19.96 60.72 391 500 40.77 42.09




 5-2 Long Term Price Parity Tests 

** and * indicate significance at 1% and  5%.  

 




Mean Stdev Min Max Mean Stdev Min Max 
COMI -0.076** 0.179 -0.670 0.800 0.181** 1.92% -12.46% 8.43% 0.997**
HRHO -0.008 0.436 -2.630 2.050 0.227 3.33% -12.28% 12.88% 0.997**
OCIC -0.204** 1.224 -4.056 21.374 0.839** 2.53% -11.00% 44.07% 1.000**
ORTE -0.054** 0.166 -0.645 2.060 0.142** 2.13% -7.72% 28.07% 1.000**
ETEL -0.095* 0.651 -2.159 2.259 0.275* 4.25% -15.36% 13.14% 0.957**
PHDC -0.057 0.617 -2.050 2.526 0.145 9.02% -29.39% 37.39% 0.978**
BMA -0.326** 0.384 -1.466 0.905 0.436** 2.71% -15.55% 3.20% 0.999**
FRA -0.079** 0.171 -0.524 0.739 0.127** 3.93% -18.89% 16.18% 0.995**
EDN -0.220** 0.239 -0.939 0.292 0.240** 3.17% -18.78% 5.89% 0.999**
GFG -0.086** 0.107 -0.430 0.189 0.108** 3.46% -19.70% 3.99% 0.998**
IRS -0.165** 0.230 -1.123 0.475 0.204** 3.50% -19.86% 5.94% 0.998**
MET -0.042** 0.133 -0.455 0.370 0.065** 7.26% -32.74% 21.63% 0.992**
TGS2 -0.057** 0.113 -0.418 0.257 0.078** 4.42% -22.46% 11.17% 0.994**
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Table  5-3 Price Matching Descriptives 
 
Company 
Total Number of 
Observations in 
Sample 
Number of Matched Trades MinSpan Descriptive 







COMI 234,853 10,710 3,800 3,734 3,704 3,580 2,703 0:01:37 1:06:45
HRHO 482,830 1,866 739 728 728 721 645 0:01:06 1:20:38
ORTE 721,854 141,923 41,528 41,502 41,486 41,396 38,759 0:00:19 0:55:33
OCIC 402,162 83,544 27,985 27,941 27,902 27,686 23,921 0:00:34 0:57:53
ETEL 398,201 1,189 469 462 461 454 402 0:01:09 0:55:24
PHDC 288,289 1,038 378 368 366 353 307 0:01:35 1:00:21
All 2,528,189 240,270 74,899 74,735 74,647 74,190 66,737 0:01:03 1:20:38
BMA 84,258 137,422 46,831 46,602 46,283 44,675 33,713 0:01:09 1:18:34
FRA 52,796 63,177 22,427 22,022 21,609 20,082 12,982 0:02:05 1:17:52
EDN 60,815 49,033 17,412 17,078 16,686 15,528 10,659 0:02:05 1:57:19
GFG 120,472 166,653 43,324 43,193 42,958 41,658 30,772 0:01:07 1:26:37
IRS 12,345 60,294 8,214 7,482 7,048 6,025 3,282 0:05:19 4:00:42
MET 7,301 7,913 2,024 1,499 1,393 1,186 767 0:16:27 4:53:09
TGS2 20,655 13,657 5,830 4,990 4,641 3,943 2,290 0:07:28 5:55:38
CRES 16,982 164,505 15,816 15,495 15,161 13,901 8,946 0:02:14 1:43:56
SAM 634 919 132 39 35 30 13 1:25:10 5:53:01
YPF 8,541.0 4,400.0 612 2,232 1,584 1,422 1,135 0:15:51 5:09:46















Table  5-4 Intraday Price Deviation Results 




Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
COMI -0.08** 0.14 -0.71 0.70 -1.00** 1.76 -12.86 14.88
HRHO 0.05 0.35 -1.87 1.74 0.11 2.82 -12.14 12.41
ORTE -0.05** 0.10 -1.50 1.50 -0.51** 1.28 -24.48 15.02
OCIC -0.21** 0.48 -3.46 5.35 -0.49** 1.04 -9.51 7.70
ETEL -0.15** 0.60 -2.14 2.55 -1.04** 3.89 -15.97 17.37
PHDC -0.05** 0.34 -1.16 1.73 -0.73** 4.24 -17.00 22.27
ALL -0.08 0.19 -3.46 5.35 -0.61 1.36 -24.48 22.27
BMA -0.40** 0.41 -1.81 1.45 -2.76** 2.97 -19.72 5.84
FRA -0.11** 0.18 -1.15 0.92 -2.46** 3.90 -26.82 13.86
EDN -0.29** 0.25 -1.18 0.67 -3.59** 3.69 -21.99 8.10
GFG -0.10** 0.12 -0.78 0.41 -3.10** 4.06 -31.02 15.27
IRS -0.18** 0.24 -1.37 0.46 -2.29** 3.46 -27.53 10.75
MET -0.04** 0.16 -0.61 1.00 -1.74** 7.42 -42.33 24.18
TGS2 -0.09** 0.12 -0.67 0.56 -2.59** 4.44 -25.97 17.65
CRES -0.28** 0.30 -1.67 1.10 -2.39** 3.25 -24.79 10.05
SAM -0.52** 1.25 -4.60 2.10 -5.09** 15.31 -56.55 29.14
YPF -0.75** 1.39 -3.99 10.28 -1.78** 3.77 13.70 -41.27
ALL -0.28 0.47 -4.60 2.10 -2.78 3.75 -56.55 29.14











Table  5-5 Intraday Absolute Price Deviations Results 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Min Max 
  Absolute Price Deviation (USD) Absolute Relative Price Deviation (%) 
COMI 0.14** 0.09  0.00  0.71  1.63** 1.21 0.00 14.88 
HRHO 0.26** 0.24  0.00  1.87  2.08** 1.90 0.00 12.41 
ORTE 0.08** 0.08  0.00  1.50  1.06** 0.88 0.00 24.48 
OCIC 0.38** 0.36  0.00  5.35  0.87** 0.76 0.00 9.51 
ETEL 0.47** 0.39  0.00  2.55  3.08** 2.59 0.00 17.37 
PHDC 0.24** 0.24  0.00  1.73  2.84** 3.23 0.00 22.27 
ALL 0.26  0.13  0.00  5.35  1.93 1.00 0.00 24.48 
BMA 0.47** 0.32  0.00  1.81  3.02** 2.70 0.00 19.72 
FRA 0.17** 0.13  0.00  1.15  3.44** 3.07 0.00 26.82 
EDN 0.32** 0.22  0.00  1.18  3.88** 3.38 0.00 21.99 
GFG 0.12** 0.10  0.00  0.78  3.54** 3.69 0.00 31.02 
IRS 0.23** 0.20  0.00  1.37  2.90** 2.96 0.00 27.53 
MET 0.13** 0.11  0.00  1.00  5.14** 5.63 0.00 42.33 
TGS2 0.12** 0.09  0.00  0.67  3.89** 3.36 0.00 25.97 
CRES 0.32** 0.25  0.00  1.67  2.77** 2.93 0.00 24.79 
SAM 1.08** 0.81  0.00  4.60  12.86** 9.69 0.00 56.55 
YPF 1.09** 1.15  0.00  10.28  2.69** 3.19 0.00 41.27 
ALL 0.40  0.35  0.00  10.28  4.41 2.14 0.00 56.55 
** and * indicate significance at 1% and 5% 
Table  5-6 Trading Costs in Sample Markets 
Market 2008 Trading Costs 2009 Trading Costs 
Egypt (bp*) 56.04 27.4
Argentina(bp) 42.23 67.03
NYSE(bp) 13.89 15.40
LSE purchases (bp)  72.25 74.45
LSE sales(bp) 22.65 22.59
NASDAQ(bp) 17.51 17.97
FX Conversion Fee (bp) 6.00 6.00
Global Safe Keeping on ADR (bp) 22.00 22.00
Global Safe Keeping on GDR (bp) 45.00 45.00
Global Settlement Fees on ADR (USD) 60 60
Global Settlement Fees on GDR 
(USD) 
115 115
DR Conversion Fee (USD) 0.05 0.05
Source: Bank of New York Mellon DR Converter www.bnym.com and ElKins/McSherry Transaction 





Table  5-7 Arbitrage Opportunities: Frequency and Descriptive Statistics 
Stock 
Arbitrage Frequency Absolute Price Deviation (USD) Absolute Relative Price Deviation (%) 
No 
Arb(%) Arb (%) Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation Mean Minimum Maximum
Standard 
Deviation
COMI 91.45 8.55 0.269 0.124 1.283 0.165 3.39 1.45 13.37 1.79
HRHO 87.14 12.86 0.507 0.134 1.871 0.396 3.71 1.24 8.68 2.10
ORTE 96.72 3.28 0.232 0.110 1.351 0.074 2.63 1.23 11.32 1.16
OCIC 93.98 6.02 0.953 0.247 5.353 0.464 2.09 0.95 7.93 1.11
ETEL 57.57 42.43 0.636 1.936 0.524 0.356 4.07 1.42 14.40 2.27
PHDC 81.22 18.78 0.417 0.161 2.685 0.398 4.64 1.45 35.43 5.49
 Average 84.68 15.32 0.502 0.452 2.178 0.309 3.42 1.29 15.19 2.32
BMA 77.87 22.13 0.845 0.190 1.703 0.281 5.89 1.20 18.53 3.11
FRA 93.66 6.34 0.343 0.120 0.920 0.124 7.35 2.00 26.00 3.75
EDN 84.84 15.16 0.575 0.122 1.106 0.213 6.40 1.30 23.82 4.27
GFG 94.95 5.05 0.291 0.086 0.782 0.090 10.10 1.95 30.47 5.50
IRS 94.51 5.49 0.543 0.180 1.349 0.214 7.52 1.84 28.03 5.43
MET 96.64 3.36 0.319 0.107 1.196 0.176 13.40 3.33 36.83 9.65
TGS2 94.67 5.33 0.242 0.082 0.545 0.063 7.37 2.31 26.45 3.55
CRES 89.52 10.48 0.669 0.208 1.671 0.259 6.52 1.64 24.79 4.93
SAM 89.39 10.61 1.580 0.619 2.278 0.633 16.24 5.67 25.98 5.26
YPF 85.8 14.2 2.216 0.584 8.980 1.335 5.18 1.23 41.27 4.21















Number of Trades to Converge Persistence of Arbitrage 





COMI 0:26:01 1.41 0.88 8 49.54% 9.54% 4.31% 
HRHO 1:27:03 1.32 0.75 4 48.42% 5.26% 3.16% 
ORTE 0:02:43 1.36 0.71 7 54.04% 14.24% 3.74% 
OCIC 0:04:03 1.5 1.05 13 48.22% 10.08% 4.74% 
ETEL 1:57:01 2.05 2.06 15 17.59% 5.53% 3.02% 
PHDC 0:40:10 1.87 1.42 8 23.94% 14.08% 1.41% 
 Average 0:46:10 1.58 0.52 15 40.29% 9.79% 3.40% 
BMA 0:05:44 2.82 3.92 114 17.11% 7.45% 3.23% 
FRA 0:06:11 1.48 0.92 10 47.01% 12.88% 4.29% 
EDN 0:07:18 1.85 1.42 13 30.54% 12.24% 5.08% 
GFG 0:02:44 1.62 1.26 12 41.91% 10.42% 4.71% 
IRS 0:16:33 1.7 1.62 18 38.80% 10.20% 4.88% 
MET 0:16:07 1.36 0.8 5 55.88% 8.82% 4.41% 
TGS2 0:11:58 1.41 0.84 6 51.45% 13.50% 3.22% 
CRES 0:10:10 2.02 2 23 28.12% 10.86% 4.22% 
SAM 0:20:33 2.8 2.95 8 14.29% 14.29% - 
YPF 0:48:30 1.97 1.55 10 26.22% 9.45% 3.96% 




Table  5-9 Frequency and Profitability from Arbitrage 
Stock Real Arbitrage Lost Arbitrage Total Profits Profits Premium Profits Discount
COMI 74.15% 25.85% $106,910.72 $17,695.52 $89,215.20  
HRHO 70.53% 29.47% $27,605.06 $19,613.57 $7,991.49  
ORTE 73.42% 26.58% $339,269.72 $25,784.74 $313,484.99  
OCIC 29.44% 70.56% $513,605.83 $46,836.89 $466,768.94  
ETEL 89.95% 10.05% $178,917.94 $32,867.14 $146,050.79  
PHDC 80.28% 19.72% $23,673.34 $8,004.51 $15,668.83  
  69.63% 30.37% $1,189,982.61 $150,802.37 $1,039,180.24  
BMA 91.66% 8.34% $1,124,634.48 $1,039.14 $1,123,595.34  
FRA 88.95% 11.05% $101,060.62 $11,941.98 $89,118.64  
EDN 89.62% 10.38% $194,622.52 $165.62 $194,456.90  
GFG 93.88% 6.12% $156,470.33 $584.58 $155,885.74  
IRS 84.26% 15.74% $31,108.95 $113.10 $30,995.85  
MET 86.76% 13.24% $2,987.42 $1,060.32 $1,927.10  
TGS2 89.71% 10.29% $28,314.86 $843.21 $27,471.65  
CRESY 84.73% 15.27% $73,228.51 $924.52 $72,303.99  
SAM 85.71% 14.29% $2,035.29 $0.00 $2,035.29  
YPF 87.31% 12.69% $57,084.78 $1,266.76 $55,818.02  
  88.26% 11.74% $1,771,547.75 $17,939.23 $1,753,608.53  
 
Table  5-10 Volumes of Real versus Lost Arbitrage 
 Volume Real Arbitrage/Trade Volume Lost Arbitrage/Trade 
Stock Mean First Quartile Third Quartile Mean First Quartile Third Quartile 
COMI 6,176 2,968 10,000 8,276 4,000 10,000 
HRHO 2,241 702 3,772 5,049 2,644 7,938 
ORTE 5,637 1,750 5,694 9,045 3,145 10,000 
OCIC 1,238 400 1,714 2,579 1,053 3,657 
ETEL 3,025 975 5,000 10,272 2,375 6,475 
PHDC 2,784 1,500 3,000 3,494 1,500 5,750 
All 3,517 1,383 4,863 6,453 2,453 7,303 
BMA 295 100 300 922 200 900 
FRA 750 300 900 1,838 700 2,300 
EDN 516 200 500 1,098 400 1,100 
GFG 843 300 900 2,186 800 2,975 
IRS 467 200 500 1,079 300 1,200 
MET 698 300 500 1,689 1200 1,400 
TGS2 1133 500 1200 2,718 1000 2,575 
CRESY 228 100 300 432 200 500 
SAM 187 137.5 200 300 250 350 
YPF 170 100 100 361 100 200 




Figure (2) Sample Price Deviation Charts
Figure  5-1 Price Deviation for ORTE and BMA 
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Stock Trades DR Trades Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price Volume Date Time Price Volume Date Time Price Volume Date Time Price Volume 
Commercial International bank Orascom Telecom 
        31-Jul-08 11:08:53 10.00 1750 31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000
        31-Jul-08 11:09:24 10.00 6230 31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 3750
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 150   31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 4577
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 500   31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 4886   31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 3073
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 2444   31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 100
        31-Jul-08 11:10:42 9.99 676 31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 10000
31-Jul-08 11:11:15 9.4 676   31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 500
     31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 500
     31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000
     31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 62500
      31-Mar-08 12:19:44 13.5 50000
Grupo Financiero Galicia  31-Mar-08 12:19:45 13.5 2940
        3-Jun-08 18:40:58 5.46 100   31-Mar-08 12:19:45 13.5 47060
     3-Jun-08 18:41:23 5.46 100 YPF
3-Jun-08 18:41:33 5.77 200    23-Jun-08 18:10:30 47.7 500
     3-Jun-08 18:41:39 5.46 100 23-Jun-08 18:10:58 50.37 500
     3-Jun-08 18:41:46 5.46 500  23-Jun-08 18:11:02 47.7 500
3-Jun-08 18:41:47 5.77 100  23-Jun-08 18:11:05 50.37 500
3-Jun-08 18:41:56 5.77 487.3   23-Jun-08 18:11:10 47.7 500
3-Jun-08 18:41:56 5.77 12.7  23-Jun-08 18:11:28 50.37 500
     3-Jun-08 18:42:03 5.46 100  23-Jun-08 18:11:31 47.7 500
3-Jun-08 18:42:11 5.77 100  23-Jun-08 18:15:38 50.37 1000
     3-Jun-08 18:42:24 5.46 100  23-Jun-08 18:15:47 47.7 500
     3-Jun-08 18:42:36 5.46 100  23-Jun-08 18:15:47 47.7 500
     3-Jun-08 18:42:55 5.46 100 23-Jun-08 18:16:07 50.37 1000
3-Jun-08 18:43:16 5.77 100   23-Jun-08 18:16:12 47.7 500
3-Jun-08 18:43:24 5.77 200     23-Jun-08 18:16:12 47.7 500









6 AN INVESTIGATION OF INTRADAY PRICE 
DISCOVERY IN CROSS-LISTED EMERGING MARKET 
EQUITIES 
6.1 Introduction 
 Price discovery,  defined as the process of searching for an equilibrium price 
(Harris et al., 1995),  is a key function of stock exchanges.  With the pheonmenal 
increase in the number of companies cross listing their stocks on large international 
exchanges in recent years, competition among exchanges for a larger proportion of 
trading has raised the question of whether the location of  price discovery remains 
local or shifts to the large international market. Recent evidence demonstrates that 
although both markets contribute to the price discovery process, the local market is 
usually the dominant location of price discovery, with a greater proportion occuring 
in the foreign market—depending on the amount of trading and how well the 
markets are informationally linked.  
 The main contribution of this paper is to provide evidence about the intraday 
price discovery of emerging market stocks that are cross listed on international 
exchanges as depository receipts (DRs): US dollar (USD)-denominated receipts that 
represent claims against local-market stocks, during overlapping trading hours. 
Although emerging markets currently dominate the market for DRs (Global Finance, 
2010), the literature is currently lacking an intraday price discovery analysis that 
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evaluates the share contributed to the process by the international exchange, while 
examining its evolution over time.  We therefore study this issue using Egyptian and 
Argentinean stocks that are cross listed as Global DRs (GDRs) and American DRs 
(ADRs) on the London and US stock exchanges.  
 Our sample is best suited for our analysis because, unlike prior studies, we 
compare DRs that are foreign listed on two international exchanges during the same 
period to allow cross-comparisons. Furthermore, we consider cross-listed equities in 
local and international market with different trading hours but a significant period of 
trading overlap. Finally, our price discovery analysis benefits from a large number of 
observations because we use two-year intraday transaction data for Egyptian and 
Argentinean stocks and their DRs, as well as intraday foreign exchange data for the 
USD to Egyptian pound (EGP) and USD to Argentinean peso (ARS).  
 We hypothesize that, consistent with previous studies, price discovery should 
occur primarily in the local market, especially given that the markets we chose are 
informationally segmented, due to language, cultural, and trading barriers12. Our 
methodology follows those of Ding et al. (1999) and Eun and Sabherwal (2003). We 
begin by verifying that our sample of DRs and their underlying stocks are linked by 
international arbitrage conditions by conducting unit root and co-integration tests. 
We follow with our price discovery analysis, which relies on the Granger and 

12
 Both markets had large trading costs and short-selling restrictions during the sample period. Moreover, Argentina also 
has capital conrols.  
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Gonzalo (GG) (1995) common long-memory error-correction estimation approach 
to measure the contribution of each market to price discovery. Finally we run panel 
regressions on our data to try to explain the contribution of each market to price 
discovery.  
 Our results indicate that whereas the local market for Egyptian securities is 
the dominant market for price discovery, the price for Argentinean securities is 
determined in both the local and US stock markets, to the extent that for some 
stocks the local market acts as a pure satellite to the international exchange.  We 
believe this evidence to be the first of its kind in DRs and corroborates Eun and 
Sabherwal’s (2003) results on dual-listed Canadian stocks. We find that liquidity, 
volume of trade, and market capitalization are all significant variables that are 
dynamic, that evolve over time, and that explain the share of price discovery.  
 This paper is organized as follows. Section 6.2 presents institutional 
background, and Section 6.3 presents our data description and preliminary analysis. 
Methodology and results are presented in Section 6.4, and we conclude in Section 
6.5.   
6.2  Data Description 
 The analysis of a cross-listed stock trading in two markets can be based on 
either transaction prices or quoted prices. Whereas quote prices are preferred 
because they do not suffer from the autocorrelation present in transaction prices, 
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they are difficult to obtain for emerging market stocks. Indeed, Ding et al. (1999) 
also relied on transaction prices for their intraday price discovery analysis on one 
Malaysian stock: Sime Darby Berhad and its dual-listed stock in Singapore. We 
believe that the objective of our analysis is not affected by the use of transaction 
prices because Eun and Sabherwal (2003) have shown that the results do not differ 
qualitatively with the use of either data type.  
 For the price discovery analysis, we use the same intraday dataset developed 
in Chapter 5, which was matched using the minspan approach. However, since price 
discovery models are very sensitive to the number of observations, we go in line with 
Eun and Sabherwal (2003) and we pick securities with a minimum of 2000 
observations in either market, leaving us with 4 Egyptian GDR-stock pairs and 9 
Argentinean ADR-stock pairs for our price discovery analysis.  
 Our analysis is based on the natural logarithm of the price series for the 
underlying stocks after converting it to USD13, and the natural logarithm of the USD 
price of the DRs. This conversion facilitates the specification of the error correction 
term in error correction models, as well as the assessment of equality of prices in the 
between the foreign markets and our local emerging markets. 

13 The price discovery analysis can be done on the foreign exchange adjusted stock 
price, thereby endogenizing the exchange rate effect, or on the stock price in local 
currency and including FX as an exogenous variable. We find no qualitative 
differences in results.    
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6.3 Tests and Results 
 Besides their location of trade and currency denomination, the DR and the 
underlying stock are both identical securities that are fully fungible. This should 
ensure that both prices are equal; otherwise active arbitrageurs will interfere to bring 
prices to parity.  Although temporary information asymmetry and differential co-
movements of the DR and its underlying stocks to their respective markets may 
cause prices to deviate in the short term, the long-run equilibrium relationship 
between prices should cause them to adjust toward parity, as ensured by their 
arbitrage linkages.  
 This theoretical pricing relationship can be empirically tested by first 
establishing that the DR and underlying stock price series are co-integrated in the 
long run, and then by showing that any deviation from this equilibrium in the short 
term is corrected by an adjustment in either one or both of the price series.  This 
latter test allows us to assess the relative contribution of each market to price 
discovery by measuring the extent to which the price of the DR adjusts to a change 
in the price of the local stocks and vice versa. We use the GG common long-
memory error-correction approach to characterize the price discovery process and to 
determine whether both markets do, in fact, contribute to price discovery. 
 Our methodology for examining price discovery is undertaken through an 
analysis of the error-correction mechanism between the two markets. A necessary 
precondition of using the error correction model is (1) to ensure that whereas each 
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price is non-stationary with a unit root, a linear combination of stationary prices 
exists, and (2) that there is a long-run co-integration equation that links both price 
series. Following these preliminary tests for unit roots and co-integration, we then 
estimate the GG common long-memory error-correction model. We finally close this 
section with a panel regression that explains the relative contribution of markets to 
price discovery.  
6.3.1 Unit Root Test 
 Following standard methodology in the literature, we use the Augmented 
Dickey and Fuller (ADF) approach  to determine if each price series is non-
stationary and exhibits a unit root. The ADF test will identify whether or not each of 
the DR Price DRtP  and foreign exchange adjusted stock price 
'S
tP 14 has a unit root 
and thus non-stationary root of I(1), which is an expected feature of prices, because 
they are non-mean reverting. It involves testing three regression variations: (1) 
random walk, (2) random walk with a drift, and (3) random walk with a drift and 








1  ,      (6.1) 
























110  ,     (6.3) 
where the test is for the null hypothesis in which the coefficient U = 0 (i.e. the data 
is non-stationary and needs to be differenced to make it stationary and thus has a 
unit root I(1)) and the alternative hypothesis that U  <0 (i.e. the data is stationary 
without differencing and does not have unit root). The significance of the unit root 
test is assessed with the regression’s t-statistic against Mackinnon’s (1991) critical 
values. Results are presented in Table 6-1 and show that all price series under three 
model variations contain a unit root, because we fail to reject the null hypothesis at 
5%.  
INSERT TABLE 6-1 ABOUT HERE 
6.3.2 Co-integration 
 We test for co-integration using two approaches. In the first approach, we 
directly test for co-integration using the result of the non-stationarity of prices and 




' is stationary. In the second approach, we rely on the Johansen 
co-integration test for the null hypothesis: the number of co-integrating vectors 
between prices, r, is equal to 0, with maximum eigenvalue and trace tests. 
 In the first approach, the objective is to show that despite non-stationary 
prices, the deviation between these prices is stationary and linear and thus a long-run 
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no-arbitrage relationship holds. To illustrate, non-stationary prices of the DR, stock, 













t uPP  1 ,  
where v and u and are the innovations in prices. Now, using these two equations, the 





t uvPP  
' ,  
meaning that there is a stationary linear combination of these prices, xt  defined as 
 ttt uvx  .         (6.4) 
We should therefore expect that if the price series are co-integrated, the ADF test on 
the price deviation should reject the null hypothesis, and thus deviation is stationary 
of I(0).  
 The second approach for testing co-integration of the price series uses the 
Johansen co-integration test 15. If the DR price and the adjusted underlying stock 

15AsdescribedinEunandSaberhwal(2003),theJohansentestdependsontheestimationofapathorderautoregressive
process, inwhich the first difference lag operator of an (n x 1) vector of I(1) timeͲseries variables is a 0mean nͲ
dimensionalwhite noise (n x n)matrix of parameters. Thismatrix rank is equal to the number of independent coͲ
integratingvectorsr=1.Cointegrationistestedbybothamaximumeigenvaluetest,whichteststhenullhypothesisthat
thenumberofcointegratingvectorsisragainstthealternativeofr+1cointegratingvectors,andatracetest,whichtests




price are co-integrated of order (1,1), the necessary condition for the co-integration is 
that there is a co-integrated vector },{ ' DRS EEE  , such that: 




PEPE        (6.5) 
where Ƭ represents the trend in the random walk processes of each price series 
defined in the ADF test above.  If the DR and stock price series are indeed co-
integrated, then 'S
tP
P must be identical to DR
tP
P and 0'   DRS EE . 
 The results of the two co-integration tests, presented in Table 6-2 show that 
both price series are indeed co-integrated. The ADF t-statistic is highly significant 
across all stock and DR prices, indicating that a stationary combination of prices 
exist. The Johansen test results reject the null of no co-integrating vectors against a 
co-integrating vector of r = 1. The coefficients of the test on both price series trends 
are close and do not deviate from each other. The Johansen test also  reports the 
number of autoregressive lags using the Schwarz Bayesian criterion, which will be 
employed for the error correction model estimation.  
INSERT TABLE 6-2 ABOUT HERE 
6.3.3 The Gonzalo and Granger Error Correction Model for Price Discovery 
 The issue of price discovery is concerned with finding the relative 
contributions of two markets to the price determination process of a stock. The two 
most established econometric models for testing the contribution of price discovery 
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in a multi-market trading setting are the Gonzalo and Granger (GG) common long-
memory error-correction estimation approach and the Hasbrouck (1995) 
information stocks. We rely on the GG model to measure the relative contribution 
to price discovery made by the local and foreign market. With this approach, we 
identify the relative contribution of each exchange to the common long-run trend of 
prices and we interpret the relative contribution of an exchange to the long-memory 
trend as its relative contribution to price discovery.  
 The GG method is the most suitable for our sample of cross-listed stocks, as 
they do not trade with the high frequency required for properly running the 
Hasbrouck method. Moreover, as discussed in Harris et al. (2002) and Eun and 
Sabherwal (2003), the information stocks computed from the Hasbrouck 
methodology rely on ordering prices, that cannot be used to run regressions on the 
results. Because our final objective is to explain the difference in relative contribution 
of price discovery across our sample, the GG approach is the most relevant.  
The GG price discovery model depends on a co-integrated vector error correction 
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The coefficients of main interest in these two equations are 'SD  and DRD of 






t PP   E  estimated with the Johansen co-
integration test, where 'SE  is normalized to 1. The coefficient denote the amount of 
adjustment in price to a deviation between the prices in both markets and reflects the 
relative portion of price discovery occurring in each market. The larger and more 
significant the sign, the greater the adjustment of the price to a change occurring in 
the other market. Results of the test are presented in Table 6-3.  
INSERT TABLE 6-3 ABOUT HERE 
 The results are noteworthy. The coefficients for price adjustment are 
significant for 11 of the 13 securities in the foreign market and for 12 of the 13 
securities in the local market, indicating that, in general, both markets contribute to 
the price discovery process. In order to measure the share that each market 
contributes to price determination in the other market, we use Eun and Sabherwal’s 
(2003) Component Share(CS), which measures of the reaction of DR price to 









        (6.8) 
 Although there is large variation across results, 75.6% of the Egyptian DR 
prices, on average, are determined in the local market, signifying that the foreign 
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market is only a satellite to the local market. The result for Argentina is surprising, as 
it shows that most of the price determination occurs on the US exchanges, with only 
41.67% of US DR prices determined locally.  
6.3.4 Robustness 
6.3.4.1 Foreign Exchange Rate as Exogenous Variable 
We re-run the VECM model with unadjusted stock price (i.e. stock price in 
local currency) and with the foreign exchange rate as an exogenous variable. Table 6-
4 includes results. While the first approach slightly underestimate the reaction of the 
foreign market to the local market, no qualitative differences in results are present.   
INSERT TABLE 6-4 ABOUT HERE 
6.3.4.2 Hasbrouck Information Shares 
 We estimate the contribution of each market with Hasbrouck Information 
Shares. While we argued that they are not best suited for our sample, we estimate it 
nevertheless to examine robustness of our tests. Hasbrouck’s (1995)  Information 
Share is more concerned with the amount of variation prices and how much of it is 
explained by the price changes on the foreign versus local market (De Jong, 2002).  
It is calculated from the variance of the residuals of the VECM model. Hasbrouck’s 
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    (6.10) 
where ɏ is the correlation between the residuals of the VECM, ɐଵ and ɐଶ are the 
variance elements of the residuals of the VECM. Hasbrouck (1995) considers the 
upper (lower) bound of market j’s information share when market j is the first 
(second) variable in the factorization (Baille et al, 2002).  
 A mid-point Hasbrouck measure is calculated as the average of the lower and 
upper bound and is usually considered an adequate measure of a single market 
contribution to price discovery. (Baille et al, 2002) One disadvantage of using 
Hasbourck’s measure in our sample is that it is best suited for markets in which 
trading is very frequent, which is usually not the case in emerging market. This makes 
the range between the upper and lower bounds quite large and thus there are non-
unique measures of price discovery.  
 Table 6-5 includes results of Upper, Lower and Mid-point Information 
Shares of the DR. The last two columns qualitatively compare the results from the 
two price discovery measures. With the exception of ORTE, the measures are 
consistent in defined the dominant market for price discovery. The mixed result for 
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ORTE can be due to the high correlation between the prices of ORTE GDR and 
stock that is not captured by the GG measure.   
INSERT TABLE 6-5 ABOUT HERE 
6.3.4.3 Granger Causality Tests 
 We further verify the price discovery results through a Granger Causality test, 
presented in Table 6-6, confirming that for 3 of the 4 Egyptian stocks, price 
discovery occurs both ways, with the local market still dominating. The price of 
HRHO seems to be completely determined locally, given that the coefficient on 
stock is not significant, as verified by the Granger causality test.   
INSERT TABLE 6-6 ABOUT HERE 
 For Argentinean stocks, the local market contributes more to price discovery 
in 5 of our 9 stocks, yet it seems that trading on US exchanges plays a dominant role 
in the process for some cases, such as BMA, CRES, and IRS. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first evidence of its kind in the literature, showing the 
international host market playing the dominant role in price discovery of emerging 
market equities, and it warrants an in-depth analysis to try to explain it.  
6.3.5 Explaining the Contribution to Price Discovery  
 In this section, we try to explain the factors that affect the contribution to 
price discovery. Because we have two years of intraday data for our securities, we 
measure the evolution of the Component Share YDR over time, providing us with a 
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larger number of observations than would be the case for a regular cross-sectional 
regression analysis. We divide our total sample into four six-month sub-samples—
first half of 2008, second half of 2008, first half of 2009, and second half of 2009—
and estimate the error correction model parameters under each. The average 
reactions of the DR prices to stock price YpDR (where p refers to sub-period) across 
the various sub-samples are shown in Figure 6-1.  
INSERT FIGURE 6-1 ABOUT HERE 
 One could hypothesize that due to the financial crisis, local stock price 
reactions to the volatile movements on the international exchanges in the USA and 
London would cause an increase in the share of price discovery in the foreign market 
and therefore a decrease in the reaction to local market YDR. This hypothesis is 
contrary to our finding, as there was an increase in the reaction of the foreign market 
to local prices during our second period—the second half of 2008, which includes 
the financial crisis. During the financial crisis, prices deviated greatly, creating 
arbitrage opportunities that required active arbitrageurs to intervene to bring prices 
to parity; thus arbitrage trades on the stock, and the DR may be a plausible reason 
for local market domination of the price discovery process during that period.  
 We attempt to explain the change in reaction of DR prices to a change in 





ip ExchangeCapSpreadTVY ,,4,3,2,10, ZEEEEE   (6.8) 
where YpDR  is the dependent variable. We use the explanatory variables of TV or 
Relative Trading Value  (defined as the ratio of DR Trading Value to Local Trading 
Value over each six-month period), Spread or Spread Ratio (defined as the ratio of 
Average Bid-Ask Spread of DR to Average Bid-Ask Spread of Local Stock over each 
six-month period), Cap or Market Capitalization (defined as the logarithm of the 
market capitalization of the company at the end of each six-month period), as well as 
the dummy variable for exchange: Exchange.  
 Following Frijins et al. (2010), we use a fixed-effects panel regression to 
control for firm-specific fixed effects, the results of which are presented in Table 6-7. 
Our regression model has overall significance and explains 54.88% of the variation in 
the ratio of price discovery adjustment. All our explanatory variables are statistically 
significant. Trading volume is negatively correlated with DR price adjustment: the 
greater the trading value, the lower the reaction of DR price to local prices, a finding 
that is consistent with results from prior studies (Eun and Sabherwal, 2003; Frijins et 
al, 2010). The spread ratio, which is a measure of liquidity, is also significant; it 
demonstrates that the larger the spread ratio in the DR, the lower the liquidity, and 
thus the higher its adjustment to local prices. The market capitalization variable is 
also significant, indicating that the larger the market capitalization of the company, 
the greater the significance of the local market in price discovery and the larger the 
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proportion of adjustment of DR price to local price. Finally, the exchange dummy is 
significant at the 5% level, indicating that market-specific variables explain a portion 
of the variation in price adjustment.  
INSERT TABLE 6-7 ABOUT HERE 
6.4 Conclusion  
 In this paper, we study price discovery for Egyptian and Argentinean stocks 
that are cross listed as DRs on the London and US exchanges.  Our analysis 
contributes to the literature in a number of ways. Not only do we present what 
appears to be the first analysis of intraday price discovery of emerging market stocks 
that are cross listed on international exchanges, but we do so for two international 
markets serving as the host foreign market during the same period.  Moreover, we 
study price discovery in markets with a much greater overlap in trading hours than 
has typically been considered, and we study them for a longer period (two years).  
 Our results show that, in line with previous research (Ding et al., 1999; 
Grammig et al., 2005; Pascual et al.; 2006; Lok and Kalev, 2006 and Frijins et al., 
2010), there is a clear dominance in terms of intraday price discovery for the 
Egyptian stocks cross listed in London. In the case of Argentina, however, we find 
that the US market plays a large and sometimes dominant role in price discovery, to 
the extent that for some stocks the local market acts as a pure satellite. This result 
can be compared to that of Eun and Sabherwal (2003), which, to the best of our 
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knowledge, is the only study that found the US market playing the dominant role for 
dual-listed Canadian stocks. We try to explain this result through a panel regression 
on the most active securities.  
 Our regression results indicate that the role of the foreign market in price 
determination fluctuates as a function of the trading value, liquidity, and market 
capitalization of companies. It seems, therefore, that those trading variables are 
reflective of the direction of information flow between markets, and that they 
determine the informational linkage of the markets. Our results contribute to a 
growing interest among scholars in understanding the impact of cross listing on 
security trading mechanisms. Future research should undertake an in-depth study of 




Table  6-1 Augmented Dickey Fuller Test Statistic 
 Stock DR 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Egyptian       
COMI -0.1514 -1.3068 -1.4960 -0.1382 -1.3259 -1.5069 
HRHO -1.1366 -1.4249 -0.8979 -1.0455 -1.3753 -0.9469 
ORTE -1.8113 -2.1892 -1.4757 -1.8122 -2.1854 -1.4433 
OCIC -0.8950 -1.5654 -1.2071 -0.8781 -1.5685 -1.2054 
Argentinean       
BMA 0.0645 -0.9057 -0.5465 0.0474 -0.9718 -0.6607 
FRA -0.5149 -1.4238 -0.9374 -0.5526 -1.5855 -1.2260 
EDN -1.5807 -1.4056 -0.0697 -1.4321 -1.4384 -0.2676 
GFG -0.6901 -1.2378 -0.3154 -0.6963 -1.3551 -0.6122 
IRS -0.8316 -1.1254 0.2035 -0.7117 -1.2309 -0.3263 
MET -1.1652 -1.4440 -1.6668 -1.1855 -1.8317 -2.2744 
TGS2 -1.4473 -1.9480 -1.7243 -1.2953 -2.1532 -2.2819 
CRES -0.6248 -1.5681 -0.8404 -0.5840 -1.6857 -1.1442 
YPF -0.1080 -1.2722 -1.4048 -0.0166 -1.5058 -1.6319 
Notes:  Table 6-1 presents the t-statistic results of the ADF test on Equations (6.1), (6.2), and 
(6.3). The 1% and 5% critical values taken from Mckinnon (1991) for (1) are -2.566 and -
1.941, for (2) are -3.433 and -2.863, and for (3) are -3.962 and -3.412, respectively. 
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Table  6-3 Contribution to Price Discovery 
 ơDR t-stat ơS’ t-stat YDR 
Egyptian      
COMI 0.1387** -11.1655  -0.0295* 2.5758 82.44% 
HRHO 0.4211** -9.9230  -0.0617 1.5572 87.23% 
ORTE 0.0583** -23.1415 -0.0238** 14.1060 71.02% 
OCIC 0.0712** -18.7074 -0.0427** 14.2582 62.53% 
All Sample     75.80% 
Argentinean      
BMA 0.0060** -5.9634 -0.0090** 10.6603 39.95% 
FRA 0.0141** -7.8796 -0.0121** 9.7758 53.85% 
EDN 0.0156** -7.5915 -0.0105** 6.7192 59.70% 
GFG 0.0118** -11.1072 -0.0070** 10.6109 62.73% 
IRS 0.0111** -3.0717 -0.0367** 11.9808 23.19% 
MET 0.0828** -6.4209 -0.0440** 6.4837 65.32% 
TGS2 0.0383** -7.4877 -0.0219** 6.7640 63.62% 
CRES   0.0015 -0.7475 -0.0211** 12.4574 6.50% 
YPF   0.0006 -0.0810 -0.0608** 9.6223 0.96% 
All Sample     41.76% 
Notes: Table 6-3 presents results of Equations (6.6) and (6.7), where the coefficients of 
interest are ơDR and ơS’, showing the average adjustment of the local (foreign) market price to 
foreign (local) market price. The numbers in brackets indicate t-statistic values of the 
























  ơDR t-stat ơS’ t-stat ơfx t-stat YDR % 
Egyptian       
COMI 0.1406** 11.1431 -0.0301* -2.6053 0.0010 0.7957 81.89 
HRHO 0.4345** 10.0419 -0.0513 -1.2869 0.0049 2.3290 88.56 
ORTE 0.0579** 23.1394 -0.0220** -13.4690 0.0016* 23.1394 71.06 
OCIC 0.0721** 18.8433 -0.0415** -14.0328 0.0015* 2.7106 62.62 
All Sample       
76.03 
Argentinean               
BMA 0.0093** 7.7726 -0.0110** -11.0712 -0.0001 -0.3413 45.54 
FRA 0.0251** 10.6221 -0.0179** -11.0832 -0.0006* -3.0032 57.58 
EDN 0.0267** 10.5083 -0.0124** -5.6479 -0.0009 -0.7872 66.61 
GFG 0.0182** 13.9245 -0.0089** -11.2891 -0.0001 -0.6863 66.78 
IRS 0.0193** 4.5771 -0.0443** -12.5449 -0.0010* -2.4075 29.85 
MET 0.1081** 6.7720 -0.0598** -7.1992 -0.0022* -2.6653 63.53 
TGS2 0.0547** 8.7740 -0.0303** -7.7897 -0.0012* -2.1743 63.48 
CRES 0.0032** 1.4169 -0.0260** -13.3502 -0.0006* -2.0803 10.87 
YPF -0.0016 -0.2001 -0.0733** -10.5395 0.0000 0.0487 -2.18 





Table  6-5 Hasbrouck Information Shares (%) 









Egyptian   
COMI 55.48 98.54 77.01 local local 
HRHO 52.10 99.18 75.64 local local 
ORTE 1.87 21.96 11.92 local foreign 
OCIC 51.13 91.53 71.33 local local 
All Sample 58.97  
Argentinea
n     
 
BMA 20.06 65.75 42.90 foreign foreign 
FRA 50.01 82.24 66.13 local local 
EDN 51.62 85.26 68.44 local local 
GFG 71.81 90.50 81.15 local local 
IRS 6.74 28.71 17.72 foreign foreign 
MET 80.31 94.62 87.46 local local 
TGS2 70.44 91.27 80.85 local local 
CRES 0.42 22.83 11.63 foreign foreign 
YPF 1.49 19.95 10.72 foreign foreign 









Table  6-6 Granger Causality Tests 
    F-Statistic 
Egyptian   
COMI  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 165.2370** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 6.9541** 
HRHO  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 106.4420** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK           2.2506 
ORTE  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 894.5500** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 185.5520** 
OCIC  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 545.5330** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 369.6820** 
Argentinean   
BMA  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 121.3590** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 376.6610** 
FRA  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 73.2342** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 228.8360** 
EDN  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 103.0240** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 129.0770** 
GFG  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 118.1190** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 228.6230** 
IRS STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 5.0165** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 169.0360** 
MET  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 30.6400** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 33.0729** 
TGS2  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 46.7084** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 66.5138** 
CRES  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR 10.6519** 
  DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 144.2380** 
YPF  STOCK does not Granger Cause DR           0.9624 
   DR does not Granger Cause STOCK 96.8847** 
Notes: Table 6-4 presents results of Granger Causality tests of DR Reaction to Stock Price 
and vice versa.  






Table  6-7 Panel Regression Results 
 Ƣ t-statistic 
Relative Trading 
Value -0.0448** -6.86417 
Spread Ratio  0.0074** 
 
2.65885 
Market Capitalization  0.0243** 
 
9.22449 
Exchange  0.1462* 
 
1.98529 
R-squared 54.88%  
Notes: Table 6-5 summarizes the results of a panel regression of Equation 6.8  




7 REVOLUTIONARY EFFECTS ON THE INTRADAY 
PRICE DISCOVERY OF EGYPTIAN CROSS-LISTED 
EQUITY 
7.1 Introduction 
In this article, we measure the relative contribution of local versus foreign 
market in the pricing of cross-listed equity before and after a political event. Our 
laboratory consists of Egyptian stocks trading on the Egyptian Stock Exchange 
(EGX) and that are cross-listed as Global Depository Receipts16 (GDRs) on the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE). The Egyptian revolution that commenced on 
January 25th 2011 with wide spread youth movements against Mubarak’s 30 year 
political regime, forced the EGX to close for a complete 2 months. This created an 
interesting setting in which Egyptian equities were solely trading as GDRs on the 
foreign market, the LSE, with no trade on the local stocks.  
 We use a high frequency intraday transaction dataset for Egyptian stocks and 
their underlying securities to examine price discovery in a unique laboratory that 
makes use of a natural experiment in equity financial markets. Our experiment 
compares the contribution of the EGX vs. LSE to price discovery of cross-listed 
Egyptian securities over two sub-periods. The first period consists of 1 month prior 

16 GDRs are dollar denominated receipts trading on international exchange and 
that represent claims against the home-market shares. Each GDR is a claim on 
one or more of the underlying stock as set by the GDR’s bundling ratio.  
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to the closure of the EGX and the second period corresponds to 1 month after the 
EGX opened and both market resumed concurrent trading.  
In assessing the relative contribution to price discovery of each market, we 
measure the Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Component Share and Hasbrouck (1995) 
Information Share, both estimated from running a vector error correction model on 
our GDR and stock price series in the two sub-periods. For robustness, we also 
employ a Granger causality test to confirm the direction of price discovery.  
Using both measures, we find that while in the first period prior to the 
revolution, securities were dominantly priced in the local market, the situation is 
reversed in the second period after the revolution, with the foreign market playing a 
more dominant role in the price discovery process for securities in which a larger 
trading value migrated to the foreign market. This result reveals the importance of 
cross-listing in maintaining market continuity and impounding information into 
security prices.  
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 7.2 provides data description and 
preliminary descriptive statistics. Section 7.3 provides tests and results on price 
discovery over the two periods and finally we conclude in Section 7.4.  
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7.2 Data Description and Preliminary Analysis 
7.2.1 Data Description  
Our dataset consists of intraday transaction data, including dates, timestamps, 
prices and volumes, for all 10 Egyptian cross-listed stocks and their GDRs for period 
of 1 month prior to the revolution (29 December 2010-27 January 2012) and 1 
month post the opening of the market (23 March 2012-26 April 2012) as well as 
intraday foreign exchange quote data between the EGP/USD over both periods.  
 We exclude from our sample securities with less than 50 matched 
observations, leaving us with four GDRs and their underlying stock. These four 
companies, Commercial International Bank (COMI), Egyptian Financial Group 
(HRHO), Orascom Telecom Holding (ORTE) and Orascom Construction (OCIC), 
on average constitute over 30% of the market capitalization of the entire EGX and, 
as a sample size, comparable to sample sizes used in previous price discovery analysis 
such as Ding et al (1999) and Furstenberg and Tabora (2004). We start with over 
210,000 observations from our securities. The two companies in our sample with the 
most observations, Orascom Telecom(ORTE)and Orascom Construction Industries 
(OCIC) are the largest companies on the EGX as well as amongst the most actively 
traded GDRs on the LSE. 
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7.2.2 Preliminary Analysis   
 The price discovery analysis requires the construction of two matched price 







*'   where 
'S
tP is the foreign exchange adjusted stock price, which is calculated by combining 
the underlying stock price in the local currency StP  at time t, the USD to local 
currency exchange rate tFX at time t, and the bundling ratio b (the number of shares 
that each DR represents). 
 Figure 1 charts the logarithmic price of our securities. Period 1 and 2 
correspond to concurrent trading pre and post the 2 month market closure at the 
EGX. The figure  
confirms that trading continued on the GDRs in the LSE while the local market was 
closed.  
 Table 7.1 provides some trading statistics related to the three periods 
including average price as well as value traded. There is an observable loss in value 
from Period 1 to Period 2, reflecting the effect of political instability on the market. 
We can also see the importance of trading on the LSE in the interim period when 
the EGX was closed since a large trading value migrated there for all of the stocks. 
Most of the trading value on the LSE remained even after the EGX re-opened 
probably due to speculations that the local market might close again. For a company 
such as ORTE, most of the trading value in Period 2 remains in London.  
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INSERT TABLE 7.1 HERE 
 To measure the relative contribution to price discovery of the foreign versus 
local market during the overlapping trading hours between market in Period 1 and 2 








and match them using the minspan matching algorithm, which matches prices that 
are closest in time to each other, yields our final dataset consisting of over 7500 
observations on the underlying stock as well as 7500 on the GDR.  
Table 7.2 provides some descriptive statistics related to the returns on the 
GDR and underlying stock prices in each market during our sub-periods. It is 
obvious that the returns have become extremely volatile in the second period with an 
increases in range of returns and standard deviation. This reflects the instability that 
occurred following the re-opening of the local market on prices of cross-listed 
Egyptian securities.  
INSERT TABLE 7.2 HERE 
Since the GDR and its underlying stock are essentially the same security, we 
also compare whether large deviations between the prices and returns of the pair 
exist. Table 7.3 summarizes descriptive statistics related to price deviations and Table 
7.4 summarize descriptive statistics related to return deviations. Moreover, we 
compare the size of those the deviations between the two periods and report the t-
statistic of difference in mean in the last column of both tables.  
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INSERT TABLE 7.3 HERE 
Large price deviations from parity exist in both periods and are significantly 
larger in the second period. Price deviations between cross-listed emerging market 
equity exist due to trading barriers, most important of which are large trading costs 
that prevent arbitrageurs from completely closing the gap between prices. We also 
observe that for three of our securities, the prices of the GDRs in the second period 
are on average higher than the underlying stock. These larger GDR premia in the 
second period can be explained by the higher demand on trading the  GDR relative 
to the underlying stock due to risk involved in trading the underlying stock on the 
local market.  
Despite the significant difference in prices, the returns on both securities are 
identically distributed in both periods, Table 7.4.  This shows that on average neither 
security provides superior return to the other.  
INSERT TABLE 7.4 HERE 
7.3 Tests and Results 
 The main objective of this paper is to measure the change in the relative 
contribution of the LSE versus the EGX in pricing cross-listed Egyptian securities 
following the 2 months closure of the EGX. While we observe from the preliminary 
analysis that the returns of both securities are identical, prices do deviate from each 
other. A price discovery assessment can establish how the price of one security 
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responds to such pricing errors. Our hypothesis is that since the LSE dominated 
trading during the 2 months when the local market was closed, we expect the share 
that the foreign market contributed to price discovery increases in the second period 
after resumption of trade in both markets, relative to the first period before the 
revolution.  
 Investigating the mechanics of price discovery in a multi-market setting can 
be done using one of two established models in the literature: the Gonzalo and 
Granger (GG) (1995) Component Share and the Hasbrouck (1995) Information 
Share. Both models rely on the estimation of a VECM that captures how prices 
adjust to disequilibria from their co-integrate state. The difference lies in that while 
the GG model focus solely on the error correction process captured by the VECM 
model, Hasbrouck defines price discovery in terms of the variance of innovations. 
An extensive discussion on the two methodology can be found in De Jong (2002) 
and Baille et al (2002). While the Hasbrouck methodology is argued to capture the 
true share of each market to price discovery, especially when the residuals of the 
VECM are correlated as usually is the case,  it suffers from relying on the Cholesky 
factorization that creates upper and lower bounds for price discovery that can be far 
apart, especially in less liquid traded securities like emerging market DRs.  We 
measure price discovery using both measures and comment on their results.   
 A necessary pre-condition before measuring the contribution of the EGX 
and LSE to price discovery in both periods is to first establish that the GDR and its 
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underlying stock price are non-stationary and that both prices are co-integrated. We 
then estimate our price discovery models. Our tests will be based on the natural 
logarithm of the price series for the underlying stocks after converting it to USD, 
and the natural logarithm of the USD price of the GDRs. This conversion facilitates 
the specification of the error correction term in error correction models of price 
discovery.  
 We test the stationarity of prices using the Augmented Dickey Fuller Test 
(ADF) test for the presence of unit root (Dickey & Fuller, 1979) and the 
Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt and Shin (KPSS) test for stationarity (Kwiatkowski, 
Phillips, Schmidt, & Shin, 1992).  Results in Table 7.5 present the results of the ADF 
t-statistic for the DR and its underlying stock in both periods under three models for 
the ADF test: with no time trend, with time trend and with an intercept and time 
trend. Non-significant t-statistics indicate the fail to reject the null hypothesis of a 
unit root. The significance of the KPSS test in the last column shows the rejection of 
the null hypothesis of stationarity in favor for non-stationarity. We can see that the 
individual price series are indeed non-stationary under most of the ADF models. The 
KPSS model confirms that all series are indeed non-stationary.  
INSERT TABLE 7.5 HERE 
 Second, we examine whether the prices are have a co-integrating relationship 
using the Johansen Co-integration test. The test specification is based on the unit 
root test results. Trace Test and Eigenvalue, Table 7.6, both  reject the hypothesis of 
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no co-integrating relationship in favor for the existence of 1 co-integrating equation 
between each GDR and its underlying stock . We also use the Johansen co-
integration test to identify the number of lags using the Akaike Information Criterion 
(AIC).  
INSERT TABLE 7.6 HERE 
 In the presence of co-integration, the short-term dynamics between the 
prices of the GDR and its underlying stock  are characterized by a vector error 
correction model (VECM). Price discovery in the two periods is measured using the 
Gonzalo and Granger (1995) Component Share and Hasbrouck (1995) Information 
Share, both of which rely on the estimation of the VECM between prices of the 
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Table 7.7 reports the VECM variance-covariance matrices of residuals for each 
of our sample securities. It is obvious that the covariance between the residuals of 
the VECM is relatively large yielding correlation that range from 0.2-0.6.  




Table 7.8 and 7.9 report the results of the price discovery assessment from 
the two periods. Under the different measures of price discovery, the results of the 
first period in Table 9 show that the GDR price is more reactive to the movements 
in the underlying stock price. This can be interpreted as the local market being the 
more dominant location for price discovery. However, for OCIC and ORTE, the 
error correction coefficient of the reaction of the local stock to the foreign market 
1D  is significant revealing that the foreign market also contributes to price discovery, 
yet at a lesser share. This is different from the result on COMI and HRHO, in which 
the insignificance of 1D   can be interpreted as the foreign market acting as a pure 
satellite  with GDR prices solely moving to react to movement in the local market.  
INSERT TABLE 7.8  
Table 7.9 presents results from the second period. A somewhat different 
picture is drawn for each security. While the share of price discovery for COMI 
generated in the local market is still dominant, 1D  of the local market is now 
significant, indicating that the local and foreign market both contribute to price 
discovery. For HRHO, the foreign market remain a satellite.  




The results are quite notable for OCIC and ORTE. The share of price 
discovery located in the foreign market has increased considerably, with  the foreign 
market becoming the dominant market for price discovery. This is indeed confirmed 
under all measures. The situation is quite dynamic for a company such as ORTE, 
where the coefficient of the DR reaction to mispricing 2D has even become 
insignificant, indicating that the local market price has become a complete satellite to 
movements on the GDR. This reveals the complete shift of the location of price 
discovery to the foreign market in the second period for those two companies. This 
is logical since as we have seen in Table 7.1 , the value traded on ORTE remains 
mostly concentrated on the LSE in Period 2.   
To corroborate our results, we also present the Granger causality test on the 
direction of price discovery in Table 7.10. Indeed, we fail to accept the hypothesis 
that movements in the GDR do not cause movements in the stock for COMI, OCIC 
and ORTE. Again, we confirm that for ORTE the location of price discovery has 
totally shifted to the local market, since we fail to reject the hypothesis that 
movements in the Stock affect the GDR.  





 The main objective of this study is to assess the change in the location of 
price discovery in cross-listed Egyptian securities following a complete 2 month  
local market closure. We compare our price discovery results across two periods: 
before and after local market closure. Our result indicates that the location of price 
discovery totally shifted to the foreign market, which became the dominant location 








(USD)           
Period 1 
Average Price 
(USD)           
Interim Period  
Average Price 




(USD million)      
Period 1 
Total Value  
Traded  
(USD million)  
Interim Period  
Total Value 
Traded 
 (USD million)  
Period 2 
GDR Stock GDR Stock GDR Stock GDR Stock GDR Stock GDR Stock 
COMI 7.286 7.308 5.750 NA 5.213 5.171 
   
49.510   311.517        79.186   NA  
   
50.664   409.193 
HRHO 11.396 11.373 6.626 NA 6.882 6.909 
     
1.455  
   
25.570           7.026   NA  
     
6.902  
   
33.790  
OCIC 46.367 46.406 40.614 NA 39.503 39.116  169.804  336.489      548.251   NA   145.164  138.403 
ORTE 3.594 3.547 2.311 NA 3.623 3.561  143.125 
   
48.265       160.554   NA   328.716 











Table  7-2 Descriptive Statistics of Returns (%) 
    
Period 1 Period 2 
COMI HRHO OCIC ORTE COMI HRHO OCIC ORTE
GDR 
Mean -0.031 -0.570 -0.021 -0.009 -0.007 -0.259 0.015 0.007 
Standard Deviation 0.573 2.473 0.527 0.365 0.723 2.370 0.777 0.474 
Minimum -2.437 -11.482 -6.666 -6.727 -4.272 -6.899 -9.734 -3.209 
Maximum 3.204 2.863 2.582 7.832 4.001 8.004 10.206 7.024 
Stock 
Mean -0.027 -0.436 -0.025 -0.010 -0.027 -0.347 0.014 0.012 
Standard Deviation 0.398 1.526 0.366 0.296 1.652 2.332 0.768 0.814 
Minimum -2.291 -6.313 -3.886 -3.336 -19.443 -12.017 -10.067 -14.462 




Table  7-3 Descriptive Statistics Price Deviations (USD) 
  Period 1 Period 2 Mean 





0.022 0.078 -0.169 0.180 0.041 0.136 -1.035 0.774 -0.063** 
HRHO 0.029 0.177 -0.401 0.328 
-
0.032 0.328 -0.994 0.634 0.062 
OCIC 
-
0.039 0.315 -1.748 1.799 0.386 0.466 -3.297 5.235 -0.426** 
ORTE 0.047 0.022 -0.021 0.297 0.061 0.097 -0.411 0.522 -0.015** 
Price Deviation Measured as 'St
DR
t PP   
Table  7-4 Descriptive Statistics on Return Deviations (%) 
  Period 1 Period 2 Mean 
Difference   Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
COMI -0.004 0.502 -2.420 2.207 0.020 1.730 -17.389 19.083 -0.023
HRHO -0.133 1.808 -7.196 3.750 0.088 2.963 -6.874 15.376 -0.221
OCIC 0.004 0.544 -4.307 3.607 0.001 1.062 -13.841 11.037 0.003
ORTE 0.001 0.416 -6.488 7.354 -0.004 0.922 -17.558 15.214 0.005
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Table  7-5 ADF T-statistic






COMI GDR -1.471 -1.416 -0.409 1.972** 
COMI Stock -1.400 -1.394 -0.623 1.916** 
HRHO GDR -1.657 1.038 -1.187 0.891** 
HRHO Stock -2.039* 1.905 -1.453 0.914** 
OCIC GDR -2.236 1.364 -1.612 3.362** 
OCIC Stock -2.467 2.191 -0.948 3.283** 
ORTE GDR -1.997* 0.589 -1.866 0.975** 
ORTE Stock -1.649 0.395 -2.201 1.262** 
Period 2 
COMI GDR -0.302 -0.942 -2.361 1.558** 
COMI Stock -1.164 -0.892 -1.337 1.369** 
HRHO GDR -1.074 -1.334 -2.941 0.969** 
HRHO Stock -1.455 -1.227 -3.029 1.067** 
OCIC GDR 1.451 -2.273 -1.544 3.412** 
OCIC Stock 0.847 -1.993 -2.176 3.372** 
ORTE GDR 0.513 -2.881* -2.628 5.101** 
ORTE Stock 0.941 -3.992** -3.380** 5.088** 
** and * denotes significance at 1% and 5% 
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Table  7-6 Variance-Covariance Matrices for Residuals from VECM 
 Period 1 
Variance-Covariance Matrix  
Period 2 
Variance-Covariance Matrix 
COMI ቀͲǤͲͲʹͲΨ ͲǤͲͲͳͲΨͲǤͲͲͳͲΨ ͲǤͲͲ͵ͲΨቁ ቀ
ͲǤͲͲͶͲΨ ͲǤͲͲͳͲΨ
ͲǤͲͲͳͲΨ ͲǤͲͲͷͲΨቁ 
HRHO ቀͲǤͲͲͳ͹Ψ ͲǤͲʹͲͲΨͲǤͲʹͲͲΨ ͲǤͲ͵ͺͲΨቁ ቀ
ͲǤͲͷʹͲΨ ͲǤͲͳͷͲΨ
ͲǤͲͳͷͲΨ ͲǤͲͶͷͲΨቁ 
OCIC ቀͲǤͲͲͳͲΨ ͲǤͲͲͳͲΨͲǤͲͲͳͲΨ ͲǤͲͲʹͲΨቁ ቀ
ͲǤͲͲͷΨ ͲǤͲͲͳΨ
ͲǤͲͲͳΨ ͲǤͲͲͷΨቁ 







Table  7-7 Price Discovery Measures Period 1 
  Period 1 
  1D  2D  GGDR HLDR HUDR 
HDR 
midpoint 
COMI 0.011 0.302** 96.62% 65.58% 99.95% 82.76% 
HRHO 0.428 1.333** 75.72% 29.21% 98.63% 63.92% 
OCIC -0.050* 0.164** 76.60% 71.10% 96.61% 83.85% 
ORTE -0.057** 0.120** 67.86% 64.48% 89.38% 76.93% 
** and * denotes significance at 1% and 5% 
 
Table  7-8 Price Discovery Measures Period 2 
Period 2 
1D  2D  GGDR HLDR HUDR 
HDR 
midpoint 
COMI -0.030* 0.077** 71.77% 77.46% 89.47% 83.47% 
HRHO -0.101 0.169* 62.57% 49.77% 79.43% 64.60% 
OCIC -0.141** 0.047** 24.88% 5.52% 25.02% 15.27% 
ORTE -0.020** 0.005 18.98% 3.59% 41.10% 22.34% 
** and * denotes significance at 1% and 5%. 
 
Table  7-9 Granger Causality Tests 
  Period 1 Period 2
  F-Statistic Probability F-Statistic Probability
COMI   
  GDR does not Granger Cause Stock 0.155 0.69 8.098 0.00
  Stock does not Granger Cause GDR 48.282 0.00 34.955 0.00
HRHO   
  GDR does not Granger Cause Stock 1.632 0.21 1.733 0.19
  Stock does not Granger Cause GDR 27.817 0.00 5.979 0.02
OCIC   
  GDR does not Granger Cause Stock 18.729 0.00 94.147 0.00
  Stock does not Granger Cause GDR 96.327 0.00 35.747 0.00
ORTE   
  GDR does not Granger Cause Stock 21.388 0.00 8.857 0.00
  Stock does not Granger Cause GDR 49.839 0.00 4.754 0.03

















8 GENERAL DISCUSSION  
A recent survey by Price Water-House Coopers (PWC) on the future of capital 
markets in 2025, shows that the trend is for rising interest amongst companies to list 
in new trading centers outside the current dominating ones. Singapore, China and 
other emerging markets are believed to be the future financial centers and to be the 
choice for future companies seeking to list.  
This trend, combined with the increasing numbers of emerging market firms 
around the world to foreign list abroad, will create new dynamics for capital markets. 
Understanding the complexities, and sometimes absurdities, of how such market 
work, is imperative for the sound working of future financial systems.  
Using a unique intraday dataset for Egyptian and Argentinean cross-listed 
equity, this dissertation examined the pricing behavior of DRs from emerging 
markets relative to their underlying stock. The pricing of emerging market DRs has 
created an interesting  puzzle for previous empirical studies, since they exhibit 
significant deviations from price parity. We confirm this result in our sample with 
daily closing prices, showing that large significant price deviations exist between DRs 
and their underlying stock.  Two questions, however, were so far left unanswered for 
DRs from emerging markets: (1) whether the price deviations reflect real arbitrage 
opportunities between the cross-listed securities and (2) whether the location of price 
discovery shift internationally or stays locally for emerging market DRs.     
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Early studies on the pricing of DRs have confused long run price parity with 
the lack of arbitrage opportunities. More recent results showing violation from price 
parity in DRs from emerging markets, still confuse them for lack of arbitrage 
opportunities,  citing the large trading barriers present in those markets to the lack of 
arbitrage activity, and as such, price deviations signify market segmentation rather 
than profitable arbitrage opportunities.  
We challenge this result, and use a high frequency intraday dataset from two 
emerging markets, Egypt and Argentina, to reveal that not only do large profitable 
arbitrage opportunities exist between their DRs and underlying stock, but that such 
opportunities involve  real arbitrage activity that brings back prices to no-arbitrage 
zones, in which price deviations are not profitable.  
Our result reveals that DRs and their underlying stock truly trade in segmented 
markets that are driven by differential demand curves and investor sentiment. Active 
arbitrageurs in this market truly keep market efficient by intervening to eliminate 
large mispricing between the identical pair. Perfect price parity, however, cannot be 
achieved between the DRs from emerging markets and their underlying stock, due to 
the presence of large trading barriers in those markets.   
On another front, this dissertation also contributes to the literature on the 
location of price discovery in a multi-market setting, by revealing that for most of 
our securities in the sample, the international market in-which the DR trades plays a 
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significant and sometimes dominant role in the pricing of such securities. This result 
shows that information from the international markets gets compounded into the 
pricing of cross-listed securities, revealing on one end the role of cross-listing in 
creating stock market linkages and information flow from large international 
financial centers to small local ones.  
Our sample of Egyptian and Argentinean DRs have proven to be helpful in 
understanding the factors that affect the pricing of DR from emerging market with 
large trading barriers. By examining our sample securities, we find that liquidity and 
activity play important roles in the pricing of DRs. The low liquidity and activity 
create large profitable arbitrage opportunities that persist for longer periods of time. 
Moreover,  liquidity and activity are also important determinants of the location of 
price discovery, as the lower they are in a certain market, the lower is that market’s 
contribution to the price discovery process.  
The low liquidity of emerging market securities have also motivated us to 
develop a more precise methodology for identifying arbitrage opportunities. 
Arbitrage opportunities till now, have been empirically identified through a simple 
measure that compares price deviation between the DR and its underlying stock to a 
static cost parameter. Such a simple measure for identifying arbitrage is not suitable 
for identifying arbitrage opportunities in our complex markets characterized by large 
low liquidity and large trading costs, that include several fixed components that make 
arbitrage only profitable beyond certain threshold. With that we propose using 
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another identification procedure that only identifies a price deviation as an arbitrage 
opportunity if the gross profit from arbitraging it exceeds the cost of arbitrage. 
Our novel procedure proves quite successful, and we are able to identify 
arbitrage opportunities between our sample DRs and their underlying stock. We 
verify the accuracy of our procedure by extracting arbitrage trades from the data set 
around such profitable arbitrage opportunities. Our arbitrage trades provide us with 
the first empirical evidence on the reality of arbitrage in the DR market, beyond what 
statistical models can help us comprehend. Arbitrage plays a key role in the price 
convergence between stocks and in upholding the long run co-integrating 
relationship between DR and underlying stock price.   
While the static pricing analysis of arbitrage reveals that markets are not fully 
integrated, and that prices deviate quite often creating profitable opportunities from 
such mispricing,  more dynamic price discovery model shows that the international 
market contributes to the pricing of DRs in such a way that information flows from 
international to the local market through DRs.  
Our price discovery analysis, shows that in the long run, both the DR and its 
underlying stock are identical securities, following each other and adjusting to 
deviations from their co-integrating relationship, described by the Gonzalo Granger  
vector error correction model for measuring the component share of each market to 
the price discovery process. 
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Several caveats are in order. Our study, while presenting the first intraday 
evidence from DRs from emerging markets, relied on intraday transaction data 
rather than quote data, which is very limited in such markets. While transaction data 
was needed for our arbitrage analysis to extract arbitrage trades, price discovery 
models are argued to be better suited for quote data, which could have allowed us to 
use the Hasbrouck information share methodology and compare at par with other 
results.   
Finally, such evidence as presented here, provides motivation to explore other 
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Sweden 1 Stockholm Stock NASDAQ 08:00- 14:30-21:00 2:00 
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United 39 London Stock New York 08:00- 14:30-21:00 2:00 
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DR Selling at Premium      DR Selling at Discount 
 
1 Foreign Exchange Rate Conversion 6 bps 
2 Trading Costs Fee in Local Markets Table 3-5 for trading costs in our sample markets 
3 Global Custodian Fees Global Settlement Fees of $115 for GDRs and $60 for ADRs and Global 
Safe Keeping Fees of 45bps for GDRs and 22bps for ADRs  
4 DR Conversion Fees of maximum of 5 cents per DR 
5 Trading Costs in Foreign Market Table 3-5 for trading costs in our sample markets 
Source: Bank of New York Mellon DR Converter www.bnym.com and Elkins/McSherry 
Figure A.1 Overview of Arbitrage Operations and its Costs in the DR market 
 
On July 16th 2009 at 9:43:18GMT a bid order comes to the  EGX for OCIC demanding 
2000 shares at EGP196 and there is another ask order for 5000 shares at EGP198 
equivalent to $35.13 converted at the latest EGP/$ exchange rate of $/EGP5.58 at 
10:42:03 and a second later in LSE there is a demand on 1000 shares of the GDR for a bid 
of $35.56 and ask for 2000 GDRs for $35.59. An active arbitrageur will first identify that 
there is a price deviation of 46cents/share since the bundling ratio of GDR to stock for 
OCIC is 1:1 and that she can buy 2000 shares of the underpriced stock on the EGX and 
short sell 2000 share of the overpriced GDR making a gross profit of $920 instantly. 
However, she first needs to identify if this deviation will be profitable to her by calculating 
the following trading costs involved with this arbitrage: 
i. Direct Trading Costs: this includes the commissions, taxes, and fees involved with 
buying and selling in each market. Table 5 summarizes average trading costs in basis 
points of trading in each of the markets in our sample. To be conservative in our 
estimates of the arbitrageur’s trading costs, we will include trading costs estimates 
that include direct and indirect costs of trade. We will also include 6bp/share 
Buy DR-5 Sell Stock-2 Buy USD-1 
Deposit Stock with 
Global Custodian-3 
Convert DR to Stock-
4 
Sell DR-5 Buy Stock-2 Sell USD-1 
Deposit Stock with 
Global Custodian-3 




foreign exchange rate commission for buying Egyptian pounds to convert the stock 
price to dollar. To carry on with our example, the trading costs in Egypt in 2009 
averaged at 27bp per share and in LSE at 23bp per share. This makes the total fees 
of $0.174/share, totaling $348.5 for the arbitrage trade.  
ii. Global Custodian and Safe Keeping Fees: The arbitrageur will then have to deposit the 
shares with a global custodian and pay a fixed one time settlement fee of $115 per 
trade and pay a global safe keeping fee of 45bp/share. This totals another $ 115.5 
iii. DR Conversion Fees: The arbitrageur will then have to instruct the global custodian to 
convert the shares to GDRs by giving instructions to the depository bank which 
charges a maximum of $0.05 per DR issuance fee, which totals another $100.  
The arbitrageur now knows that she will make a net profit of $920-$348.5-$115.5-
$100=$356. Since the trade is profitable, the arbitrageur will then execute the order buying 
2000 shares on the EGX and selling 2000 shares on the GDR. In the intraday trade data, we 
can empirically identify the previous arbitrage by observing the trade or series of trades on 
the EGX at 9:43:20 for 2000 shares at EGP196 and a trade at 9:43:24 for 2000 GDRs $35.5
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10.6 Appendix 6 Example of Extracted Arbitrage Trade Data for Egyptian 
and Argentinean Stocks and DRs 
 
Commercial International Bank COMI
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
    31-Jul-08 11:05:37 10.00 10000
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 200   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 4133   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 61   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 2000   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 200   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 500   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 500   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 40   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 150   
31-Jul-08 11:05:44 9.4 1916   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 200   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 34   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 500   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 1000   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 1500   
31-Jul-08 11:06:19 9.4 1466   
    31-Jul-08 11:06:39 10.00 10000
31-Jul-08 11:06:51 9.4 34   
31-Jul-08 11:06:51 9.4 200   
31-Jul-08 11:06:51 9.4 100   
31-Jul-08 11:06:51 9.4 4666   
31-Jul-08 11:08:33 9.4 5114   
31-Jul-08 11:08:33 9.4 834   
    31-Jul-08 11:08:53 10.00 1750
    31-Jul-08 11:09:24 10.00 6230
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 150   
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 500   
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 4886   
31-Jul-08 11:10:10 9.4 2444   
    31-Jul-08 11:10:42 9.99 676




EGF Hermes HRHO 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
22-Jan-08 9:42:21 20.6 4628.5     
22-Jan-08 9:42:21 20.6 12.5   
22-Jan-08 9:42:21 20.6 50   
22-Jan-08 9:42:21 20.6 3000   
22-Jan-08 9:42:33 20.6 2309   
22-Jan-08 9:42:33 20.6 191   
22-Jan-08 9:42:55 20.6 60   
      22-Jan-08 9:42:57 21.8 10000
    
4-Feb-10 10:50:10 11.6 4400.5     
4-Feb-10 10:50:26 11.6 599.5   
  4-Feb-10 10:52:33 11.3 2500
      4-Feb-10 10:52:37 11.3 2500
 
Orascom Construction ORTE 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
25-Feb-08 9:01:00 15.1 250   
25-Feb-08 9:01:11 15.1 100
25-Feb-08 9:01:11 15.1 100
  25-Feb-08 9:01:34 14.7 1840
  25-Feb-08 9:01:41 14.7 3160
25-Feb-08 9:02:01 15.1 4097
25-Feb-08 9:02:01 15.1 903
25-Feb-08 9:02:24 15.1 97
25-Feb-08 9:02:24 15.1 203   
  
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000   
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 3750
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 4577
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 3073
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 100
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 10000
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 500
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 500
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 5000
31-Mar-08 12:19:32 13.8 62500
  31-Mar-08 12:19:44 13.5 50000
  31-Mar-08 12:19:45 13.5 2940
      31-Mar-08 12:19:45 13.5 47060
  
      10-Feb-10 9:58:16 6 2000
10-Feb-10 9:58:17 6.2 600
231 
 
10-Feb-10 9:58:34 6.2 1000
10-Feb-10 9:58:39 6.2 2000
10-Feb-10 9:58:41 6.2 100
10-Feb-10 9:58:45 6.2 1000
10-Feb-10 9:58:48 6.2 1000
10-Feb-10 9:58:57 6.2 388
10-Feb-10 9:58:57 6.2 12
10-Feb-10 9:58:57 6.2 600
10-Feb-10 9:58:57 6.2 400
10-Feb-10 9:59:11 6.2 1000
10-Feb-10 9:59:22 6.2 1000
10-Feb-10 9:59:22 6.2 600
10-Feb-10 9:59:23 6.2 4000
10-Feb-10 9:59:37 6.2 4000
10-Feb-10 9:59:40 6.2 2000
10-Feb-10 9:59:49 6.2 40
  10-Feb-10 10:00:01 6 2000
10-Feb-10 10:00:04 6.240889 484.2
10-Feb-10 10:00:04 6.240889 1540
10-Feb-10 10:00:04 6.240889 1975.8
10-Feb-10 10:00:05 6.240889 222.2
10-Feb-10 10:00:19 6.240889 100
10-Feb-10 10:00:23 6.240889 300
10-Feb-10 10:00:35 6.240889 202
10-Feb-10 10:00:35 6.240889 460
10-Feb-10 10:00:45 6.240889 200
10-Feb-10 10:00:46 6.240889 138
10-Feb-10 10:00:46 6.240889 62
      10-Feb-10 10:01:44 6 2000
 
Orascom Construction Industries OCIC
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
    30-Mar-09 10:24:35 24.5 3040
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.9 500  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.9 40  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.9 200  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.9 40  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.8 500  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.8 250  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.8 2530  
30-Mar-09 10:24:48 24.8 940  
  30-Mar-09 10:25:29 24.3 3000
  30-Mar-09 10:25:34 24.3 3000
  30-Mar-09 10:25:39 24.3 3000
30-Mar-09 10:25:54 24.8 25  
30-Mar-09 10:25:54 24.8 975  
30-Mar-09 10:26:07 24.8 1000  
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30-Mar-09 10:26:08 24.8 2085  
30-Mar-09 10:26:08 24.8 2742  
30-Mar-09 10:26:08 24.8 63  
30-Mar-09 10:26:08 24.8 100  
30-Mar-09 10:26:08 24.8 10  
30-Mar-09 10:26:16 24.8 2000  
30-Mar-09 10:26:18 24.8 490  
30-Mar-09 10:26:18 24.8 20  
30-Mar-09 10:26:18 24.8 100  
30-Mar-09 10:26:18 24.8 390  
30-Mar-09 10:26:35 24.8 3188    
 
Telecom Egypt ETEL 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
5-Feb-08 9:39:02 20.2 985   
  5-Feb-08 9:41:08 19.5 1000
5-Feb-08 9:42:38 20.2 1000
5-Feb-08 9:43:16 20.2 1050
5-Feb-08 9:43:41 20.2 450
5-Feb-08 9:43:41 20.2 2050
5-Feb-08 9:44:13 20.1 10000
  5-Feb-08 9:44:53 19.5 1000
5-Feb-08 9:45:11 20.1 25000
5-Feb-08 9:45:22 20.1 1000
5-Feb-08 9:46:20 20.1 11950
5-Feb-08 9:46:20 20.1 3355   
        
      5-Nov-09 9:53:59 14 20000
  5-Nov-09 9:54:58 14 400
5-Nov-09 9:58:36 15.6 5000
5-Nov-09 9:58:36 15.6 15000   
        
      16-Nov-09 9:47:32 15 500
16-Nov-09 9:48:10 16.1 2500
  16-Nov-09 9:49:37 15 2000
16-Nov-09 9:49:47 16.0 2500
      16-Nov-09 9:50:06 15 2500
 
Palm Hills PHDC 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
19-Mar-09 11:41:07 5.5 1500         
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  19-Mar-09 11:41:08 5.3 1500 
  19-Mar-09 11:41:08 5.3 1500 
19-Mar-09 11:41:12 5.5 3000   
19-Mar-09 11:41:34 5.5 300   
        19-Mar-09 11:41:46 5.3 1500 
                
23-Jun-09 8:12:40 7.05 200         
23-Jun-09 8:12:40 7.05 1800   
        23-Jun-09 8:12:42 8.3 2000 
 
Banco Macro BMA 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
      4-Nov-08 14:31:17 8.4 100
4-Nov-08 14:31:18 9.8 620   
4-Nov-08 14:31:19 9.8 380   
4-Nov-08 14:31:22 9.8 100   
4-Nov-08 14:31:37 9.8 1000   
4-Nov-08 14:31:47 9.8 1000   
  4-Nov-08 14:31:53 8.5 100
  4-Nov-08 14:32:16 8.5 100
  4-Nov-08 14:32:26 8.5 200
4-Nov-08 14:32:46 9.7 536   
4-Nov-08 14:32:46 9.7 9464   
  4-Nov-08 14:32:46 8.6 9500
      4-Nov-08 14:32:46 8.5 100
          
7-Oct-09 19:27:33 24.7 1.1     
  7-Oct-09 19:27:33 25.1 100
  7-Oct-09 19:29:20 25.0 300
  7-Oct-09 19:29:20 25.2 500
7-Oct-09 19:30:06 24.7 96.4   
7-Oct-09 19:30:07 24.7 500   
7-Oct-09 19:30:07 24.7 20.8   
      7-Oct-09 19:31:07 25.0 100
          
  11-Nov-09 19:10:32 31.9 200
11-Nov-09 19:11:19 31.1 37.2   
11-Nov-09 19:11:29 31.1 12.4   
11-Nov-09 19:12:00 31.1 24.5   
11-Nov-09 19:12:59 31.2 175.5   
  11-Nov-09 19:14:36 31.9 200
11-Nov-09 19:15:11 31.5 13   
11-Nov-09 19:15:11 31.5 6.1   
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11-Nov-09 19:15:28 31.1 4.5   
11-Nov-09 19:22:22 31.2 166   
  11-Nov-09 19:26:01 31.8 400
11-Nov-09 19:26:03 31.2 34   
11-Nov-09 19:26:04 31.2 366     
 
BBVA Banco Frances FRA 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
        10-Mar-08 19:14:47 7.4 200 
10-Mar-08 19:14:51 7.6 20.666667   
10-Mar-08 19:14:52 7.6 200   
10-Mar-08 19:14:52 7.6 200   
10-Mar-08 19:14:52 7.6 133.33333   
10-Mar-08 19:14:52 7.6 166.66667   
10-Mar-08 19:14:52 7.6 79.333333   
10-Mar-08 19:14:56 7.6 87.333333   
10-Mar-08 19:14:57 7.6 112.66667   
        10-Mar-08 19:14:59 7.4 800 
                
        23-Oct-08 19:01:16 2.2 300 
23-Oct-08 19:02:11 2.5 166.66667   
23-Oct-08 19:02:12 2.5 133.33333   
  23-Oct-08 19:02:14 2.2 600 
  23-Oct-08 19:03:18 2.2 600 
  23-Oct-08 19:03:21 2.2 200 
  23-Oct-08 19:03:23 2.2 100 
  23-Oct-08 19:03:25 2.2 100 
  23-Oct-08 19:04:21 2.2 400 
  23-Oct-08 19:04:21 2.2 100 
  23-Oct-08 19:04:57 2.2 5000 
  23-Oct-08 19:04:57 2.2 5000 
23-Oct-08 19:10:18 2.5 200   
23-Oct-08 19:10:18 2.5 198   
23-Oct-08 19:10:19 2.5 1146.3333   
23-Oct-08 19:10:19 2.5 3333.3333   
  23-Oct-08 19:10:44 2.2 10000 
23-Oct-08 19:10:45 2.5 10000   
  23-Oct-08 19:11:02 2.2 100 
23-Oct-08 19:11:06 2.5 100         
                
        3-Apr-09 15:20:03 2.5 100 
  3-Apr-09 15:20:05 2.5 100 
3-Apr-09 15:20:20 2.6 300   
  3-Apr-09 15:22:02 2.5 100 
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  3-Apr-09 15:22:13 2.5 100 
  3-Apr-09 15:23:06 2.5 1000 
3-Apr-09 15:23:18 2.6 36.666667   
3-Apr-09 15:23:19 2.6 522.66667   
3-Apr-09 15:28:06 2.6 540.66667         
                
        8-Jun-09 19:43:46 4.6 2200 
8-Jun-09 19:43:56 4.8 2200   
  8-Jun-09 19:44:23 4.6 8500 
8-Jun-09 19:44:35 4.8 7800   
  8-Jun-09 19:44:54 4.6 1400 
8-Jun-09 19:45:06 4.8 1400   
  8-Jun-09 19:45:41 4.6 1700 
8-Jun-09 19:45:46 4.8 1600   
8-Jun-09 19:46:49 4.8 793         
 
Edenor EDN 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
30-Apr-08 19:01:23 19.2 500         
30-Apr-08 19:01:23 19.2 138   
30-Apr-08 19:01:28 19.2 500   
30-Apr-08 19:01:35 19.2 100   
  30-Apr-08 19:01:50 18.8 500 
  30-Apr-08 19:01:50 18.8 500 
        30-Apr-08 19:01:51 18.8 100 
                
15-Jan-09 17:43:11 4.8 200         
15-Jan-09 17:44:47 4.8 300   
15-Jan-09 17:44:47 4.8 250   
15-Jan-09 17:44:47 4.8 500   





Grupo Financiero Galicia GFG 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
        21-May-08 16:02:35 6.0 800 
21-May-08 16:03:36 6.2 1200   
  21-May-08 16:03:49 6.0 100 
  21-May-08 16:03:49 6.0 100 
  21-May-08 16:03:49 6.0 100 
        21-May-08 16:03:49 6.0 100 
                
        3-Jun-08 18:40:58 5.5 100 
  3-Jun-08 18:41:23 5.5 100 
3-Jun-08 18:41:33 5.8 200   
  3-Jun-08 18:41:39 5.5 100 
  3-Jun-08 18:41:46 5.5 500 
3-Jun-08 18:41:47 5.8 100   
3-Jun-08 18:41:56 5.8 487.3   
3-Jun-08 18:41:56 5.8 12.7   
  3-Jun-08 18:42:03 5.5 100 
3-Jun-08 18:42:11 5.8 100   
  3-Jun-08 18:42:24 5.5 100 
  3-Jun-08 18:42:36 5.5 100 
  3-Jun-08 18:42:55 5.5 100 
3-Jun-08 18:43:16 5.8 100   
3-Jun-08 18:43:24 5.8 200         
                
24-Apr-09 16:15:46 2.1 500         
24-Apr-09 16:16:28 2.1 3000         
24-Apr-09 16:16:44 2.1 3630         
        24-Apr-09 16:19:13 2.0 5000 
24-Apr-09 16:19:19 2.1 1000         
24-Apr-09 16:19:19 2.1 1500         
24-Apr-09 16:19:54 2.1 2500         
 
IRSA 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
8-Jul-08 19:54:28 11.2 21.1         
8-Jul-08 19:54:28 11.2 60.7   
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8-Jul-08 19:54:33 11.2 239.3   
8-Jul-08 19:54:33 11.2 184.7   
8-Jul-08 19:54:33 11.2 176   
  8-Jul-08 19:54:41 10.8 300 
  8-Jul-08 19:54:46 10.8 100 
  8-Jul-08 19:54:48 10.8 100 
8-Jul-08 19:55:10 11.2 8.7   
8-Jul-08 19:55:59 11.2 91.3         
                
3-Nov-08 16:14:04 4.4 500         
  3-Nov-08 16:14:19 3.7 200 
  3-Nov-08 16:14:19 3.7 300 
    
  3-Nov-08 16:42:22 3.7 100 
  3-Nov-08 16:42:22 3.7 200 
  3-Nov-08 16:42:24 3.7 100 
  3-Nov-08 16:42:24 3.7 100 
3-Nov-08 16:42:42 4.3 17.8   
3-Nov-08 16:43:09 4.3 500   
3-Nov-08 16:43:10 4.3 100   
        3-Nov-08 16:43:17 3.7 100 
                
22-Dec-09 14:57:06 9.5 500         
22-Dec-09 14:57:06 9.5 140   
22-Dec-09 14:57:15 9.5 200   
22-Dec-09 14:57:19 9.6 602.4   
22-Dec-09 14:57:19 9.6 500   
  22-Dec-09 14:57:27 10.0 1000 
  22-Dec-09 15:04:06 10.0 200 
  22-Dec-09 15:09:29 10.0 300 
22-Dec-09 15:09:56 9.6 41   
22-Dec-09 15:12:00 9.7 164   
22-Dec-09 15:12:00 9.7 96   




Metro Gas MET 
Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
22-May-08 15:00:47 5.3 1000   
  22-May-08 15:00:50 5.5 1000 
  22-May-08 15:00:51 5.4 100 
  22-May-08 15:00:52 5.4 100 
22-May-08 15:00:53 5.3 1000         
                
20-May-08 19:09:40 3.7 500         
  20-May-08 19:09:51 3.4 500 
  20-May-08 19:11:29 3.5 1000 
20-May-08 19:11:45 3.7 130   
20-May-08 19:18:07 3.7 100   
20-May-08 19:20:52 3.6 85.2   
        20-May-08 19:58:52 3.6 300 
                
        3-Nov-08 14:32:47 1.3 200 
3-Nov-08 14:41:08 1.6 200   
  3-Nov-08 14:41:30 1.3 200 
  3-Nov-08 14:41:31 1.3 500 
3-Nov-08 14:41:41 1.6 700   
3-Nov-08 14:51:11 1.6 400   
3-Nov-08 14:51:16 1.6 469.6   
3-Nov-08 14:51:16 1.7 700   
3-Nov-08 14:52:08 1.7 830.4   
  3-Nov-08 15:02:03 1.3 300 
  3-Nov-08 15:02:05 1.3 400 
3-Nov-08 15:06:04 1.7 169.6   
3-Nov-08 15:06:04 1.7 430.4   
3-Nov-08 15:09:40 1.7 500   
3-Nov-08 15:25:51 1.7 69.6   
3-Nov-08 15:25:51 1.7 948.4   
  3-Nov-08 15:31:37 1.3 100 
3-Nov-08 15:38:01 1.7 51.6   
  3-Nov-08 15:40:02 1.4 600 
3-Nov-08 15:40:07 1.7 600   
3-Nov-08 15:46:10 1.7 38.4   
3-Nov-08 15:49:58 1.7 261.6   
  3-Nov-08 15:50:06 1.4 300 
  3-Nov-08 15:50:12 1.4 300 






Stock Trades DR Trades 
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol 
26-Jun-08 18:15:45 3.5 400         
26-Jun-08 18:15:46 3.5 20   
26-Jun-08 18:15:46 3.5 200   
26-Jun-08 18:15:47 3.5 150   
26-Jun-08 18:15:47 3.5 230   
        26-Jun-08 18:15:55 3.2 1000 
                
        15-Sep-08 19:22:33 3.0 100 
  15-Sep-08 19:22:34 3.0 800 
15-Sep-08 19:22:38 3.2 100   
15-Sep-08 19:22:39 3.2 900   
  15-Sep-08 19:22:41 3.0 1000 
15-Sep-08 19:22:43 3.2 785.2   
15-Sep-08 19:22:43 3.2 214.8         
                
15-Sep-08 19:40:07 3.2 100         
15-Sep-08 19:46:07 3.2 100   
15-Sep-08 19:47:27 3.2 500   
  15-Sep-08 19:47:38 3.0 100 
        15-Sep-08 19:47:39 3.1 400 
                
        5-Nov-08 15:03:16 2.0 100 
  5-Nov-08 15:03:16 2.0 200 
5-Nov-08 15:03:22 2.3 1000   
  5-Nov-08 15:03:30 2.0 400 
5-Nov-08 15:03:34 2.3 700   
5-Nov-08 15:16:27 2.3 300   
5-Nov-08 15:16:27 2.3 340.8   
5-Nov-08 15:29:20 2.3 100   
5-Nov-08 15:34:20 2.3 59.2   
5-Nov-08 15:34:20 2.3 600   
5-Nov-08 15:34:20 2.3 299.4   
5-Nov-08 15:36:46 2.3 100.6   
5-Nov-08 15:36:54 2.3 155.6   
  5-Nov-08 16:00:57 2.0 100 
5-Nov-08 16:05:15 2.3 389.6   
5-Nov-08 16:16:07 2.3 654.8   
5-Nov-08 16:16:07 2.3 3345.2   
  5-Nov-08 16:16:43 2.0 100 
  5-Nov-08 16:17:23 2.0 200 
  5-Nov-08 16:17:23 2.0 100 
5-Nov-08 16:17:28 2.3 1000   
240 
 
  5-Nov-08 16:17:37 1.9 600 
  5-Nov-08 16:17:51 2.0 100 
  5-Nov-08 16:17:51 2.0 500 
5-Nov-08 16:23:55 2.3 400   
5-Nov-08 16:30:59 2.3 200         
                
        14-Jul-09 13:57:42 2.1 100 
14-Jul-09 14:00:10 2.3 300   
14-Jul-09 14:00:10 2.3 10   
  14-Jul-09 14:01:19 2.1 400 
14-Jul-09 14:07:14 2.3 106.4   
14-Jul-09 14:10:06 2.3 293.6   
14-Jul-09 14:10:57 2.3 396.4   
14-Jul-09 14:50:12 2.3 279.4   
14-Jul-09 14:54:35 2.3 3.6   
  14-Jul-09 15:26:55 2.2 100 
        14-Jul-09 15:43:55 2.2 100 
 
Cresud CRESY 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
22-Jan-08 15:06:07 16.9 0.9   
22-Jan-08 15:06:07 16.9 199.1
  22-Jan-08 15:06:31 16.5 300
  22-Jan-08 15:06:46 16.4 200
22-Jan-08 15:06:54 16.9 0.9
22-Jan-08 15:06:54 16.8 99.1   
      
    19-Feb-08 14:52:44 18.5 280
  19-Feb-08 14:52:44 18.6 100
19-Feb-08 14:52:51 19.0 380
  19-Feb-08 14:54:57 18.5 400
    19-Feb-08 14:54:57 18.6 100
      
    24-Jun-09 17:11:08 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:12:28 9.4 800
  24-Jun-09 17:12:28 9.4 400
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 400
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 100
241 
 
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.3 100
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:13:31 9.4 500
  24-Jun-09 17:13:32 9.4 100
24-Jun-09 17:13:36 9.8 1000
  24-Jun-09 17:14:13 9.4 600
  24-Jun-09 17:14:13 9.4 200
  24-Jun-09 17:14:13 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:14:13 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:14:13 9.4 100
24-Jun-09 17:14:18 9.8 1000   
  24-Jun-09 17:14:26 9.4 200
  24-Jun-09 17:14:26 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:14:26 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:14:26 9.4 100
24-Jun-09 17:14:29 9.8 1000
  24-Jun-09 17:14:33 9.4 200
  24-Jun-09 17:14:33 9.4 200
  24-Jun-09 17:14:33 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:14:33 9.4 100
24-Jun-09 17:14:39 9.8 400   
24-Jun-09 17:15:08 9.8 600   
  24-Jun-09 17:15:43 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:15:50 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:18 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:21 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:24 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:26 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:28 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:31 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:33 9.4 100
  24-Jun-09 17:16:35 9.4 100
24-Jun-09 17:16:45 9.8 1000   
 
APSA SAM 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
    24-Jun-08 18:44:39 11.7 100
  24-Jun-08 18:44:39 11.7 100
  24-Jun-08 18:44:39 11.7 100
  24-Jun-08 18:44:39 11.7 100
24-Jun-08 18:44:54 13.9 50
24-Jun-08 18:44:54 13.9 350
  24-Jun-08 18:45:02 11.7 100
24-Jun-08 18:45:10 13.9 100
  24-Jun-08 18:46:20 11.7 100
  24-Jun-08 18:46:20 11.8 100
  24-Jun-08 18:46:20 11.8 100
242 
 
  24-Jun-08 18:46:20 11.8 100
24-Jun-08 18:46:26 13.9 400
24-Jun-08 19:13:01 14.1 87.5
24-Jun-08 19:13:01 13.9 112.5
24-Jun-08 19:21:32 13.9 287.5
24-Jun-08 19:21:44 13.9 12.5
24-Jun-08 19:22:45 13.9 12.5
    24-Jun-08 19:25:13 12.0 300
    24-Jun-08 19:25:27 12.0 400
    24-Jun-08 19:30:52 12.1 200
24-Jun-08 19:35:45 13.9 50
24-Jun-08 19:35:46 13.7 12.5
    24-Jun-08 19:46:10 12 400
24-Jun-08 19:46:14 13.9 125
    24-Jun-08 19:49:13 12 200
 
YPF 
Stock Trades DR Trades
Date Time Price$ Vol Date Time Price$ Vol
    23-Jun-08 18:10:30 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:10:58 50.4 500
  23-Jun-08 18:11:02 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:11:05 50.4 500
  23-Jun-08 18:11:10 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:11:28 50.4 500
  23-Jun-08 18:11:31 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:15:38 50.4 1000
  23-Jun-08 18:15:47 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:15:47 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:16:07 50.4 1000
  23-Jun-08 18:16:12 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:16:12 47.7 500
23-Jun-08 18:18:04 50.4 2182
  23-Jun-08 18:18:06 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:18:06 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:18:06 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:18:06 47.7 500
  23-Jun-08 18:57:34 47.7 100
  23-Jun-08 19:09:00 47.7 100
  23-Jun-08 19:17:49 47.7 100
23-Jun-08 19:40:23 51.3 18   
      
14-Oct-09 14:47:04 39.3 100   
  14-Oct-09 14:47:14 40.5 100
14-Oct-09 14:52:08 39.5 100
  14-Oct-09 14:52:16 40.5 100
14-Oct-09 14:55:43 39.8 22
14-Oct-09 14:55:44 39.8 100
243 
 
14-Oct-09 15:07:05 39.8 45
  14-Oct-09 15:12:42 40.5 100
14-Oct-09 15:12:49 39.8 100   
      
7-Nov-08 19:16:00 55.4 100   
  7-Nov-08 19:16:03 47.8 100
7-Nov-08 19:20:19 55.4 100
7-Nov-08 19:20:29 55.4 100
7-Nov-08 19:20:36 55.4 100
7-Nov-08 19:20:47 55.4 100
7-Nov-08 19:20:55 55.4 100
  7-Nov-08 19:21:11 47.5 100
7-Nov-08 19:22:05 55.4 300
  7-Nov-08 19:22:08 47.3 100
7-Nov-08 19:22:31 55.7 14
7-Nov-08 19:27:49 55.4 386
  7-Nov-08 19:27:55 47.1 100
  7-Nov-08 19:29:10 47.5 200
  7-Nov-08 19:29:10 47.5 100
  7-Nov-08 19:32:13 47.5 100
7-Nov-08 19:38:34 55.4 163
7-Nov-08 19:40:48 55.4 100

















































































































































10.10 Appendix 10 Price Deviation by Hour of Overlap 
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